Variable annuities and aggregate mortality risk

2016 ◽  
Vol 237 ◽  
pp. R55-R61 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Weale ◽  
Justin van de Ven
Keyword(s):  
Relative Risk ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Mortality Risk ◽  
Mortality Rates ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Actual Cost ◽  
Relative Risk Aversion ◽  
Variable Annuities ◽  
Actual Mortality ◽  
Specific Mortality

This paper explores the extent to which annuitants might be prepared to pay for protection against cohort-specific mortality risk, by comparing traditional indexed annuities with annuities whose payout rates are revised in response to differences between expected and actual mortality rates of the cohort in question. It finds that a man aged 65 with a coefficient of relative risk aversion of two would be prepared to pay 75p per £100 annuitised for protection against aggregate mortality risk while a man with risk aversion of twenty would be prepared to pay £5.75 per £100; studies put the actual cost at £2.70–£7 per £100, suggesting that unless annuitants are very risk averse it is likely that existing products tend to over-insure against cohort mortality risk.

Relative Risk Aversion and Portfolio Choice

2005 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pablo Muñoz Ceballos ◽  
Esteban Flores Díaz
Keyword(s):  
Relative Risk ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Portfolio Choice ◽  
Relative Risk Aversion

scholarly journals Relative risk aversion models: How plausible are their assumptions?

2021 ◽  
pp. 104346312199408
Author(s):  
Carlo Barone ◽  
Katherin Barg ◽  
Mathieu Ichou
Keyword(s):  
Relative Risk ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Loss Aversion ◽  
Educational Inequality ◽  
Risky Choice ◽  
Relative Risk Aversion ◽  
Downward Mobility ◽  
Educational Decisions ◽  
Empirically Supported ◽  
Occupational Risks

This work examines the validity of the two main assumptions of relative risk-aversion models of educational inequality. We compare the Breen-Goldthorpe (BG) and the Breen-Yaish (BY) models in terms of their assumptions about status maintenance motives and beliefs about the occupational risks associated with educational decisions. Concerning the first assumption, our contribution is threefold. First, we criticise the assumption of the BG model that families aim only at avoiding downward mobility and are insensitive to the prospects of upward mobility. We argue that the loss-aversion assumption proposed by BY is a more realistic formulation of status-maintenance motives. Second, we propose and implement a novel empirical approach to assess the validity of the loss-aversion assumption. Third, we present empirical results based on a sample of families of lower secondary school leavers indicating that families are sensitive to the prospects of both upward and downward mobility, and that the loss-aversion hypothesis of BY is empirically supported. As regards the risky choice assumption, we argue that families may not believe that more ambitious educational options entail occupational risks relative to less ambitious ones. We present empirical evidence indicating that, in France, the academic path is not perceived as a risky option. We conclude that, if the restrictive assumptions of the BG model are removed, relative-risk aversion needs not drive educational inequalities.

scholarly journals The Burden of the Nondiversifiable Risk of Entrepreneurship

2010 ◽  
Vol 100 (3) ◽  
pp. 1163-1194 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert E Hall ◽  
Susan E Woodward
Keyword(s):  
Relative Risk ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Venture Capital ◽  
Dynamic Program ◽  
Certainty Equivalent ◽  
Important Class ◽  
Relative Risk Aversion ◽  
The Past ◽  
Equity Value ◽  
The Difference

Entrepreneurship is risky. We study the risk facing a well-documented and important class of entrepreneurs, those backed by venture capital. Using a dynamic program, we calculate the certainty-equivalent of the difference between the cash rewards that entrepreneurs actually received over the past 20 years and the cash that entrepreneurs would have received from a risk-free salaried job. The payoff to a venture-backed entrepreneur comprises a below-market salary and a share of the equity value of the company when it goes public or is acquired. We find that the typical venture-backed entrepreneur received an average of $5.8 million in exit cash. Almost three-quarters of entrepreneurs receive nothing at exit and a few receive over a billion dollars. Because of the extreme dispersion of payoffs, an entrepreneur with a coefficient of relative risk aversion of two places a certainty equivalent value only slightly greater than zero on the distribution of outcomes she faces at the time of her company's launch. (JEL G24, G32, L26, M13)

Relative Risk Aversion Revisited

1982 ◽  
Vol 64 (3) ◽  
pp. 481 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frederick W. Siegel ◽  
James P. Hoban
Keyword(s):  
Relative Risk ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Relative Risk Aversion
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