Addressing Russian Threat. Changes to Defence Policies of the Nordic States After 2014

The substantial deterioration of the security environment after Russian aggression against Ukraine and the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 was a catalyst for significant changes in the Nordic states’ approach to security and defence. Common perceptions of the Russian threat focused defence policies of the Nordic states around rebuilding total defence capabilities, which would combine military and civilian efforts. Besides these efforts to reinforce national capacity to defend against an armed attack, the Nordic states increased regional security and defence cooperation, along with cooperation with NATO, the EU and the United States. The article explores the developments in defence policies of the Nordic states that were a result of changes in the security environment caused by Russian aggression against Ukraine and the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014. It tries to discuss differences in national threat assessment, and then compare and contrast unique national approaches to defence policies that were adopted by the Nordic states. The conclusion conceptualizes unique features of the Nordic approach to defence stemming from the common threat to their security.

Política europea de seguridad y defensa y sus efectos en la industria de defensa

Defence has traditionally not been a priority within Community policies. However, in recent years it had become aware of the need to promote it, with special attention to the development of the industrial base. The most significant milestone for change comes in December 2013 when the Council discusses the future of security and defence. Until then, the Council took precedence over national optics and the Commission acted in the face of industry as a regulator to promote the implementation of single market rules in the defence market. The Libyan crisis of 2011 highlighted the need for strategic autonomy. This abstract concept implies the capability to act. It highlights the need for greater autonomy in industrial matters to support military capabilities without external dependencies. The crisis also occurs at a time of widespread decline in defence budgets that makes it difficult for nations to tackle large programs individually. The need for a competitive industrial base to support autonomous operations is of value. It is in this context that the EU Global Strategy in 2016 is enacted, resulting in the implementation in defence of the CFSP initiative aimed at streamlining demand, and the European Defence Plan, which includes the creation of a specific fund, the EDF, aimed at incentivising industrial cooperation to act on the supply side. The initiatives launched over the past four years to promote security and defence cooperation, with particular attention to the industrial component, are underway and will be difficult to go back even if European countries are in the dilemma between protectionism and cooperation. The COVID 19 crisis has diverted that attention. The future presents a scenario of greater strategic instability, which is faced with different national perspectives, greater competition between great powers in which Europe does not present a single voice, and a European society that seems far from its defence. Under these conditions, Europe faces the need to decide between having military and industrial capabilities appropriate to its political objectives or maintaining formulas for cooperation with third parties following current models. If the strategic objective is to have sufficient autonomy to address actions independently, the development of an industrial defence policy will be a basic element and will be conditioned by member states' visions, budgetary effort, and level of coordination of operational demand and industrial supply.

GROWING BILATERAL RELATION BETWEEN INDIA AND RUSSIA IN DIFFERENT SECTORS AND EMERGING AS GLOBAL POWERS

73 years of bilateral relation between India and Russia, Today India and Russia have emerged as global powers with cooperation in different sectors like technical, nuclear energy, outer space, security, education,counter terrorism, defense, politics, the food security has recently become an area of cooperation between the two countries. With the coming of Putin to power, we see India and Russia bilateral relationship entering new areas of cooperation. A healthy relation with Russia is a key element for the cultivation of India Foreign policy. The foundation element for the rapid increase in bilateral relation between the two countries can be traced back to October 2000 with the signing of the Declaration on the Indo –Russia Strategic Partnership. India and Russia are dependent on each other and the cooperation exists because of much mutual self-interest. Both India and Russia are part of BRICS, SCO AND RIC which have provided them a platform to have discussion on issues outside the Western block and emerge as global power in Asia, The cultural exchange programme and education initiatives programmes with people to people contact play a vital role in strengthening and bringing the two countries close to each other. Economic partnership between the two countries is regarded as a strong pillar for strategic partnership along with defence cooperation which provide maximum economic growth and development for both the countries. Keywords: Bilateral relation, economic, defence cooperation, mutual self-interest, strategic partnership, cultural exchange

"Neither staunch friends nor confirmed foes": New Zealand's defence diplomacy in Asia

<p>Read a recent Defence White Paper of any number of countries or look at the range of foreign relations one country has with others in the contemporary age, and one is likely to come across the term 'defence diplomacy'. The traditional function of armed forces has been to prepare for and undertake the use of force. As part of this role, armed forces have cooperated with those of other nations to enhance security by countering or deterring potential enemies. In the post-Cold War era however, a new form of defence relations has emerged; in contrast to, yet supplementing their traditional role, armed forces have been employed in building cooperative relationships between former and potential future foes. This shift is explained by the concept of defence diplomacy; the concept identified by Andrew Cottey and Anthony Forster that armed forces have a peacetime role in pursuit of broader foreign and security policy goals. Recognising that defence cooperation activities have a long history, Cottey and Forster differentiated defence diplomacy between 'old', meaning those traditional defence cooperation activities aimed at allies and friendly states, and 'new', meaning defence cooperation aimed at potential or former enemies. New Zealand, like many other countries, has used the term since the 1990s to describe those aspects of the diplomatic relationship, specifically peacetime cooperative activities, performed by the Ministry of Defence and the New Zealand Defence Force with the armed forces of other nations. This thesis explores the origins of defence diplomacy and the adoption of the concept by New Zealand. It looks at the way in which New Zealand has developed and managed its 'old' defence diplomacy in Asia through examining the example of the Five Power Defence Arrangements. It then explores New Zealand’s 'new' defence diplomacy with what are considered here as “non-like-minded” states such as China, Viet Nam and Indonesia. Through these three case studies, the thesis examines key dilemmas and problems of defence diplomacy that have arisen in the development of these key relationships. The thesis then concludes with an analysis of New Zealand’s defence diplomacy according to the framework established by Cottey and Forster.</p>

"Neither staunch friends nor confirmed foes": New Zealand's defence diplomacy in Asia

<p>Read a recent Defence White Paper of any number of countries or look at the range of foreign relations one country has with others in the contemporary age, and one is likely to come across the term 'defence diplomacy'. The traditional function of armed forces has been to prepare for and undertake the use of force. As part of this role, armed forces have cooperated with those of other nations to enhance security by countering or deterring potential enemies. In the post-Cold War era however, a new form of defence relations has emerged; in contrast to, yet supplementing their traditional role, armed forces have been employed in building cooperative relationships between former and potential future foes. This shift is explained by the concept of defence diplomacy; the concept identified by Andrew Cottey and Anthony Forster that armed forces have a peacetime role in pursuit of broader foreign and security policy goals. Recognising that defence cooperation activities have a long history, Cottey and Forster differentiated defence diplomacy between 'old', meaning those traditional defence cooperation activities aimed at allies and friendly states, and 'new', meaning defence cooperation aimed at potential or former enemies. New Zealand, like many other countries, has used the term since the 1990s to describe those aspects of the diplomatic relationship, specifically peacetime cooperative activities, performed by the Ministry of Defence and the New Zealand Defence Force with the armed forces of other nations. This thesis explores the origins of defence diplomacy and the adoption of the concept by New Zealand. It looks at the way in which New Zealand has developed and managed its 'old' defence diplomacy in Asia through examining the example of the Five Power Defence Arrangements. It then explores New Zealand’s 'new' defence diplomacy with what are considered here as “non-like-minded” states such as China, Viet Nam and Indonesia. Through these three case studies, the thesis examines key dilemmas and problems of defence diplomacy that have arisen in the development of these key relationships. The thesis then concludes with an analysis of New Zealand’s defence diplomacy according to the framework established by Cottey and Forster.</p>

Post-Quantum Cryptographic Assemblages and the Governance of the Quantum Threat

Threats against security in the Internet often have a wide-range and can have serious impacts within society. Large quantum computers will be able to break the cryptographic algorithms used to ensure security today, which is known as the quantum threat. Quantum threats are multi-faceted and very complex cybersecurity issues. We use assemblage theory to explore the complexities associated with these threats, including how they are understood within policy and strategy. It is in this way that we explore how the governance of the quantum threat is made visible. Generally, the private and academic sector have been a primary driver in this field, but other actors(especially states) have begun to grapple with the threat and have begun to understand the relation to defence challenges, and pathways to cooperation in order to prepare against the threat. This may pose challenges for traditional avenues of defence cooperation as states attempt to understand and manage the associated technologies and perceived threats. We examine how traditionally cooperating allies attempt to govern the quantum threat by focusing on Australia, Canada, the European Union (EU), New Zealand, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States (US). We explore the linkages within post-quantum cryptographic assemblages and identify several governmental interventions as attempts to understand and manage the threat and associated technologies. In examining over 40 policy and strategy-related documents between traditionally defence cooperating allies, we identify six main linkages: Infrastructure, Standardization, Education, Partnerships, Economy, and Defence. These linkages highlight the governmental interventions to govern through standardization and regulation as a way to define to contours of the quantum threat.

Defence cooperation between Sweden and Finland. Brothers in arms in the Nordic and beyond

The security of Europe has been evolving in the last decade, causing the verification of national defence policies. Being members of the European Union but not NATO, Sweden and Finland are revising their defence policies to face complex threats. Their geographical proximity is one factor causing their close military cooperation, supported by building–up their national military and civilian capabilities to deter potential threat from Russia and face hybrid challenges. The progress is visible, especially over the last decade. They are not disregarding closing ranks with other Nordic countries, NATO and specifically the US recognising that a joint effort with those nations and organisations, sharing the same values and facing similar threats, is foundation of their security. The paper utilises the qualitative research approach using a case study, desk research, analysis, and synthesis as methods.

Evaluating Hungary’s Participation in the European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy

Hungary joined the European Union in 2004 but started to participate in EU crisis management operations well before. Since the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) was a new policy area at that time, it was an extraordinary experience for Hungary to be integrated into a policy still under development. Aft er briefly detailing the foreign and security policy options Hungary faced right after the transition from communism, this paper analyses Hungary’s contribution to the CSDP. The CSDP is based on two pillars — one operational and the other related to capability-building. The paper first analyses Hungary’s participation in the civilian and military operations launched in the framework of the CSDP. Specifically, it explores the operations Hungary has joined, the kind of capacities it has contributed and the deficiencies and problems that have emerged in this sphere. Second, the paper addresses Hungary’s perspectives and aspirations regarding capability development. Specifically, it looks at how Hungary views the future of the CSDP, especially in light of the country’s participation in permanent structured cooperation (PESCO), the central element in the EU’s joint defence capability development. Methodologically, the paper employs qualitative content and discourse analysis, drawing on relevant secondary literature and analyses of official EU and Hungarian (legislative and non-legislative) documents. Surveying Hungary’s participation in EU crisis management operations since the beginning of the CSDP, the paper finds it has joined 42 per cent of civilian and 70 per cent of military operations. These have been in the immediate neighbourhood but also distant locations (Africa, Central Asia, and the Near East). At the same time, distinct challenges have hampered Hungary’s contribution to certain operations, such as a dearth of foreign language skills and a lack of strategic airlift and mobile logistics capabilities. The paper also finds that regional defence cooperation was not the central driver of cooperation within PESCO projects. Overall, Hungary is somewhere in the middle of the pack in terms of the number of PESCO projects it participates in.