scholarly journals Can Insurance Market Competition Coexist With Provider Price Regulation? Evidence From Medicare Advantage

Author(s):  
Robert A. Berenson ◽  
Judith Feder ◽  
Laura Skopec

Proposals to contain health care costs often draw from 1 of 2 primary policy approaches—price regulation or market competition. These approaches are often viewed as in conflict, even though some health economists have long argued that they may be compatible, and desirable, given the unique characteristics of health care markets. Medicare Advantage (MA) markets provide a real-world example supporting the view that provider price regulation and insurance market competition can be complementary.

Diabetes ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 67 (Supplement 1) ◽  
pp. 45-LB
Author(s):  
VINAY CHIGULURI ◽  
DOUGLAS BARTHOLD ◽  
RAJIV GUMPINA ◽  
CYNTHIA CASTRO SWEET ◽  
JASON PIERATT ◽  
...  

Circulation ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 132 (suppl_3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Alpesh Amin ◽  
Allison Keshishian ◽  
Lin Xie ◽  
Onur Baser ◽  
Kwanza Price ◽  
...  

Objective: The study aim was to compare major bleeding risk and health care costs after initiating oral anticoagulants (OACs) for treatment-naïve non-valvular atrial fibrillation (NVAF) patients. Methods: Patients in the Medicare advantage population prescribed apixaban, rivaroxaban, dabigatran or warfarin were selected from the Optum Research Database 01JAN2013-31DEC2014. The first OAC prescription date was designated as the index date. Patients were required to have a NVAF diagnosis, continuous health plan enrollment for 6 months and no OAC claims before the index date. Patients were classified into four cohorts based on their index OAC prescription. Major bleeding events, identified by the Cunningham algorithm plus additional bleeding sites, were compared using a Cox proportional hazards model. Health care costs were calculated per patient per month and compared using generalized linear models. Results: The study included 36,260 patients: 3,762 apixaban, 2,677 dabigatran, 8,740 rivaroxaban, and 21,081 warfarin patients. CHA2DS2-VASc score was higher in apixaban patients (4.2) compared to dabigatran and rivaroxaban (both 4.0; p<0.001), but lower than in warfarin patients (4.3; p<0.001). After adjusting for baseline characteristics, apixaban patients were significantly less likely to have a major-bleeding event within one year of treatment initiation compared to rivaroxaban (HR=0.69; 95% CI=0.59-0.81) and warfarin (HR=0.71; 95% CI=0.61-0.82) patients and trended towards numerically lower major bleeding compared to dabigatran patients (HR=0.87; 95% CI=0.72-1.06). Major bleeding-related medical costs were lower in apixaban patients ($53) compared to rivaroxaban ($111) and warfarin ($138) patients (p<0.001) and similar to dabigatran patients ($44, p=0.370). Furthermore, apixaban patients incurred lower all-cause medical costs ($1,646) compared to dabigatran ($1,974, p=0.02), rivaroxaban ($1,909, p=0.002) and warfarin ($2,162, p<0.001) patients. Conclusion: In a large national Medicare advantage population, treatment-naïve NVAF patients treated with apixaban were significantly less likely to have a major-bleeding event compared to those prescribed rivaroxaban or warfarin and had significantly lower medical costs.


2014 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. A246
Author(s):  
G.S. Clore ◽  
S.L. Slabaugh ◽  
B.H. Curtis ◽  
H. Fu ◽  
D.P. Schuster

World Affairs ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 183 (3) ◽  
pp. 270-281
Author(s):  
Rachel Kreier

Last year in this journal, I offered an explanation for America’s high health care costs rooted in the concept of “supply-side moral hazard,” and advocated for an all-payer system of price regulation as an appropriate policy response. The good news—particularly in the current time of pandemic—is that politicians and health services researchers are beginning to acknowledge the need for some form of price regulation. Legislative proposals thus far have focused narrowly on pharmaceutical prices and “surprise billing” for out-of-network charges. However, a few months ago, in March 2020, three Harvard researchers released a more comprehensive proposal. The bad news is that the proposal would preserve a large role for market forces, which, I argue here, amounts to going into battle against high health care costs with one hand tied behind your back. Furthermore, the reliance on private markets would lock in place the rampant inequality and Byzantine complexity bedeviling American health care.


2003 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 125-148 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sherry Glied

Since 1999, health care costs have been growing faster than national income. This rapid growth has occurred as the ability of private and public purchasers to reduce service utilization and bargain for lower prices has fallen, insurers have recouped lost profits through higher premiums, and new technologies have driven up costs throughout the sector. Private insurance market responses to these rising costs may lead to reductions in the number of people with insurance and to increased fragmentation of the insurance market. Over time, technological change in medicine both increases costs and improves the quality of care. The challenge for public policy is to maintain insurance and some degree of equity in the face of these rising costs.


2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (8) ◽  
pp. 1861-1872 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juliana L. Meyers ◽  
Shweta Madhwani ◽  
Debora Rausch ◽  
Sean D. Candrilli ◽  
Girishanthy Krishnarajah ◽  
...  

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