scholarly journals CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS AS INSTRUMENTS OF EU CRISIS MANAGEMENT - THEIR ESSENCE, ROLE AND DETERMINANTS

Author(s):  
Kamil ZAJĄCZKOWSKI

The aim of this article is to highlight the essence, the meaning and the role of EU civilian missions and military operations conducted under the umbrella of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The first two parts constitute an introduction which presents the institutional framework, scope and mandate of EU missions/operations as well as their nature. The subsequent parts constitute an attempt to answer the question of what distinguishes EU missions/operations and what their specificity is. In this context, the CSDP crisis management model is presented along with the significance of operations in building the EU's international identity and in strengthening the political dimension of European integration, especially in relation to security and defence policy. The main weaknesses and shortcomings of CSDP missions/operations have also been characterized. Thusly, eleven such weaknesses have been identified which, to a large extent, determine the shape, scope and nature of CSDP missions and operations carried out by the European Union

2012 ◽  
Vol 47 (4) ◽  
pp. 454-472 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hylke Dijkstra

The European Union (EU) has launched an impressive number of crisis management missions since its Common Security and Defence Policy became operational in 2003. This article analyses the agenda-setting phase of these civilian and military operations in order to explain why the EU has sent troops, policemen, judges, prosecutors and monitors across three continents. It presents an institutionalist perspective and argues that the former High Representative Javier Solana and his officials have been instrumental in putting various operations on the agenda. They have employed deliberate agenda-setting strategies, such as venue shopping, conflict expansion and issue framing, to further their bureaucratic interest of launching new missions. Solana and his officials had the ability to affect the agenda-setting process thanks to their pivotal position in policy making. This gave them with superior information on the state of play and an early mover advantage as well as strong international networks. The article provides empirical evidence from the crisis management missions in Aceh, Bosnia, Chad and Kosovo. It concludes with the changes to the Common Security and Defence Policy after the Treaty of Lisbon.


2017 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 260-264
Author(s):  
Marius Pricopi

Abstract The United Kingdom’s choice to withdraw from the European Union (Brexit) took many by surprise, including a good part of the „Leave“ voters. The repercussions of this vote are in full display and affect each and every area of the community life. Considering different indicators (such as the number of troops deployed by the United Kingdom to military operations conducted by the European Union or the British contributions to the Battlegroups), in this paper we submit to analysis the United Kingdom’s stance in the process of military integration within the European Union in the period before the Brexit Referendum (2011-2015); we mainly argue that - although regrettable - Brexit will not significantly affect the day-to-day activities and projects conducted within the Common Security and Defence Policy.


2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-64
Author(s):  
Krisztina Juhász

Abstract Hungary joined the European Union in 2004 but started to participate in EU crisis management operations well before. Since the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) was a new policy area at that time, it was an extraordinary experience for Hungary to be integrated into a policy still under development. Aft er briefly detailing the foreign and security policy options Hungary faced right after the transition from communism, this paper analyses Hungary’s contribution to the CSDP. The CSDP is based on two pillars — one operational and the other related to capability-building. The paper first analyses Hungary’s participation in the civilian and military operations launched in the framework of the CSDP. Specifically, it explores the operations Hungary has joined, the kind of capacities it has contributed and the deficiencies and problems that have emerged in this sphere. Second, the paper addresses Hungary’s perspectives and aspirations regarding capability development. Specifically, it looks at how Hungary views the future of the CSDP, especially in light of the country’s participation in permanent structured cooperation (PESCO), the central element in the EU’s joint defence capability development. Methodologically, the paper employs qualitative content and discourse analysis, drawing on relevant secondary literature and analyses of official EU and Hungarian (legislative and non-legislative) documents. Surveying Hungary’s participation in EU crisis management operations since the beginning of the CSDP, the paper finds it has joined 42 per cent of civilian and 70 per cent of military operations. These have been in the immediate neighbourhood but also distant locations (Africa, Central Asia, and the Near East). At the same time, distinct challenges have hampered Hungary’s contribution to certain operations, such as a dearth of foreign language skills and a lack of strategic airlift and mobile logistics capabilities. The paper also finds that regional defence cooperation was not the central driver of cooperation within PESCO projects. Overall, Hungary is somewhere in the middle of the pack in terms of the number of PESCO projects it participates in.


2020 ◽  
pp. 137-169
Author(s):  
Alexander Sidorov ◽  

The article is devoted to the analysis of the complex of problems associated with the organization of the defence structures of the European Union and the role of France in this process. The focus of the project «European defenсe», the possibility of its implementation within the EuroAtlantic space are investigated. The continuity and evolution of the European defence potential building program are shown. The concepts of «European defenсe», «European army» are analyzed and their real content is revealed. The pairing of France’s national efforts with partners in the framework of the Permanent Structured Cooperation on Security and Defence (PESCO) projects is shown; the importance of a pragmatic approach to building a «European defenсe» on the basis of a number of interstate programs of military-industrial cooperation is highlighted. The connection between the new stage of scientific and technological progress and the revitalization of plans to strengthen the defence potential of the EU is revealed. The evolution of the French leadership’s approach to building a «European defenсe» is presented, its assessment of the current state of this project, and in connection with this, features of its views on the prospects for developing a dialogue with Russia. Against the background of a slowdown in the development of the EU Common Security and Defence Policy, the role of interstate initiatives outside the EU, aimed at accelerating and increasing the effectiveness of military operations, has been highlighted. The examples of individual actions emphasize the key role of states, in particular France, in the implementation of missions of a pan-European character. As a result of the analysis, a conclusion was made about the sustainable and non-opportunistic nature of the transformations in the field of military construction in the EU. A forecast is given regarding the possible scale and real fulfillment of European defence construction plans. The conclusion about the significance of the «European defenсe» project for the implementation of France’s geopolitical plans and the strengthening of its positions in the EU and in the Euro-Atlantic field is substantiated.


2014 ◽  
pp. 68-91
Author(s):  
Marek Brylonek

In 1999, soon after the European Union member states had decided to establish the European Security and Defence Policy, the processes of appointing adequate tools for its accomplishment also started. Decisions were made to create organs and institutions and to elaborate appropriate procedures which would enable fast and precise decision-making of planning and conduct in the field of security and defence. Since that time the European Union and its Security and Defence Policy have evolved in many aspects and are still evolving. Security researchers currently attempt to provide the answer to an important problem: what are the trends characterising changes in the Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union. The author, basing on research and own experiences of work in the politico-strategic planning structures of the European External Action Service, analyses current trends in the Common Security and Defence Policy, especially regarding the evolution of the Union’s organs and institutions, crisis management procedures, implementation of comprehensive approach and tendencies in the newly-deployed missions. This material is a result of extensive discussions and consultations conducted within a broad international and interinstitutional crisis management environment. It is based on interviews with high-level subject-related personnel and the listed bibliography


2011 ◽  
Vol 15 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 200-217 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Keohane

In 1999, few people would have predicted that the EU would send ships to Somalia, police to Afghanistan, judges to Kosovo and soldiers to Chad. Yet, that is exactly what the EU has been doing. The European Security and Defence policy (ESDP) –since renamed the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) – was launched shortly after NATO’s war in Kosovo in June 1999, to ensure that Europeans could respond to international crises, including launching operations, without depending on the US (via NATO). Since 2003 the EU has initiated some 24 peace-support operations in Europe, Africa and Asia, using both civil and military resources, and some of these missions have had impressive results. However, at times there have been some real difficulties with CSDP operations, ranging from resource shortages, intermittent political support from Member States, and a lack of coordination between EU actors. Lessons already identified in the crisis management debate point to two fundamental factors of success. First, a comprehensive approach that brings together the different actors deployed in the field. Second, the resilience of the political and material commitment of crisis management actors, possibly over many years. Both these factors pose important questions for the future of EU peace operations.


2008 ◽  
Vol 60 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 199-225 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dusko Lopandic

The author analyses the development of EU in the new international surroundings during the last decade, also exploring the development of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). The first part treats the changes in international relations, the role of USA and the NATO evolution. With the changes in international relations that are characterized by the relative weakening of USA, the rise of the powers such as China and Russia as well as the process of globalization within the multipolar frameworks, the European Union and its members states are facing the problem of adjusting to the new conditions. The second part of the article overviews the EU development, its geostrategic priorities as well as the development of ESDP. In the last dozen of years, the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the ESDP development have gone through a dynamic evolution. The attempts of the EU countries to emancipate from USA and become a serious factor in international relations imply that it should strengthen its international identity, and the political and military components, in particular.


2019 ◽  
pp. 512-519
Author(s):  
Teymur Dzhalilov ◽  
Nikita Pivovarov

The published document is a part of the working record of The Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee on May 5, 1969. The employees of The Common Department of the CPSU Central Committee started writing such working records from the end of 1965. In contrast to the protocols, the working notes include speeches of the secretaries of the Central Committee, that allow to deeper analyze the reactions of the top party leadership, to understand their position regarding the political agenda. The peculiarity of the published document is that the Secretariat of the Central Committee did not deal with the most important foreign policy issues. It was the responsibility of the Politburo. However, it was at a meeting of the Secretariat of the Central Committee when Brezhnev raised the question of inviting G. Husák to Moscow. The latter replaced A. Dubček as the first Secretary of the Communist party of Czechoslovakia in April 1969. As follows from the document, Leonid Brezhnev tried to solve this issue at a meeting of the Politburo, but failed. However, even at the Secretariat of the Central Committee the Leonid Brezhnev’s initiative at the invitation of G. Husák was not supported. The published document reveals to us not only new facets in the mechanisms of decision-making in the CPSU Central Committee, the role of the Secretary General in this process, but also reflects the acute discussions within the Soviet government about the future of the world socialist systems.


2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 135-156
Author(s):  
Marco Inglese

Abstract This article seeks to ascertain the role of healthcare in the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). The article is structured as follows. First, it outlines the international conceptualisation of healthcare in the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the European Social Charter (ESC) before delving into the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Second, focusing on the European Union (EU), it analyses the role of Article 35 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the Charter) in order to verify its impact on the development of the CEAS. Third, and in conclusion, it will argue that the identification of the role of healthcare in the CEAS should be understood in light of the Charter’s scope of application. This interpretative approach will be beneficial for asylum seekers and undocumented migrants, as well as for the Member States (MSs).


Author(s):  
Kreuschitz Viktor ◽  
Nehl Hanns Peter

This chapter examines the recovery of unlawful and incompatible State aids, which is one of the cornerstones of free and undistorted competition in the European Union. The repayment of an aid declared unlawful and incompatible with the common market is of utmost importance, as it eliminates the distortion of competition caused by the competitive advantage afforded by the contested aid. In other words, by repaying an unlawful aid, the recipient forfeits the advantage it had enjoyed over its competitors on the market and therefore the previously existing situation is restored; it is common ground in this respect that this objective is attained once the aid in question—increased, where appropriate, by default interests—has been repaid by the recipient.


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