The readability of 10-K reports and insider trading profitability

2021 ◽  
pp. 031289622110251
Author(s):  
Dewan Rahman ◽  
Barry Oliver

This study links the readability of 10-K reports to insider trading profitability. Using a sample of 102,060 insider transactions in the United States between 1994 and 2016, we empirically demonstrate that less readable 10-K reports increase profitability from insider trading. Consistent with the proprietary cost argument, we also document that readability impacts on insider trading profitability are more pronounced for research and development–intensive firms, for firms facing higher product market competition and trade secrecy, and for firms with lower levels of voluntary management disclosures. Overall, this study supports the proprietary cost and strategic information asymmetry channel of readability and suggests that less readable reports lead to the exploitation of information advantages by insiders. JEL Classification: D4, G14, G34, G40

2011 ◽  
Vol 14 (03) ◽  
pp. 505-533 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Firth ◽  
T. Y. Leung ◽  
Oliver M. Rui

The main purpose of this paper is to examine the legal insider trading activities by directors of companies listed on the Hong Kong Exchange over the period 1993 to 1999. One characteristic of insider trading in Hong Kong is the high frequency of transactions and the large amounts of money involved. Inside purchases appear to signal and correct undervaluation and inside sales appear to signal and correct overvaluation. In contrast to research from Britain and the United States, insider sales are more informative than purchases. On average, insiders earn HK$91,297 per trade, while outsiders who mimic insiders' transactions earn minimal returns. Many firms suffer from infrequent trading and our results are consistent with directors engaging in inside transactions so as to help create a market for the shares. In additional tests, we find that the frequency of insider trading is a function of information asymmetry.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Glaeser ◽  
Wayne R. Landsman

We examine how product market competition affects the disclosure of innovation. Theory posits that product market competition can cause firms to increase their disclosure of innovation to deter product market competitors. Consistent with this reasoning, we find that patent applicants in more competitive industries voluntarily accelerate their patent disclosures, which are credibly disclosed via the United States Patent and Trademark Office. Our inferences are robust to using changes in industry-level import tariffs as sources of plausibly exogenous variation in product market competition in differences-in-differences designs. Consistent with patent disclosure deterring product market competitors, we find that timelier patent disclosures are more strongly associated with declines in the similarity of competitors’ products than are less timely patent disclosures. In total, our results suggest that product market competition increases patent disclosure timeliness, which is consistent with firms using the disclosure of innovation to deter product market competition.


2017 ◽  
Vol 20 (03) ◽  
pp. 1750021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hsin-Yi Yu ◽  
Li-Wen Chen

In deciding how much customer information to disclose, managers face a tradeoff between the benefits of reducing information asymmetry and the losses of revealing proprietary information. This paper investigates which factors affect the level of ambiguous customer identity disclosure and whether such ambiguous disclosure affects the cost of equity capital. The empirical evidence shows that the proprietary cost is a crucial factor in ambiguous customer identity disclosure. Firms with a higher level of ambiguous customer identity disclosure generate a higher cost of equity capital. Moreover, the higher cost of equity capital is concentrated among firms under imperfect market competition.


2020 ◽  
pp. 234094442092771
Author(s):  
Paula Castro ◽  
Maria T Tascon ◽  
Francisco J Castaño ◽  
Borja Amor-Tapia

This article contributes to the literature by indicating how certain monetary policies impact the compensation incentives of US managers to adopt riskier business policies. Specifically, based on the agency problems between shareholders and managers and between shareholders and creditors, a research framework is developed to identify the influence of low interest rates on managers’ risk-taking incentives proxied by the sensitivity of executive compensation to stock return volatility (Vega). We examine 1,293 firms in the United States between 2000 and 2016, and the results indicate that low interest rates increase the managers’ short-term risk-taking incentives and that those incentives contribute to the risk effectively taken by the firm. Our results are robust to the use of alternative monetary proxies and to the presence of passive versus active institutional shareholders. JEL CLASSIFICATION E41; E43; E51; M12; M52


2019 ◽  
Vol 51 (4) ◽  
pp. 525-535
Author(s):  
David M. Kotz

The current economic expansion in the United States, which began in the summer of 2009, has lasted for more than nine years as of this writing, making it the second longest expansion since the end of World War II. The previous two expansions, of the 1990s and 2000s, were prolonged by big asset bubbles, which have played a key role in the neoliberal era in promoting long economic expansions. However, the current expansion has not seen an asset bubble large enough to significantly affect the macroeconomy. This paper examines the expansion since 2009 by analyzing the movements of the rate of profit, and its determinants, and the role of aggregate demand, with the aim of determining the factors that have kept crisis tendencies at bay so far. JEL Classification: E32, E30, E11, E02


2019 ◽  
Vol 64 (4) ◽  
pp. 540-565 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric M. Gibbons ◽  
Allie Greenman ◽  
Peter Norlander ◽  
Todd Sørensen

Guest workers on visas in the United States may be unable to quit bad employers due to barriers to mobility and a lack of labor market competition. Using H-1B, H-2A, and H-2B program data, we calculate the concentration of employers in geographically defined labor markets within occupations. We find that many guest workers face moderately or highly concentrated labor markets, based on federal merger scrutiny guidelines, and that concentration generally decreases wages. For example, moving from a market with a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of zero to a market comprised of two employers lowers H-1B worker wages approximately 10%, and a pure monopsony (one employer) reduces wages by 13%. A simulation shows that wages under pure monopsony could be 47% lower, suggesting that employers do not use the full extent of their monopsony power. Enforcing wage regulations and decreasing barriers to mobility may better address issues of exploitation than antitrust scrutiny alone.


2017 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 263-285 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emawtee Bissoondoyal-Bheenick ◽  
Robert Brooks ◽  
Wei Chi ◽  
Hung Xuan Do

We assess the stock market volatility spillover between three closely related countries, the United States, China and Australia. This study considers industry data and hence provides a clear idea of the channels through which volatility is transmitted across these countries. We find that there is significant bilateral causality between the countries at the market index level and across most of the industries for the full sample period from July 2007 to May 2016. There is one-way volatility spillover from the United States to China in the financial services, industrials, consumer discretionary and utilities industry. There is insignificant volatility spillover from the Australian to Chinese stock markets in financial services, telecommunications and energy industries. Once we remove the effect of the global financial crisis (GFC), we find significant bilateral relationship across all of the industries across the three countries. JEL Classification: G15


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