Economic Oppression as an International Wrong or as Crime against Humanity

2005 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 173-212 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elias Davidsson

The International Criminal Court (ICC) was established to secure the punishment of persons who have committed the most serious crimes which ‘deeply shock the conscience of humanity’.1 Yet what shocks the ‘conscience of humanity’ and what leaves people yawning, depends to a large extent on how mass media select and present facts. While millions of innocent human beings have been killed and maimed over the last century in armed conflict and by mass killing, the overwhelming majority of those who fall victim to adverse human agency are not injured by proximate violence but as a result of being compelled to live in subhuman conditions. Many more die silently each year of preventable hunger and disease than from widely reported direct violence. These silent deaths are mostly the result of decisions made, without malice, by individuals pursuing political or economic interests. Yet, intentionally or recklessly depriving even a single person of basic necessities may give rise to criminal penalties. Failing by gross negligence to ensure basic necessities to a dependent person may also give rise to criminal penalties. Causing death by deprivation of air, water, food, shelter or medicines may amount to murder. Compelling a person to live in inhumane or degrading conditions amounts to inhumane treatment, a violation of customary international law. Such conditions are defined herein as those which do not fulfil minimal humanitarian standards applicable to prisoners of war. The present article examines the conditions under which measures which subject a civilian population to inhumane or degrading conditions of life or perpetuate such conditions, constitute an international wrongful act2 that may reach the level of a crime against humanity under customary and conventional law.3

2016 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 279
Author(s):  
Fazlollah Foroughi ◽  
Zahra Dastan

Due to quantitative expansion and evolution in committing the crime at the international level, the scope of criminal proceedings has been widened significantly. Tolerance and forgiveness towards crimes that happen at international level not only is a double oppression on the victims, but also provide a fertile context for others to commit crimes more daringly. Thus, it is essential that international criminals are held accountable to the law and competent institution, and the realization of this issue leads to the victim satisfaction in international law. Not only in international law, but also in domestic law, show respect and protection of human rights is effective only when there is an effective justice system to guarantee the rights. Although some international crimes practically occur by the government or at least high-ranking government officials, the Statute of the International Criminal Court has reiterated this point that they only have jurisdiction over the crimes committed by natural persons rather than legal entities, which one good example is governments, and although the real victims of these crimes have been human beings, in the case of action and referring the case to the competent international courts, these are the states (rather than the victims) that actually have the right of access to the authorities and not beneficiaries .Thus, at the first step, we should see whether the Court has jurisdiction over the crime committed by the government and whether people can file an action independently in the International Criminal Court or not? When people, rather than governments, are beneficiaries in some international crimes, why only the government and not the people is the plaintiff? And what is the right of the victim in such category of crimes? Accordingly, the current research seeks to examine these rights and restrictions, and relevant limitations.


Author(s):  
Schabas William A

This chapter comments on Article 27 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 27 consists two paragraphs that are often confounded but fulfil different functions. Paragraph 1 denies a defence of official capacity, i.e. official capacity as a Head of State or Government, a member of a Government or parliament, an elected representative or a government official shall not exempt a person from criminal responsibility under the Statute. Paragraph 2 amounts to a renunciation, by States Parties to the Rome Statute, of the immunity of their own Head of State to which they are entitled by virtue of customary international law. In contrast with paragraph 1, it is without precedent in international criminal law instruments.


2019 ◽  
Vol 101 (912) ◽  
pp. 1091-1115
Author(s):  
Dustin A. Lewis

AbstractLegal controversies and disagreements have arisen about the timing and duration of numerous contemporary armed conflicts, not least regarding how to discern precisely when those conflicts began and when they ended (if indeed they have ended). The existence of several long-running conflicts – some stretching across decades – and the corresponding suffering that they entail accentuate the stakes of these debates. To help shed light on some select aspects of the duration of contemporary wars, this article analyzes two sets of legal issues: first, the notion of “protracted armed conflict” as formulated in a war-crimes-related provision of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, and second, the rules, principles and standards laid down in international humanitarian law and international criminal law pertaining to when armed conflicts have come to an end. The upshot of the analysis is that under existing international law, there is no general category of “protracted armed conflict”; that the question of whether to pursue such a category raises numerous challenges; and that several dimensions of the law concerning the end of armed conflict are unsettled.


Author(s):  
Schabas William A

This chapter comments on Article 98 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 98 emerged in the context of the debate on grounds to refuse surrender and assistance. The Rome Statute has the potential to conflict with other obligations of States under international law, whether pursuant to customary international law or treaty. In particular, they are required to respect the immunities of diplomats and international officials. States that allow military activity by foreign troops on their territory often have agreements, known as ‘status of forces agreements’ (SOFAs). Article 98 governs these conflicts by, in effect, making obligations of arrest and surrender under the Statute subordinate to other legal norms.


Author(s):  
Schabas William A

This chapter comments on Article 80 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 80 deals with the application by States of penalties prescribed by their national law. The provision was introduced in the final draft, submitted to the Conference early in the day on 17 July 1998, as part of a compromise aimed at calming the objections of a relatively small number of States that had unsuccessfully campaigned to include capital punishment within the range of available penalties in the Rome Statue. Some of these States were concerned that the exclusion of the death penalty would be interpreted as evidence of a growing abolitionist trend internationally and possibly of an emerging norm of customary international law.


Author(s):  
Hennie Strydom

This chapter describes South Africa’s law governing the immunity of foreign states and officials, as well as of regional organizations. As the chapter explains, this law is made up of a combination of customary international law, international treaty law, English law, parliamentary legislation, and constitutional law. The chapter begins by describing the domestic status of international law in South Africa. It then describes in detail the 1981 Foreign States Immunities Act, including the various limitations on and exceptions to immunity set forth in the Act. After discussing the immunity of foreign states, it addresses head of state and diplomatic immunities and describes the controversial Bashir case from 2015 concerning a request from the International Criminal Court that South Africa arrest and surrender a sitting head of state. Finally, the chapter discusses the immunity of regional organizations and their staff, in particular the African Union and the South African Development Community.


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 112 ◽  
pp. 182-186 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fausto Pocar

Article 21 of the Rome Statute, in defining the applicable sources of law for the International Criminal Court (ICC), breaks with the practice of the ad hoc tribunals by treating customary international law as only a secondary authority. Nonetheless, customary international law still has an acknowledged role in ICC jurisprudence in filling lacunae in the Rome Statute and aiding in its interpretation. One can also predict other instances in which the application of customary international law will be required. It remains to be seen, however, whether the ICC's use of customary law will lead to that law's further fragmentation or whether that use will instead modify customary law to reflect the ICC Statute.


Author(s):  
Pocar Fausto

This chapter focuses on criminal prosecution. Traditionally, in domestic law, criminal prosecution has been regarded as a tool capable of contributing to peaceful and secure governance. Under international law, however, recourse to criminal prosecution as a safeguard for maintaining international peace and security is very recent and still limited, and in many respects disputed. This is the case both when international rules are applied by international jurisdictions and when they are directed at soliciting the exercise of criminal prosecution by domestic courts. The chapter looks at the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC Statute), which expressly provides that the jurisdiction of the Court ‘shall be limited to the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole’, and identifies these crimes as the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression. Given that the ICC Statute does not merely codify customary international law, but also partially develops or restricts it, its adoption has produced some degree of fragmentation of international criminal law, which further impacts on the existing international case law.


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 112 ◽  
pp. 172-176
Author(s):  
Dapo Akande

More than any other international criminal tribunal, the International Criminal Court (ICC) has, in its early years, pursued cases against heads of state. The Court issued arrest warrants for President Omar al Bashir of Sudan and for Muammar Gaddafi while he was Libya's head of state, and it charged Uhuru Kenyatta shortly before he became head of state of Kenya. These attempts to prosecute heads of states have not only led to tensions between the Court and the African Union,1 but also pit the desire to hold senior leaders accountable for grave international crimes against the customary international law principle that certain senior state officials—especially heads of state—have immunity from foreign criminal jurisdiction by virtue of their status, including immunity from arrest and their inviolability when abroad.2


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