scholarly journals Agenda-setting in the Common Security and Defence Policy: An institutionalist perspective

2012 ◽  
Vol 47 (4) ◽  
pp. 454-472 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hylke Dijkstra

The European Union (EU) has launched an impressive number of crisis management missions since its Common Security and Defence Policy became operational in 2003. This article analyses the agenda-setting phase of these civilian and military operations in order to explain why the EU has sent troops, policemen, judges, prosecutors and monitors across three continents. It presents an institutionalist perspective and argues that the former High Representative Javier Solana and his officials have been instrumental in putting various operations on the agenda. They have employed deliberate agenda-setting strategies, such as venue shopping, conflict expansion and issue framing, to further their bureaucratic interest of launching new missions. Solana and his officials had the ability to affect the agenda-setting process thanks to their pivotal position in policy making. This gave them with superior information on the state of play and an early mover advantage as well as strong international networks. The article provides empirical evidence from the crisis management missions in Aceh, Bosnia, Chad and Kosovo. It concludes with the changes to the Common Security and Defence Policy after the Treaty of Lisbon.

2017 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 260-264
Author(s):  
Marius Pricopi

Abstract The United Kingdom’s choice to withdraw from the European Union (Brexit) took many by surprise, including a good part of the „Leave“ voters. The repercussions of this vote are in full display and affect each and every area of the community life. Considering different indicators (such as the number of troops deployed by the United Kingdom to military operations conducted by the European Union or the British contributions to the Battlegroups), in this paper we submit to analysis the United Kingdom’s stance in the process of military integration within the European Union in the period before the Brexit Referendum (2011-2015); we mainly argue that - although regrettable - Brexit will not significantly affect the day-to-day activities and projects conducted within the Common Security and Defence Policy.


2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-64
Author(s):  
Krisztina Juhász

Abstract Hungary joined the European Union in 2004 but started to participate in EU crisis management operations well before. Since the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) was a new policy area at that time, it was an extraordinary experience for Hungary to be integrated into a policy still under development. Aft er briefly detailing the foreign and security policy options Hungary faced right after the transition from communism, this paper analyses Hungary’s contribution to the CSDP. The CSDP is based on two pillars — one operational and the other related to capability-building. The paper first analyses Hungary’s participation in the civilian and military operations launched in the framework of the CSDP. Specifically, it explores the operations Hungary has joined, the kind of capacities it has contributed and the deficiencies and problems that have emerged in this sphere. Second, the paper addresses Hungary’s perspectives and aspirations regarding capability development. Specifically, it looks at how Hungary views the future of the CSDP, especially in light of the country’s participation in permanent structured cooperation (PESCO), the central element in the EU’s joint defence capability development. Methodologically, the paper employs qualitative content and discourse analysis, drawing on relevant secondary literature and analyses of official EU and Hungarian (legislative and non-legislative) documents. Surveying Hungary’s participation in EU crisis management operations since the beginning of the CSDP, the paper finds it has joined 42 per cent of civilian and 70 per cent of military operations. These have been in the immediate neighbourhood but also distant locations (Africa, Central Asia, and the Near East). At the same time, distinct challenges have hampered Hungary’s contribution to certain operations, such as a dearth of foreign language skills and a lack of strategic airlift and mobile logistics capabilities. The paper also finds that regional defence cooperation was not the central driver of cooperation within PESCO projects. Overall, Hungary is somewhere in the middle of the pack in terms of the number of PESCO projects it participates in.


2014 ◽  
pp. 68-91
Author(s):  
Marek Brylonek

In 1999, soon after the European Union member states had decided to establish the European Security and Defence Policy, the processes of appointing adequate tools for its accomplishment also started. Decisions were made to create organs and institutions and to elaborate appropriate procedures which would enable fast and precise decision-making of planning and conduct in the field of security and defence. Since that time the European Union and its Security and Defence Policy have evolved in many aspects and are still evolving. Security researchers currently attempt to provide the answer to an important problem: what are the trends characterising changes in the Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union. The author, basing on research and own experiences of work in the politico-strategic planning structures of the European External Action Service, analyses current trends in the Common Security and Defence Policy, especially regarding the evolution of the Union’s organs and institutions, crisis management procedures, implementation of comprehensive approach and tendencies in the newly-deployed missions. This material is a result of extensive discussions and consultations conducted within a broad international and interinstitutional crisis management environment. It is based on interviews with high-level subject-related personnel and the listed bibliography


Author(s):  
Kamil ZAJĄCZKOWSKI

The aim of this article is to highlight the essence, the meaning and the role of EU civilian missions and military operations conducted under the umbrella of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The first two parts constitute an introduction which presents the institutional framework, scope and mandate of EU missions/operations as well as their nature. The subsequent parts constitute an attempt to answer the question of what distinguishes EU missions/operations and what their specificity is. In this context, the CSDP crisis management model is presented along with the significance of operations in building the EU's international identity and in strengthening the political dimension of European integration, especially in relation to security and defence policy. The main weaknesses and shortcomings of CSDP missions/operations have also been characterized. Thusly, eleven such weaknesses have been identified which, to a large extent, determine the shape, scope and nature of CSDP missions and operations carried out by the European Union


2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 362-377 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marijn Hoijtink ◽  
Hanna L Muehlenhoff

Against the background of a sense of crisis in the European Union and in international politics, European Union Member States have since 2016 increased their cooperation within the Common Security and Defence Policy, for example, establishing the European Defence Fund. Scholars have long pointed out that the European Union lacks the necessary ‘hard’ military power to influence international politics, subscribing to and constituting an image of the European Union as not masculine enough. We are critical of these accounts and develop a different argument. First, building on insights from feminist security and critical military studies, we argue that the European Union is a military power constituted by multiple masculinities. We consider the European Union to be a masculine military power, not only because it uses and aims to develop military instruments, but also because of how militarism and military masculinities permeate discourses, practices and policies within Common Security and Defence Policy and the European Union more broadly. We argue, second, that the crisis narrative allows the European Union to strengthen Common Security and Defence Policy and exhibit more aggressive military masculinities based on combat, which exist alongside entrepreneurial and protector masculinities. These developments do not indicate a clear militarisation of Common Security and Defence Policy, but, rather, an advancement and normalisation of militarism and the militarised masculinities associated with it.


Politeja ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (54) ◽  
pp. 45-64
Author(s):  
Janusz J. Węc

The Reform of the Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union in 2016‑2017The subject of the article is the reform of the Common Security and Defence Policy in 2016‑2017 following the adoption of the new EU External Security Strategy by the European Council in June 2016. The first part of the article analyzes the European Union’s Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy. However, the second part of the article reconstructs the process of implementing the global strategy and describes the successes and failures of the reform.


Author(s):  
M. S. Fedorov

The article deals with the system of EU's functional units responsible for conducting crisis management within the framework of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). It analyses their structure and particular features. The author puts forward three main factors, which affected the shape of this system. First, it is the exclusively intergovernmental nature of the CSDP and the veto-power of EU member states in this field. Second, the EU-US and the EU-NATO relations have also influenced the shape of the CSDP organizational structures. On the one hand, the Alliance has served as an example of a successful security organization for the European integration strategists. On the other, Washington has always sought to embed the European security and defense integration into NATO and to control it. Third, the CSDP institutional system embodies a specific approach towards crisis management, elaborated by the EU - a combination of both military and civil instruments of peacemaking (the so-called "civil-military synergy"). Thus, there are two chains of units within the CSDP, designed for planning and conducting military operations and civil missions respectively. Having analyzed political and operational units of the CSDP the author concludes that, overall, the created institutional system is well-suited to the ambitions of the EU in the field of crisis management. However, the EU member states cannot use the potential of this system to the full because of the political differences that divide them.


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