Cohesion and Sport Team Effectiveness: The Benefit of a Common Group Identity

1992 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Audrey J. Murrell ◽  
Samuel L. Gaertner
2020 ◽  
Vol 130 (629) ◽  
pp. 1248-1261
Author(s):  
Gary E Bolton ◽  
Johannes Mans ◽  
Axel Ockenfels

Abstract The provision of trader feedback is critical to the functioning of many markets. We examine the influence of group identity on the volunteering and informativeness of feedback. In a market experiment conducted simultaneously in Germany and the United States, we manipulate the interaction of traders based on natural social and induced home market identities. Traders are more likely to provide feedback information on a trader with whom they share a common group identity, and the effect is more pronounced for social identity than for home market identity. Both kinds of group identity promote rewarding good performance and punishing bad performance.


Author(s):  
David Muchlinski

Despite international guarantees to respect religious freedom, governments around the world often impose substantial restrictions on the abilities of some religious groups to openly practice their faith. These regulations on religious freedom are often justified to promote social stability. However, research has demonstrated a positive correlation between restrictions on religious freedom and religious violence. This violence is often thought to be a result of grievances arising from the denial of a religious group’s right to openly practice its faith. These grievances encourage violence by (a) encouraging a sense of common group identity, (b) encouraging feelings of hostility toward groups imposing those regulations, and (c) facilitating the mobilization of religious resources for political violence.


2011 ◽  
Vol 101 (6) ◽  
pp. 2562-2589 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roy Chen ◽  
Yan Chen

When does a common group identity improve efficiency in coordination games? To answer this question, we propose a group-contingent social preference model and derive conditions under which social identity changes equilibrium selection. We test our predictions in the minimum-effort game in the laboratory under parameter configurations which lead to an inefficient low-effort equilibrium for subjects with no group identity. For those with a salient group identity, consistent with our theory, we find that learning leads to ingroup coordination to the efficient high-effort equilibrium. Additionally, our theoretical framework reconciles findings from a number of coordination game experiments. (JEL C71, C91, D71)


2001 ◽  
Vol 57 (1) ◽  
pp. 167-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
John F. Dovidio ◽  
Samuel L. Gaertner ◽  
Yolanda Flores Niemann ◽  
Kevin Snider

2001 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 299-316 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jason A. Nier ◽  
Samuel L. Gaertner ◽  
John F. Dovidio ◽  
Brenda S. Banker ◽  
Christine M. Ward ◽  
...  

2011 ◽  
Vol 25 (6) ◽  
pp. 606-621 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bob Heere ◽  
Jeffrey James ◽  
Masayuki Yoshida ◽  
Glaucio Scremin

The primary purpose of this study was to assess the proposition that identification with a university, city and/ or state could affect an individual’s identification process with a sport team (Heere & James, 2007a). The team identity scale was modified and used to measure multiple group identities. A secondary purpose was to provide further evidence of the reliability and validity of the multidimensional group identity instrument. The results provide some evidence that the group identity instrument is reliable and valid in four settings: team, university, city, and state. For this particular sample, team identity was positively influenced by the associated group identities. The findings support the use of a group identity scale to test different group identities and support the proposition that identification with a focal group such as a sport team does not exist in a vacuum and may be influenced by an individual’s relationship with other groups.


2016 ◽  
Vol 39 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Seewald ◽  
Stefanie Hechler ◽  
Thomas Kessler

AbstractWe argue that general social psychological mechanisms (e.g., common group identity) can account for prosocial behavior and cooperative norms without the need for punishing Big Gods. Moreover, prosocial religions often do not prevent conflict within their religious groups. Hence, we doubt whether Big Gods and prosocial religions are more effective than alternative identities in enhancing high-level cooperation.


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