Supporting societal and economic dynamics of recovery: lessons from Chernobyl and Fukushima

2021 ◽  
pp. 014664532110068
Author(s):  
Thierry Schneider ◽  
Jacques Lochard

This paper does not necessarily reflect the views of the International Commission on Radiological Protection. Beyond the consideration of radiological aspects, the rehabilitation of living and working conditions after a large nuclear accident is a complex process in which all dimensions of individual and community life are involved and interconnected. Responsibles of socio-economic entities are facing various difficulties/challenges, including the implementation of protective actions for ensuring the protection of employees, the continuity of production of good-quality products in affected areas, and restoring the confidence of consumers. For affected local communities, the deployment of a socio-economic programme is essential to enable a sustainable future while recognising that a return to the pre-accident situation is generally not achievable. In this context, supporting the societal and economic dynamics of the recovery process requires the adoption of specific governance mechanisms respecting a series of ethical and social values, as highlighted by lessons from the post-accident management of the Chernobyl and Fukshima accidents at Chernobyl and Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plants.

Author(s):  
L. Sihver ◽  
N. Yasuda

In this paper, the causes and the radiological consequences of the explosion of the Chernobyl reactor occurred at 1:23 a.m. (local time) on Apr. 26, 1986, and of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster following the huge Tsunami caused by the Great East Japan earthquake at 2.46 p.m. (local time) on Mar. 11, 2011 are discussed. The need for better severe accident management (SAM), and severe accident management guidelines (SAMGs), are essential in order to increase the safety of the existing and future operating nuclear power plants (NPPs). In addition to that, stress tests should, on a regular basis, be performed to assess whether the NPPs can withstand the effects of natural disasters and man-made failures and actions. The differences in safety preparations at the Chernobyl and Fukushima Daiichi will therefore be presented, as well as recommendations concerning improvements of safety culture, decontamination, and disaster planning. The need for a high-level national emergency response system in case of nuclear accidents will be discussed. The emergency response system should include fast alarms, communication between nuclear power plants, nuclear power authorities and the public people, as well as well-prepared and well-established evacuation plans and evacuation zones. The experiences of disaster planning and the development of a new improved emergency response system in Japan will also be presented together with the training and education program, which have been established to ensure that professional rescue workers, including medical staff, fire fighters, and police, as well as the normal populations including patients, have sufficient knowledge about ionizing radiation and are informed about the meaning of radiation risks and safety.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
T. Schneider ◽  
J. Lochard ◽  
M. Maître ◽  
N. Ban ◽  
P. Croüail ◽  
...  

Lessons from the Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear power plant accident emphasize the difficulties for restoring the socio-economic activities in the affected areas. Among them, a series of radioligical protection challenges were noted, in particular concerning the protection of employees, the securing of the production and the guarantee provided to consumers of the radiological monitoring of products to restore their confidence. Based on case studies reporting the experience of employers deploying their activities in affected areas, an analysis of these radiological protection challenges has been performed. Characterizing the radiological situation was not always straightforward for the managers. With the help of radiological protection experts, protective actions have been identified and specific efforts have been devoted to provide information to employees and their families helping them to make their own judgement about the radiological situation. Respecting the decisions of employees and developing a radiological protection culture among them have proved to be efficient for restoring the business activities. Continuing or restoring the production not always manageable. It requires to develop dedicated radiological monitoring processes to ensure the radiological protection of workers and the quality of the production. Re-establishing the link with the consumers and organising the vigilance on the long-term were necessary for companies to maintain their production or develop new ones. Deploying a socio-economic programme for ensuring the community resilience in affected areas requires the adoption of governance mechanisms respecting ethical values to ensure the overall objective of protecting people and the environment against the risks of ionizing radiation and contributing to provide decent living and working conditions to the affected communities. It is of primary importance to rely on the involvement of local communities in the elaboration and deployment of the socio-economic activities with due considerations for ensuring the integrity of the communities, and respecting their choices.


Symmetry ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 414
Author(s):  
Atsuo Murata ◽  
Waldemar Karwowski

This study explores the root causes of the Fukushima Daiichi disaster and discusses how the complexity and tight coupling in large-scale systems should be reduced under emergencies such as station blackout (SBO) to prevent future disasters. First, on the basis of a summary of the published literature on the Fukushima Daiichi disaster, we found that the direct causes (i.e., malfunctions and problems) included overlooking the loss of coolant and the nuclear reactor’s failure to cool down. Second, we verified that two characteristics proposed in “normal accident” theory—high complexity and tight coupling—underlay each of the direct causes. These two characteristics were found to have made emergency management more challenging. We discuss how such disasters in large-scale systems with high complexity and tight coupling could be prevented through an organizational and managerial approach that can remove asymmetry of authority and information and foster a climate of openly discussing critical safety issues in nuclear power plants.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Marko Bohanec ◽  
Ivan Vrbanić ◽  
Ivica Bašić ◽  
Klemen Debelak ◽  
Luka Štrubelj

2021 ◽  
pp. 014664532110153
Author(s):  
Hajimu Yamana

This paper does not necessarily reflect the views of the International Commission on Radiological Protection. This article describes the institutional structure established for decommissioning Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. To deal with the aftermath of the unprecedented nuclear accident in Fukushima, several responsible institutions such as Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) have worked together at the initiative of the Government of Japan. In this structure, Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings (TEPCO) implements the decommissioning due to its legal responsibility, while the essential direction and milestones are set by the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters of the Government of Japan. Nuclear Damage Compensation and Decommissioning Facilitation Corporation, a government-affiliated organisation, oversees and facilitates the decommissioning by TEPCO, and the Nuclear Regulatory Authority regulates safety from an independent standpoint. The main basic elements essential for the success of this long-term project have been developed, such as the technical strategy, financial system, and organisational capability. Decommissioning is making progress.


Author(s):  
Robert A. Leishear

Water hammers, or fluid transients, compress flammable gasses to their autognition temperatures in piping systems to cause fires or explosions. While this statement may be true for many industrial systems, the focus of this research are reactor coolant water systems (RCW) in nuclear power plants, which generate flammable gasses during normal operations and during accident conditions, such as loss of coolant accidents (LOCA’s) or reactor meltdowns. When combustion occurs, the gas will either burn (deflagrate) or explode, depending on the system geometry and the quantity of the flammable gas and oxygen. If there is sufficient oxygen inside the pipe during the compression process, an explosion can ignite immediately. If there is insufficient oxygen to initiate combustion inside the pipe, the flammable gas can only ignite if released to air, an oxygen rich environment. This presentation considers the fundamentals of gas compression and causes of ignition in nuclear reactor systems. In addition to these ignition mechanisms, specific applications are briefly considered. Those applications include a hydrogen fire following the Three Mile Island meltdown, hydrogen explosions following Fukushima Daiichi explosions, and on-going fires and explosions in U.S nuclear power plants. Novel conclusions are presented here as follows. 1. A hydrogen fire was ignited by water hammer at Three Mile Island. 2. Hydrogen explosions were ignited by water hammer at Fukushima Daiichi. 3. Piping damages in U.S. commercial nuclear reactor systems have occurred since reactors were first built. These damages were not caused by water hammer alone, but were caused by water hammer compression of flammable hydrogen and resultant deflagration or detonation inside of the piping.


2018 ◽  
Vol 183 (4) ◽  
pp. 503-513 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tae Young Kong ◽  
Gamal Akabani ◽  
John W Poston

Abstract One of the most important issues in the nuclear power industry is the implementation of the 2007 Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) published in ICRP Publication 103. These recommendations include the implementation of the concept of dose constraints for occupationally exposed workers at nuclear power plants (NPPs). When considering these changes from a cost–benefit standpoint, the implementation of dose constraints is still highly controversial. This study analysed annual occupational dose distributions to determine whether a dose constraint is needed for occupationally exposed workers at the US NPPs. Results of the analysis showed that the use of dose constraints had no positive impact on radiation safety of workers at NPPs in the USA. In fact, it appears that the implementation of dose constraints will impose an unnecessary regulatory burden on licensees. Based on these results, implementation of dose constraints is not recommended.


2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 ◽  
pp. 1-7 ◽  
Author(s):  
T. J. Katona ◽  
A. Vilimi

Nuclear power plants shall be designed to resist the effects of large earthquakes. The design basis earthquake affects large area around the plant site and can cause serious consequences that will affect the logistical support of the emergency actions at the plant, influence the psychological condition of the plant personnel, and determine the workload of the country’s disaster management personnel. In this paper the main qualitative findings of a study are presented that have been performed for the case of a hypothetical 10−4/a probability design basis earthquake for the Paks Nuclear Power Plant, Hungary. The study covers the qualitative assessment of the postearthquake conditions at the settlements around the plant site including quantitative evaluation of the condition of dwellings. The main goal of the recent phase of the study was to identify public utility vulnerabilities that define the outside support conditions of the nuclear power plant accident management. The results of the study can be used for the planning of logistical support of the plant accident management staff. The study also contributes to better understanding of the working conditions of the disaster management services in the region around the nuclear power plant.


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