The Influence of Family Ownership on Long-Lived Asset Write-Offs

2015 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 355-371 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giulio Greco ◽  
Silvia Ferramosca ◽  
Marco Allegrini
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Agency Theory ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Family Ownership ◽  
Agency Conflicts ◽  
Asset Value

Building on agency theory, this article investigates whether family firms’ accounting behavior regarding long-lived asset write-offs differs from that of nonfamily firms. We provide evidence that nonfamily firms use write-offs for earnings management purposes, while family firms report write-offs coherent with the firm performance. Family firms experience dwindling sales and lower profitability in the years following the write-offs, consistently with an effective decline in their assets value. The findings are consistent with reduced owner-manager agency conflicts in family firms. We find no indication of family entrenchment, which is consistent with family owners being concerned with the reputational damage associated with a loss of a firm’s asset value.

scholarly journals Family ownership heterogeneity and audit committees independence and its implication towards the revised Malaysia code on corporate governance (MCCG, 2007)

2014 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 456-462 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wan Masliza Wan Mohammad ◽  
Wan Fadzilah Wan Yusoff ◽  
Nik Mohamad Zaki Nik Salleh
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Family Ownership ◽  
Agency Conflicts ◽  
Institutional Structures ◽  
Corporate Governance Reforms ◽  
Governance Reforms

This study examines the effectiveness of audit committee independence when moderated by firms’ family ownership. This is to investigate the implication of revised Malaysia Code on Corporate Governance (2007) that requires majority composition of independence directors in the audit committee. We study 1,206 firm-year observations between fiscal years 2004 to 2009 of firms listed in Bursa Malaysia. The findings suggest that independent directors are more effective in curbing earnings management when there is stronger ownership of family members. Our research offers insights on the important of family institutional structures on corporate governance reforms in Malaysia. Malaysian family firms are mostly traditional firms which have built their reputation and strength in the industry for many generations. The reputation built, improve shareholders confidence and reduce potential agency conflicts

Corporate Social Responsibility and Earnings Management: The Moderating Role of Family Ownership

2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Asif Saeed ◽  
Aijaz Mustafa Hashmi ◽  
Attiya Yasmin Javid
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Social Responsibility ◽  
Social Responsibility ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Negative Impact ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Least Square ◽  
Family Ownership ◽  
Corporate Social ◽  
The Impact

This study aims to explore the impact of family ownership on the relationship among corporate social responsibility (CSR) and earning management (EM) in Pakistan. Data is collected from nonfinancial listed firms on Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSE) for the period 2009-2017. Our results of pooled ordinary least square regression indicate that CSR has significant negative impact on EM. Furthermore, results also indicate that association between CSR and EM is moderated by family ownership. Family firms which perform CSR activities are less involved in EM as compare to nonfamily firms perform CSR activities. This variation in behavior of EM in family and non-family firms can possibly be explained by socioemotional wealth theory. Keywords: Corporate Social Responsibility, Earnings Management, Family Ownership

Family firms, family generation and performance: evidence from an emerging economy

2014 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 197-219 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohammad Badrul Muttakin ◽  
Arifur Khan ◽  
Nava Subramaniam
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Emerging Market ◽  
Emerging Economy ◽  
Family Ownership ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Generation Family ◽  
And Performance ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Better Than

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of family ownership on firm performance. In particular the authors investigate whether family firms outperform non-family firms and whether first generation family firms perform better than second generation family firms in an emerging economy using Bangladesh as a case. Design/methodology/approach – This study uses a data set of 141 listed Bangladeshi non-financial companies for the period 2005-2009. The methodology is based on multivariate regression analysis. Findings – The result shows that family firms perform better than their non-family counterparts. The authors also find that family ownership has a positive impact on firm performance. The analysis further reveals intergenerational differences where family firms and performance are associated positively only when founder members act as CEOs or chairmen. However, when descendents serve as CEOs or chairmen family firms are associated with poorer firm performance. Originality/value – The authors extend the findings of previous studies that investigate the family ownership and firm performance relationship in developed economy settings, but neglected emerging economies. The study also informs the literature about the intergenerational impact of family firms on performance in an emerging market.

Family Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence From Public Companies in Chile

2007 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 83-94 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jon I. Martínez ◽  
Bernhard S. Stöhr ◽  
Bernardo F. Quiroga
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Regression Model ◽  
Conceptual Framework ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Multiple Regression Model ◽  
Family Ownership ◽  
Public Companies ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Measures Of Performance ◽  
Better Than

We studied the impact of family ownership on firm performance by using a set of data on Chilean firms. From a sample of 175 firms listed on the stock market, the group of 100 family-controlled firms performed significantly better than the group of 75 nonfamily companies over the 10-year period under study (1995—2004). Three distinct measures of performance—ROA, ROE, and a proxy of Tobin's Q—were employed to test the differences of means between the two groups of firms. These results were in line with our multiple regression model. All these findings support our conceptual framework and hypothesis, which states that public family firms perform better than public nonfamily firms.

scholarly journals How is firm performance related to family ownership in Malaysia and does board independence moderate the relationship?

2015 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 21-35 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sin-Huei Ng ◽  
Tze San Ong ◽  
Boon Heng Teh ◽  
Wei Ni Soh
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Agency Theory ◽  
Family Ownership ◽  
Board Independence ◽  
Moderating Effects ◽  
Dominant Party ◽  
The Family ◽  
And Control ◽  
Relationship Of ◽  
The Relationship

This paper explores whether the performance of publicly-listed family-controlled firms in Malaysia is related to the extent of the families’ ownership. It also explores whether there are any moderating effects from the various attributes of board independence on the ownership-performance relationship of these firms. The findings indicate that increasing families’ ownership is related to better firm performance under the condition that the families do not have absolute ownership and control over their firms. However, giving more control via majority ownership that causes the families to become the only dominant party might enhance their ability to expropriate and cause firm performance to deteriorate. Therefore, proposal to increase ownership as a mean to reduce the classical agency-theory problems should be caveated under the principal-principal perspective. It is also found that the various board independence attributes do not exhibit any moderating influence on the family ownership-firm performance relationship. This finding may indicate the powerlessness of the boards of director in Malaysia when encountered with the influential controlling families whom the directorship tenures and opportunities of the non-family directors depend on. Decisions made by the controlling families which have bearing on firm performance may not have been effectively counter checked by the boards due to the lack of truly independent nature of the boards

scholarly journals Earnings management, audit committee effectiveness and the role of blockholders ownership: Evidence from UK large firms

2012 ◽  
Vol 1 (4) ◽  
pp. 100-116 ◽  
Author(s):  
Murya Habbash
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Effective Control ◽  
Agency Conflicts ◽  
Controlling Shareholders

The existing literature documents that the quality of financial reporting is higher when firms have effective audit committees. However, recent studies find that audit committees are not effective in family firms where agency conflicts arise between controlling and non-controlling shareholders. This study extends the previous findings by investigating the effectiveness of audit committees in firms with similar agency conflicts when one owner obtains effective control of the firm. Compared to firms with a low level of block ownership, high-blockholder firms face less agency problems due to the separation of ownership and management, but more severe agency problems between controlling (blockholders) and non-controlling shareholders (minority shareholders). Using a unique hand-collected sample, this study tests the largest 350 UK firms for three years from 2005 to 2007, and shows that firms with effective audit committees have less earnings management. This study also documents that the monitoring effectiveness of audit committees is moderated in firms with high blockholder ownership. The results are not sensitive to the endogeneity test and hold for alternative specifications of both dependent and independent variables. Overall, these findings suggest that audit committees are ineffective in mitigating the majority-minority conflict compared to their effectiveness in reducing owners-managers conflicts. These conclusions, along with some recent similar evidence (e.g., Rose, 2009 and Guthrie and Sokolowsky, 2010), may raise doubts about the monitoring role of blockholders asserted by agency theorists and widely accepted in corporate governance literature.

scholarly journals Agency costs, corporate governance mechanisms and performance of public listed family firms in Malaysia

2011 ◽  
Vol 42 (3) ◽  
pp. 17-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. Ibrahim ◽  
F. A. Samad
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Agency Costs ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Family Ownership ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Utilization Ratio ◽  
And Performance

We compare corporate governance and performance between family and non-family ownership of public listed companies in Malaysia from 1999 through 2005 measured by Tobin’s Q and ROA. We also examine the governance mechanisms as a tool in monitoring agency costs based on asset utilization ratio and expense ratio as proxy for agency costs. We find that on average firm value is lower in family firms than non-family firms, while board size, independent director and duality have a significant impact on firm performance in family firms as compared to non-family firms. We also find that these governance mechanisms have significant impact on agency costs for both family and non-family firms.

scholarly journals Impact of family ownership, management, and generations on IPO underpricing and long-run performance

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 266-279
Author(s):  
Lukas Setia-Atmaja ◽  
Yane Chandera
Keyword(s):  
Family Firms ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Family Firm ◽  
Family Ownership ◽  
Agency Conflicts ◽  
Ipo Underpricing ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Study Results ◽  
The Impact

This paper examines the impact of family ownership, management, and generations on IPO underpricing and the long-run performance of publicly listed firms in Indonesia from 2004 to 2015. This study is based on agency theory, which discusses the relationship between shareholders and management, as well as controlling and non-controlling shareholders. Study results show that IPO underpricing was 28% higher for family firms than non-family firms. Among family firms, a family member’s presence as a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) significantly reduced the level of IPO underpricing. A negative relationship between family CEO and IPO underpricing was only observed if a CEO at the time of IPO was the founder instead of family descendants. A long-run return of family-firm IPOs was more likely to underperform their non-family-firm counterparts. The findings in the primary market suggest that investors predict bigger issues of agency conflicts between controlling and non-controlling shareholders in family firms than the issues of agency conflicts between shareholders and management in non-family firms. Since investors consider family-firm IPOs to be riskier than non-family firms, they demand a higher level of IPO underpricing to compensate for such risks. The results in the secondary market confirm the findings in the primary market.

Family firms, board structure and firm performance: evidence from top Indian firms

2017 ◽  
Vol 59 (5) ◽  
pp. 699-717 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. Rathish Bhatt ◽  
Sujoy Bhattacharya
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Family Management ◽  
Family Ownership ◽  
Board Structure ◽  
Board Size ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Board Characteristics ◽  
The Relationship

Purpose Given the prevalence of family-run businesses in India, this paper aims to empirically investigate the impact of family firms on the relationship between firm performance and board characteristics. The effectiveness of board characteristics such as independent directors, chairman independence, role duality, non-executive directors, board busyness, board size, board meetings and board attendance are studied in the Indian context. Design/methodology/approach The sample consists of top-listed firms in India for the period 2002 to 2012. Board index was constructed to capture the governance quality of the firm. The authors also study the relationship between board structure and firm performance by segregating the sample based on family management, family ownership and family representative directors. Random effects model was used for the regression analysis in the study. Findings The authors find a negative effect of board structure on firm performance in family firms compared to non-family firms. Contrary to the most Western literature, family management was not found to significantly affect firm performance as compared to that of professionally managed firms. In the subset analysis of family firms, higher proportion of family ownership and family representative directors did not show any significant impact on the firm performance. Having a higher proportion of independent directors, larger board size or an independent chairman does not appear to improve this insignificant relationship between family firms and firm performance. Also, in family firms, no significant difference in performance is noticed before and during recession period. Originality/value The study uses a self-defined corporate governance index to measure the governance parameters, specifically the board characteristics. The results documented in this study adds to the debate on the generalizability of the findings in Western governance studies in emerging markets like India with unique institutional development background.

scholarly journals The influence of family board involvement on earnings management

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 106-123
Author(s):  
Fabio Franzoi ◽  
Mark Mietzner ◽  
Franziska Thelemann
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Family Involvement ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Real Earnings Management ◽  
Family Management ◽  
Family Ownership ◽  
Executive Board ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Founding Family

This study explores the influence of family ownership and family board involvement on earnings management in German-listed firms. We extend existing research by applying a more precise measurement of family involvement that offers new insights into a family’s effect on earnings management behaviour. Our models suggest that the degree of management involvement of families is a significant driver of earnings management, a factor disregarded so far in the literature. Furthermore, the distinction between founding family and family ownership should be carefully considered. Employing a sample of 278 firms from 2000-2013, we find that greater family management presence on the executive board is associated with more earnings-decreasing accrual-based earnings management practices and more real earnings management activities via discretionary expenses. This is viewed as less value-destroying REM activity to meet earning targets. Overall, German family firms seem to use their powerful positions as shareholders and executive board members to expropriate shareholders and manage earnings to meet targets while maintaining family wealth

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