Contest for Dominance: US–China Rivalry in Asia

China Report ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 56 (4) ◽  
pp. 484-500
Author(s):  
Mintu Barua

There is an ongoing debate whether China is a satisfied power or a dissatisfied revisionist power. On the basis of the concept of regime insecurity and power transition theory, this article argues that the resolution of this debate mainly depends on some essentially interrelated complex factors—China’s assertive behaviour, China’s core interests, China’s internal security, and China’s involvement in territorial disputes. Moreover, this article examines the validity of the usual claim of power transition theory that the dominant power is always satisfied with the status quo, and contrary to this idea of power transition theory, this article suggests that the dominant power can be dissatisfied and revisionist too if its hegemony is under threat.

2019 ◽  
Vol 05 (03) ◽  
pp. 317-341
Author(s):  
Serafettin Yilmaz ◽  
Wang Xiangyu

Dissatisfaction is a major concept in power transition theory, which postulates that a rapidly rising power tends to be dissatisfied with the international system and would thus attempt to reform or replace it, whereas the hegemonic power would, by default, be satisfied with and work to maintain the status quo. This paper, however, offers an alternative outlook on the reigning-rising power dynamics by examining the conditions for and implications of hegemonic dissatisfaction and rising power satisfaction. It argues that although China, as a potential systemic challenger harboring grievances against the existing global regimes, has been a recurrent subject for studies, it is the United States, the established hegemon, that appears increasingly dissatisfied with the status quo. The U.S. dissatisfaction is informed by a set of internal and external factors often justified with a reference to China as a challenger, and is manifested in a number of anti-system strategies, including unconventional diplomatic rhetoric, as well as withdrawal from various international institutions or attempts to undermine them. The U.S. discontent, as contrasted with China’s satisfaction as a rising power, has a number of potential geopolitical and economic implications at the bilateral, regional, and global levels, endangering the viability and sustainability of the universally accepted political and economic regimes.


Author(s):  
Jonathan M. DiCicco

Power transition theory and Graham Allison’s Thucydides Trap Project are discussed in tandem with two complementary aims: to highlight theoretical and empirical contributions of the power transition research program, and to provide critical perspective on the Thucydides Trap Project. Conventional-wisdom approaches of this sort are distinguished from power transition theory, the empirical international relations theory proposed by A. F. K. Organski and further articulated and tested by generations of scholars. The theory’s central elements—national power, stages of power transition, shifts in the distribution of power, international order and the status quo—are identified and discussed, with a focus on key variables used to explain war and peace among contending states. A comparative, critical examination of the Thucydides Trap Project is used as a lens for spotlighting key empirical contributions of the power transition theory research tradition and the value of adhering to norms of scientific rigor. Opportunities for further growth and development are noted, with special attention afforded to essential features of the power transition theory research program, including the study of (1) the timing and initiation of war; (2) rising powers’ dissatisfaction with the status quo, and a possible distinction between dissatisfaction and revisionism; and (3) reducing the risk of violent, revisionist challenges.


2014 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 205-221 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer Dabbs Sciubba

In May 2006, President Vladimir Putin said that Russia’s dire demographics were the biggest challenge facing Russia. We know little about how states conduct foreign policy under demographic decline but some expect Russia to become more pacifist or to turn attention inward as its internal situation deteriorates. Power transition theory (PTT), however, which considers population as a key component of power, anticipates riskier international behavior under demographic changes. PTT predicts aggression under two conditions: when a dominant power sees its decline while secondary powers are rising; and when an inferior state sees its power increase while the dominant power declines. This article interprets Russia’s foreign policy actions from May 2006 through 2012 in light of PTT. I find that Russia was physically aggressive in its region when its population decline peaked, as PTT expects. Power transition theory also predicts Russia’s diplomatically aggressive foreign policy at the system level as Russian leaders’ perceptions of a favorable shift in the global balance of power gave them more confidence in Russia’s capabilities to challenge the status quo. This study furthers our understanding of foreign policy-making in times of demographic decline, extends power transition theory, and serves as a model for evaluating demographic trends and foreign policy for other great powers.


2021 ◽  
Vol 97 (5) ◽  
pp. 1335-1352
Author(s):  
Steve Chan

Abstract Current discourse on International Relations conflates international order and the interstate distribution of power. Many studies fail to clarify the concept of international order or to provide systematic empirical analysis that compares states' conduct in relation to this order. The prevailing tendency relies instead on rhetorical assertion or definitional fiat to attribute revisionist and status-quo motivations to different countries. For example, power-transition theory claims that rising states are typically revisionist, whereas established states are committed to the status quo. This article presents a contrarian view, arguing that the dominant or established state can be a revisionist. This state is not forever committed to those rules and institutions of international order that it has played a decisive role in fostering. Conversely, a rising state is not inevitably bent on challenging the order that has enabled its ascendance. Revisionism is thus not unique to a rising power; moreover, this state is not destined to be a challenger to international order and an instigator of systemic war as typically depicted in the current literature. I advance these propositions in the context of recent conduct by China and the US, suggesting that whereas China has become less revisionist over time (even while its power has increased), the US has become more so especially during the Trump administration. The major impetus challenging the liberal international order has come more from domestic sources in the West than from China.


2018 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 613-640 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steve Chan ◽  
Weixing Hu ◽  
Kai He

International Relations literature often refers to states’ motivations as revisionist or status-quo oriented. Such attributions are especially prevalent in discourse on the power-transition theory, suggesting that the danger of war rises when a revisionist China catches up to a status-quo US. Such attributions, however, are rarely supported by systematic evidence providing a direct comparison of Chinese and US conduct. We undertake an analysis of how these countries have behaved differently over time according to their policy pronouncements, their participation in international institutions and agreements, and their voting in the United Nations. Our analysis challenges the conventional wisdom that a rising power tends to be revisionist whereas an incumbent hegemon is invariably committed to the defense of the international order.


2019 ◽  
pp. 368-390
Author(s):  
Michael Zürn ◽  
Klaus Dieter Wolf ◽  
Matthew D. Stephen

The concluding chapter draws together the findings and compares them across chapters, issue areas, and actors. Three findings are most noteworthy. First, the demands of both rising powers and NGOs can be characterized as in some cases status quo oriented and in others reformist. There are only a few signs of revisionism. Second, the challengers do not constitute a coherent group in international politics. There are very few indications of a systemic challenge with similar positions and coalitions in all cases, as power transition theory suggests. Third, the demands for change are issue-area specific and are mostly directed against either unequal representation in the decision-making bodies or strong forms of neo-liberal or human rights-based intrusiveness.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document