Triple Helix: The Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, Roma and Racial Discrimination

2016 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 112-125 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claude Cahn

The judgment of 16 July 2015 is ecj’s first substantive ruling in a case concerning racial discrimination against Roma. This is noteworthy, given the centrality of Roma to the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights in the area of discrimination (on the European Court of Human Rights, Roma and racial discrimination, see C. Cahn (2015), ‘Triple Helix: The Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, Roma and Racial Discrimination’, in: Claude Cahn, Human Rights, State Sovereignty and Medical Ethics, Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, pp. 106–148.). The ecj ruling in the chez case is important for a number of reasons, including for recognizing that the ban on discrimination by association applies also to cases of indirect discrimination. Its most significant contribution however is its reflections on the role of stigma in driving discrimination based on racial or ethnic origin. Also of note is its rejection of a number of approaches used in national law – in Bulgaria and elsewhere – as incompatible with European Union anti-discrimination law. The judgment is among the most important ecj rulings to date on discrimination. The current article discusses some of the noteworthy aspects of the case.


2009 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 221-234 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marie-Bénédicte Dembour

AbstractThe European Court of Human Rights has recently developed its jurisprudence related to racial discrimination in highly significant ways. The Court has rightly been applauded for abandoning its requirement that racial discrimination be proved 'beyond reasonable doubt' and for endorsing the concept of indirect discrimination, allowing it, in the last five years, to begin to find states from 'eastern Europe' in violation of the Convention for having discriminated against especially Roma applicants. While welcome, these new developments should not detract from the need to continue asking difficult questions, including the following: why has it taken decades for the Court to start finding a violation of Article 14 on grounds of race? Why are cases, such as Menson v. United Kingdom concerning the slow reaction of the police in investigating the lethal attack of a black man, not found admissible? Can we expect the Court, created in a region which largely built itself upon colonialism, to generate mechanisms fit to tackle racism? In the past, judges themselves have provided the most virulent critique of the Court's inability to tackle racism. Migrants still remain to benefit from their progressive stance in relation to Article 14 claims based on grounds of race.


2006 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 421-431 ◽  
Author(s):  
Morag Goodwin

On 7 February 2006, a chamber of the European Court of Human Rights gave judgment in the much awaited ‘Ostrava case’, which challenged the placing of disproportionate numbers of Romani children in ‘special schools’ for the learning impaired in the Czech Republic. This practice, widespread across Central and Eastern Europe, amounts in effect to racial segregation and denies Romani children access to a standard of education comparable to their non-Romani peers. The Ostrava case, taking eight months to assemble and seven years to reach judgment day in Strasbourg, represented the centre-piece of the litigation strategy of the Romani rights movement. The decision of the Strasbourg Court to ignore the evidence of indirect racial discrimination by a 6-1 majority represents not only a setback for those working for the improvement of the situation of the Roma – widely acknowledged as the most disadvantaged, discriminated and marginalised group in Europe – but also for the crystallisation of non-discrimination norms in Europe.


2021 ◽  
pp. 092405192110539
Author(s):  
Karin de Vries ◽  
Thomas Spijkerboer*

In the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) the right of States to control migration is firmly established despite strong indications that the effects of migration control are not racially neutral. In this article we attempt to understand how it is possible that the doctrine of sovereign migration control is not considered to breach the prohibition of racial discrimination. We argue that the ECtHR’s approach to migration and racial discrimination fits a pattern in the historical development of migration law whereby the right to travel, and the power of States to restrict this right, have been consistently defined in such a way as to protect the interests of the predominantly white population of today's global North. Hence, the ease with which the racialised impact of migration control is accepted as normal and compatible with the prohibition of racial discrimination is consistent with migration law's long history as part of colonial and postcolonial relations.


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