System Dynamics Modeling for a Public–Private Partnership Program to Promote Bicycle–Metro Integration Based on Evolutionary Game

2021 ◽  
pp. 036119812110124
Author(s):  
Jianming Cai ◽  
Yue Liang
Keyword(s):  
System Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Public Private Partnership ◽  
Dynamics Simulation ◽  
Rail Transit ◽  
Long Distance ◽  
Private Partnership ◽  
Bike Sharing ◽  
Integration Mode ◽  
Partnership Program

A marriage between dockless bike-sharing systems and rail transit presents new opportunities for sustainable transportation in Chinese cities. However, how to promote the bicycle–metro integration mode remains largely unstudied. This paper designs a public–private partnership program to promote bicycle–metro integration. We consider the cooperation between bike-sharing companies and rail transit companies to improve both services and attract long-distance travelers to choose the bicycle–metro integration mode, with government subsidies. To analyze the proportion of each population participating in this public–private partnership program, we establish an evolutionary game model considering bike-sharing companies, rail transit companies, and long-distance travelers, and obtain eight scenarios of equilibriums and corresponding stable conditions. To prove the evolutionary game analysis, we construct a system dynamics simulation model and confirm that the public–private partnership project can be achieved in reality. We discuss key parameters that affect the final stable state through sensitivity analysis. The results demonstrate that by reasonably adjusting the values of parameters, each equilibrium can be changed into an optimal evolutionary stable strategy. This study can provide useful policy implications and operational recommendations for government agencies, bike-sharing companies, and transit authorities to promote bicycle–metro integration.

scholarly journals System Dynamics Analysis of Evolutionary Game Strategies between the Government and Investors Based on New Energy Power Construction Public-Private-Partnership (PPP) Project

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (7) ◽  
pp. 2533 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lei Gao ◽  
Zhen-Yu Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Social Capital ◽  
System Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Public Private Partnership ◽  
Behavioral Strategies ◽  
Private Partnership ◽  
System Evolution ◽  
Power Construction ◽  
New Energy ◽  
The Government

The public-private-partnership (PPP) is a new mode for the government and social capital to jointly invest in public infrastructure projects. In particular, PPP projects for new energy power construction have been strongly supported in some countries in recent years, because it can not only reduce financial pressure on the government, but also promote the development of new energy. Current scholars study the economic benefits of PPP projects for new energy power construction from a macro perspective, and they rarely study behavioral strategies of the government and social capital as a game process of project construction from a micro perspective. This paper will fill this gap. This study firstly built an evolutionary game model of the government and investors based on new energy power construction PPP projects. Secondly, taking China’s typical new energy power construction PPP project–waste incineration power generation as an example, the system dynamics (SD) model was proposed to simulate the evolutionary process of game players’ behavioral strategies. Finally, the effects of key factors in the construction of PPP project on the strategies’ stability were studied. The results show that: (1) there is no evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) in the game system between the government and investors, and system evolution is characterized by periodic behavior. (2) When the government implements dynamic bounty measures, the system evolution process is still a closed loop with periodic motion. However, when the government implements dynamic punishment measures, there is a stable ESS in the hybrid strategy of the game system. (3) The government can increase unit fines when making dynamic strategic adjustments, which will not only promote the active cooperation of investors, but also reduce the probability of government supervision, thereby reducing costs.

An evolutionary game analysis of user-pay public–private partnership projects

2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Danrong Song ◽  
Jinbo Song ◽  
Hehui Yuan ◽  
Yu Fan
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Public Private Partnership ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Successful Implementation ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Private Partnership ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
The Public

PurposeWith the growing demand for infrastructure and public services in recent years, PPP-UP have attracted a great deal of attention. However, while the user focuses on the payment for use and the private sector is concerned with its return on investment, the public sector pays more attention to the efficient utilization of public funds. In order to analyze the willingness of each stakeholder to join PPP-UP, an evolutionary game model involving the three parties is constructed.Design/methodology/approachAn evolutionary game model is established that considers the users and the public and private sectors in user-pay public-private-partnership projects (PPP-UP). Eight scenarios of equilibriums and the game's evolutionary stable strategies are analyzed, and the corresponding stability conditions are then obtained. A situation where all three players are willing to cooperate in theory is also examined. The key influencing parameters that affect cooperation behaviors are further discussed.FindingsFirst, the results illustrate that by properly adjusting the influencing factors, the cooperation status among the three parties can be changed along with certain evolutionary trends. Second, it is hard to modify unsatisfactory evolutionary stability by small changes in both the price compensation of and the construction and operation compensation. Third, it is necessary to involve the users in the decision-making process in PPP-UP and take their demands regarding benefits and payments into account.Originality/valueIn this paper, we focus on PPP-UP to research interactions among the public and private sectors and the users. Based on the analysis of the evolutionary game, to facilitate the successful implementation and development of a project, several conditions are needed to ensure tripartite cooperation. Several recommendations are then proposed for decision-makers in PPP-UP.

On the Public Private Partnership Financing Strategies of Urban Rail Transit

2011 ◽  
Vol 255-260 ◽  
pp. 4095-4099 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jian Xiao Chen ◽  
Jing Fang
Keyword(s):  
Public Private Partnership ◽  
Urban Rail Transit ◽  
Operating Efficiency ◽  
Rail Transit ◽  
Private Capital ◽  
Private Partnership ◽  
The Public ◽  
Urban Rail

Introduction and innovation of PPP mode can attract more private capital to involve urban rail transit construction and enhance overall operating efficiency of URT. Based on analyzing the characters of URT PPP, through summarizing the PPP categories in application, this paper classifies the URT PPP practical approaches into four broad strategies, and provides a framework and some suggestions for assessing and managing risks associated with various URT PPP strategies.

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