WOULD THE UNITED STATES DOCTRINE OF PREVENTIVE WAR BE JUSTIFIED AS A UNITED NATIONS DOCTRINE?

Author(s):  
Gregory A. Barton

While a few positive stories on organic farming appeared in the 1970s most mainstream press coverage mocked or dismissed organic farmers and consumers. Nevertheless, the growing army of consumer shoppers at health food stores in the United States made the movement impossible to ignore. The Washington Post and other newspapers shifted from negative caricatures of organic farming to a supportive position, particularly after the USDA launched an organic certification scheme in the United States under the leadership of Robert Bergland. Certification schemes in Europe and other major markets followed, leading to initiatives by the United Nations for the harmonization of organic certification through multilateral agencies. As organic standards proliferated in the 1990s the United Nations stepped in to resolve the regulatory fragmentation creating a global market for organic goods.


1985 ◽  
Vol 47 ◽  
pp. 4-5
Author(s):  
Paul F. Diehl ◽  
Michael J. Montgomery

Simulation is an increasingly popular pedagogical device; much of the recent literature on the theory and practice of political science instruction attests to this. Probably the most popular simulation device is called model United Nations. In recent articles in Teaching Political Science and NEWS for Teachers of Political Science, William Hazelton and James Jacob have described Model United Nations in glowing terms, focusing on one particular conference and completely ignoring the rest of the 200 or more conferences held annually across the United States.Like Jacob and Hazelton, we recognize the great potential value of United Nations simulations in trying to illuminate the often confusing politics of international organizations. As former participants and directors of these programs, however, we are keenly aware of the shortcomings and difficulties associated with the existing structure of model U.N. programs.


2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 457-459
Author(s):  
Kai He ◽  
T. V. Paul ◽  
Anders Wivel

The rise of “the rest,” especially China, has triggered an inevitable transformation of the so-called liberal international order. Rising powers have started to both challenge and push for the reform of existing multilateral institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and to create new ones, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). The United States under the Trump administration, on the other hand, has retreated from the international institutions that the country once led or helped to create, including the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); the Paris Agreement; the Iran nuclear deal; the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty; the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO); and the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC). The United States has also paralyzed the ability of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to settle trade disputes by blocking the appointment of judges to its appellate body. Moreover, in May 2020, President Trump announced his decision to quit the Open Skies Treaty, an arms control regime designed to promote transparency among its members regarding military activities. During the past decade or so, both Russia and the United States have been dismantling multilateral arms control treaties one by one while engaging in new nuclear buildups at home.


Author(s):  
Francesco Giumelli ◽  
Michal Onderco

Abstract While the current practice of the United Nations Security Council, the European Union, and the United States leans towards imposing only targeted sanctions in most of the cases, private actors often complain about inability to process financial transactions, ship goods, or deliver services in countries where sanctions targets are located. The impact of sanctions often ends up being widespread and indiscriminate because sanctions are implemented by for-profit actors. This article investigates how for-profit actors relate to the imposition of sanctions, how they reflect them in their decisions, and how they interact with the public authorities. The findings of our research show that for-profit actors, with the possible exception of the largest multinationals, do not engage with public authorities before the imposition of sanctions. The behaviour of for-profit actors in the implementation phase is in line with the assumption of firms and business as profit-maximisers. Weighting the profits from business against the costs of (non-)compliance and make the decisions that in their view maximise their profit. Indeed, de-risking seems to be the most common approach by the companies due to the uncertainties produced by the multiple and overlapping sanctions regimes imposed by the United Nations, the European Union, and the United States.


1957 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 495-496

Seventh United Nations Technical Assistance Conference: At the Seventh UN Technical Assistance Conference, which met at Headquarters on October 17, 1956, under the presidency of Sir Leslie Munro (New Zealand), 63 governments pledged $14,940,000; this sum excluded the amount to be pledged by the United States. Several participating countries, including the Federal Republic of Germany, Indonesia and El Salvador, were unable to announce their contributions at the Conference as negotiations had not been completed


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