Extending Bayesian Models of the Rubber Hand Illusion

2020 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 127-160 ◽  
Author(s):  
Piotr Litwin

Abstract Human body sense is surprisingly flexible — in the Rubber Hand Illusion (RHI), precisely administered visuo-tactile stimulation elicits a sense of ownership over a fake hand. The general consensus is that there are certain semantic top-down constraints on which objects may be incorporated in this way: in particular, to-be-embodied objects should be structurally similar to a visual representation stored in an internal body model. However, empirical evidence shows that the sense of ownership may extend to objects strikingly distinct in morphology and structure (e.g., robotic arms) and the hypothesis about the relevance of appearance lacks direct empirical support. Probabilistic multisensory integration approaches constitute a promising alternative. However, the recent Bayesian models of RHI limit too strictly the possible factors influencing likelihood and prior probability distributions. In this paper, I analyse how Bayesian models of RHI could be extended. The introduction of skin-based spatial information can account for the cross-compensation of sensory signals giving rise to RHI. Furthermore, addition of Bayesian Coupling Priors, depending on (1) internal learned models of relatedness (coupling strength) of sensory cues, (2) scope of temporal binding windows, and (3) extension of peripersonal space, would allow quantification of individual tendencies to integrate divergent visual and somatosensory signals. The extension of Bayesian models would yield an empirically testable proposition accounting comprehensively for a wide spectrum of RHI-related phenomena and rendering appearance-oriented internal body models explanatorily redundant.

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Piotr Litwin

Human body sense is surprisingly flexible – precisely administered multisensory stimulation may result in the illusion that an external object is part of one’s body. There seems to be a general consensus that there are certain top-down constraints on which objects may be incorporated: in particular, to-be-embodied objects should be structurally similar to a visual representation stored in an internal body model for a shift in one’s body image to occur. However, empirical evidence contradicts the body model hypothesis: the sense of ownership may be spread over objects strikingly distinct in morphology and structure (e.g., robotic arms or empty space) and direct empirical support for the theory is currently lacking. As an alternative, based on the example of the rubber hand illusion (RHI), I propose a multisensory integration account of how the sense of ownership is induced. In this account, the perception of one’s own body is a regular type of multisensory perception and multisensory integration processes are not only necessary but also sufficient for embodiment. In this paper, I propose how RHI can be modeled with the use of Maximum Likelihood Estimation and natural correlation rules. I also discuss how Bayesian Coupling Priors and idiosyncrasies in sensory processing render prior distributions interindividually variable, accounting for large interindividual differences in susceptibility to RHI. Taken together, the proposed model accounts for exceptional malleability of human body perception, fortifies existing bottom-up multisensory integration theories with top-down models of relatedness of sensory cues, and generates testable and disambiguating predictions.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Piotr Litwin

Human body sense is surprisingly flexible – precisely administered multisensory stimulation may result in the illusion that an external object is part of one’s body. There seems to be a general consensus that there are certain top-down constraints on which objects may be incorporated: in particular, to-be-embodied objects should be structurally similar to a visual representation stored in an internal body model for a shift in one’s body image to occur. However, empirical evidence contradicts the body model hypothesis: the sense of ownership may be spread over objects strikingly distinct in morphology and structure (e.g., robotic arms or empty space) and direct empirical support for the theory is currently lacking. As an alternative, based on the example of the rubber hand illusion (RHI), I propose a multisensory integration account of how the sense of ownership is induced. In this account, the perception of one’s own body is a regular type of multisensory perception and multisensory integration processes are not only necessary but also sufficient for embodiment. In this paper, I propose how RHI can be modeled with the use of Maximum Likelihood Estimation and natural correlation rules. I also discuss how Bayesian Coupling Priors and idiosyncrasies in sensory processing render prior distributions interindividually variable, accounting for large interindividual differences in susceptibility to RHI. Taken together, the proposed model accounts for exceptional malleability of human body perception, fortifies existing bottom-up multisensory integration theories with top-down models of relatedness of sensory cues, and generates testable and disambiguating predictions.


2020 ◽  
Vol 82 (8) ◽  
pp. 4084-4095
Author(s):  
Roberto Erro ◽  
Angela Marotta ◽  
Mirta Fiorio

Abstract In the rubber hand illusion (RHI), simultaneous brush stroking of a subject’s hidden hand and a visible rubber hand induces a transient illusion of the latter to “feel like it’s my hand” and a proprioceptive drift of the hidden own hand toward the rubber hand. Recent accounts of the RHI have suggested that the illusion would only occur if weighting of conflicting sensory information and their subsequent integration results in a statistically plausible compromise. In three different experiments, we investigated the role of distance between the two hands as well as their proximity to the body’s midline in influencing the occurrence of the illusion. Overall, the results suggest that the illusion is abolished when placing the two hands apart, therefore increasing the mismatch between the visual and proprioceptive modality, whereas the proximity of the two hands to the body’s midline plays only a minor role on the subjective report of the illusion. This might be driven by the response properties of visuotactile bimodal cells encoding the peripersonal space around the hand.


2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Naoki Arizono ◽  
Yuji Ohmura ◽  
Shiro Yano ◽  
Toshiyuki Kondo

The self-identification, which is called sense of ownership, has been researched through methodology of rubber hand illusion (RHI) because of its simple setup. Although studies with neuroimaging technique, such as fMRI, revealed that several brain areas are associated with the sense of ownership, near-infrared spectroscopy (NIRS) has not yet been utilized. Here we introduced an automated setup to induce RHI, measured the brain activity during the RHI with NIRS, and analyzed the functional connectivity so as to understand dynamical brain relationship regarding the sense of ownership. The connectivity was evaluated by multivariate Granger causality. In this experiment, the peaks of oxy-Hb on right frontal and right motor related areas during the illusion were significantly higher compared with those during the nonillusion. Furthermore, by analyzing the NIRS recordings, we found a reliable connectivity from the frontal to the motor related areas during the illusion. This finding suggests that frontal cortex and motor related areas communicate with each other when the sense of ownership is induced. The result suggests that the sense of ownership is related to neural mechanism underlying human motor control, and it would be determining whether motor learning (i.e., neural plasticity) will occur. Thus RHI with the functional connectivity analysis will become an appropriate biomarker for neurorehabilitation.


Perception ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 48 (9) ◽  
pp. 882-891 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paweł Motyka ◽  
Piotr Litwin

Rubber hand illusion is caused by spatiotemporally congruent visuotactile stimulation which induces a sense of ownership towards a fake limb. We tested two predictions of the Bayesian bottom-up model; namely, that the strength of the illusion is inversely proportional to (a) the distance separating hands and (b) the precision of proprioceptive signals. To manipulate distance, we displaced participants’ hands to either a position close to (8 cm) or far from (24 cm) the rubber hand. Before manipulation, we assessed proprioceptive abilities in a task requiring active reproduction of one’s arm’s position. Proprioceptive precision was operationalised as inversely related to the variance of the estimations. Multiple regression showed that both for subjective and physiological measures neither distance, nor proprioceptive precision, nor their interaction were predictors of illusion strength. Bayes factor analyses provided evidence for null effects. Our findings suggest the limited relevance of proprioception for the strength of visuo-haptically induced rubber hand illusion.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Warrick Roseboom ◽  
Peter Lush

The rubber hand illusion (RHI), in which participants report experiences of ownership over a fake hand, appears to demonstrate that subjective ownership over one’s body can be easily disrupted. In RHI, ownership is typically quantified through ratings of agreement with statements putatively about body ownership. It was recently shown that propensity to agree with these statements is correlated with trait phenomenological control (the ability to generate experience to meet expectancies arising from direct or indirect suggestion) and that existing methods of controlling for suggestion effects in RHI are invalid. Here, we present the results of simulated experiments that mimic standard practice in RHI studies, using real participant data. In each experiment the sample was biased in selection for trait phenomenological control. Using samples comprised of participants higher in trait phenomenological control almost guarantees that an experiment provides evidence for RHI. By contrast, samples comprised of only participants lower in trait phenomenological control find evidence for RHI only around half the time (and “ownership” experience just 4% of the time). It is therefore likely that existing RHI experiments have studied phenomenological control by proxy. Previous RHI studies cannot be used to make inferences about the sense of ownership in humans generally.


Author(s):  
José Luis Bermúdez

In the last 20 years, a robust experimental paradigm has emerged for studying the structure of bodily experience, focusing primarily on what it is to experience one’s body as one’s own. The initial impetus came from the rubber hand illusion (RHI) first demonstrated by Botvinick and Cohen, subsequently extended by various researchers to generate illusions of ownership at the level of the body as a whole. This paper identifies some problems with how ownership is discussed in the context of bodily illusions, and then shows how those problems can be addressed through a model of the experienced space of the body. Section 1 briefly reviews the bodily illusions literature and its significance for cognitive science and philosophy. Section 2 expresses reservations with the concept of ownership in terms of which the RHI and other illusions are standardly framed. I offer three hypotheses for the source of our putative “sense of ownership”. The main body of the paper focuses on the third hypothesis, which is that judgments of ownership are grounded in the distinctive way that we experience the space of the body.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arran T Reader ◽  
Victoria S Trifonova ◽  
H. Henrik Ehrsson

Body ownership refers to the distinct sensation that our observed body belongs to us, which is believed to stem from multisensory integration. The rubber hand illusion (RHI) provides the most well-known evidence for this proposal: synchronous (but not asynchronous) stroking of a fake hand and a participant’s real hidden hand can induce a sense of ownership over the false limb. Whilst the RHI may interfere with object-directed action and alter motor cortical activity, it is not yet clear whether a sense of ownership over an artificial hand has functional consequences for movement production per se. As such, we performed two motion-tracking experiments (n=117) to examine the effects of the RHI on the reaction time, acceleration, and velocity of rapid index finger abduction. We also examined whether subjective components of the illusion and the associated changes in hand position sense (proprioceptive drift) were correlated with changes in the kinematic variables. We observed convincing evidence that the induction of the RHI did not alter any kinematic variables. Moreover, the subjective sensations of rubber hand ownership, referral of touch, and agency did not convincingly correlate with kinematic variables, and nor did proprioceptive drift, suggesting that changes in body representation elicited by the RHI may not influence basic movement. Whilst experiment 1 suggested that individuals reporting a greater sensation of the real hand disappearing performed movements with smaller acceleration and velocity following illusion induction, we did not replicate this effect in a second experiment, suggesting that these effects may be small or not particularly robust.


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