scholarly journals Psychiatry and Neuroscience

2009 ◽  
Vol 54 (8) ◽  
pp. 513-517 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joel Paris

Objective: To examine the extent to which neuroscience accounts for mental disorders. Method: Relevant literature on this problem was selectively reviewed. Results: Thus far, neuroscience research has contributed more to the understanding of the brain than to determining the causes of mental disorders. Its model is more appropriate to severe than to common mental disorders. A reductionistic approach cannot account for emergent phenomena occurring at the level of the mind. Conclusions: Mental disorders cannot be reduced to abnormalities in neuronal activity; psychiatric symptoms need to be understood at multiple levels.

Author(s):  
Edward Shorter

In 1996 the Wall Street Journal noted, “The nervous breakdown, the affliction that has been a staple of American life and literature for more than a century, has been wiped out by the combined forces of psychiatry, pharmacology and managed care. But people keep breaking down anyway.” Indeed they do keep breaking down. Kitty Dukakis, wife of former presidential candidate Michael Dukakis, remembered lying in bed doing nothing. “I couldn’t get up and get dressed, but I couldn’t sleep either.” What was the matter with Kitty Dukakis and millions of sufferers like her? Depressed? What does psychiatry think? In psychiatry there are a few distinct, sharply defined diseases that would be difficult to miss, such as melancholia and catatonia. These tend to be psychotic illnesses, involving loss of contact with reality in the form of delusions and hallucinations, though not always. Then there is the great mass of nonpsychotic ill-defined illnesses whose labels are constantly changing and that are very common. Today these are called depression, oft en anxiety, and panic as well. These are all behavioral diagnoses, suggesting that the main problem is in the mind rather than the brain and body. Yet there is a tradition, now almost lost, of viewing psychiatric symptoms as a result of body processes, and it has always been convenient to speak of these as “nervous” diseases, even though much more of the body than the physical nerves may be involved. Writing in 1972, English psychiatrist Richard Hunter directed attention toward the body as a whole. “Many diseases are ushered in by a lowering of vitality which patients appreciate as irritability and depression. The mind is the most sensitive indicator of the state of the body. An abnormal mental state is equivalent to a physical sign of something going wrong in the brain.” The term symptom cluster is popular today, but that is jargonish, so let us call these patients “nervous.” Their distinguishing characteristic is that they do not have the “C” word, as Eli Robins at Washington University in St. Louis used to call it, meaning that they are not “crazy.”


2010 ◽  
Vol 197 (5) ◽  
pp. 411-412 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dheeraj Rai ◽  
Petros Skapinakis ◽  
Nicola Wiles ◽  
Glyn Lewis ◽  
Ricardo Araya

SummaryIn a representative sample of the UK population we found that common mental disorders (as a group and in ICD–10 diagnostic categories) and subthreshold psychiatric symptoms at baseline were both independently associated with new-onset functional disability and significant days lost from work at 18-month follow-up. Subthreshold symptoms contributed to almost half the aggregate burden of functional disability and over 32 million days lost from work in the year preceding the study. Leaving these symptoms unaccounted for in surveys may lead to gross underestimation of disability related to psychiatric morbidity.


2009 ◽  
Vol 24 (S1) ◽  
pp. 1-1
Author(s):  
F. Sirois

The author resents a frame for evaluating patients in various medical contexts and discusses principles of brief intervention. the frame relies on a basic assumption differentiating the approach of the mind from that of the brain whereby the subjective experience of the patient is compared with the reality process of medical procedures. In that specific context, psychiatric symptoms are seen as elaboration of the gap between the subjective experience of the patients and the objective medical assessment. Psychiatric evaluatiion is therefore subjected to that context where assessment of anxiety and coping mechanisms is paramount to search for the central psychic position from which the patient experiences the clinical episode. Principles of brief intervention are based on the interplay of psychic and external reality. Such principles are spelled out in ten different items along the clinical course of patients as to follow a short, stepwise path to help patients move from accommodating the external reality to their subjective experience to the other way around.


2018 ◽  
Vol 48 (12) ◽  
pp. 1954-1965 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sigrid Salomonsson ◽  
Erik Hedman-Lagerlöf ◽  
Lars-Göran Öst

AbstractSick leave due to common mental disorders (CMDs) increase rapidly and present a major societal challenge. The overall effect of psychological interventions to reduce sick leave and symptoms has not been sufficiently investigated and there is a need for a systematic review and meta-analysis of the field. The aim of the present meta-analysis was to calculate the effect size of psychological interventions for CMDs on sick leave and psychiatric symptoms based on all published randomized controlled trials. Methodological quality, the risk of bias and publication bias were also assessed. The literature searches gave 2240 hits and 45 studies were included. The psychological interventions were more effective than care as usual on both reduced sick leave (g = 0.15) and symptoms (g = 0.21). There was no significant difference in effect between work focused interventions, problem-solving therapy, cognitive behavioural therapy or collaborative care. We conclude that psychological interventions are more effective than care as usual to reduce sick leave and symptoms but the effect sizes are small. More research is needed on psychological interventions that evaluate effects on sick leave. Consensual measures of sick leave should be established and quality of psychotherapy for patients on sick leave should be improved.


1914 ◽  
Vol 60 (249) ◽  
pp. 192-224
Author(s):  
R. G. Rows

It is interesting at the present time to notice that disorders of the mind are being considered from a broader point of view. No longer is it reckoned sufficient to enumerate the psychic symptoms and to label the case accordingly. In the scientific journals it is not unusual to find the statement that a certain case does not fit into any division of our present-day classification. It is recognised that to describe a case as an atypical example of a disease is equivalent to saying that some factor has escaped our notice, or is one we cannot explain; that ætiology, from the psychogenic as well as the pathogenic point of view, must be considered, and that bodily and nervous symptoms may be as much a part of the illness as are the psychic; in fact, these last are often merely a symbol expressing some change in the function of an organ outside the brain.


2007 ◽  
Vol 190 (5) ◽  
pp. 394-401 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ricardo Araya ◽  
Alan Montgomery ◽  
Graciela Rojas ◽  
Rosemarie Fritsch ◽  
Jaime Solis ◽  
...  

BackgroundThere is growing research interest in the influence of the built environment on mental disorders.AimsTo estimate the variation in the prevalence of common mental disorders attributable to individuals and the built environment of geographical sectors where they live.MethodA sample of 3870 adults (response rate 90%) clustered in 248 geographical sectors participated in a household cross-sectional survey in Santiago, Chile. Independently rated contextual measures of the built environment were obtained. The Clinical Interview Schedule was used to estimate the prevalence of common mental disorders.ResultsThere was a significant association between the quality of the built environment of small geographical sectors and the presence of common mental disorders among its residents. The better the quality of the built environment, the lower the scores for psychiatric symptoms; however, only a small proportion of the variation in common mental disorder existed at sector level, after adjusting for individual factors.ConclusionsFindings from our study, using a contextual assessment of the quality of the built environment and multilevel modelling in the analysis, suggest these associations may be more marked in non-Western settings with more homogeneous geographical sectors.


1990 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 470-474 ◽  
Author(s):  
Z. J. Lipowski

From the early days of psychiatry as a distinct field of knowledge and clinical practice two competing approaches to the etiology and treatment of mental disorders have vied for dominance: the somatic and the psychic (“moral”) [l]. We are witnessing the same struggle today. To speak metaphorically, we can opt for either brainless or mindless psychiatry, as Szasz [2] proposed. He failed to consider a third option, however, one that may be called an integrative approach. The latter is neither mindless nor brainless but rather encompasses both the mind and the brain in its theoretical and practical consideration [1,3,4]. I will formulate the integrative approach in this paper and argue that it has a distinct advantage for both the study and treatment of mental disorders.


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