Delegation in EU merger control: The determinants of referrals to national competition authorities (2004–2012)

This chapter examines EU merger control. The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of EU merger control. Section 3 discusses the jurisdictional rules which determine whether a particular merger should be investigated by the European Commission in Brussels or by the national competition authorities (‘the NCAs’) of the Member States. Section 4 deals with the procedural considerations such as the mandatory pre-notification to the Commission of mergers that have a Union dimension and the timetable within which the Commission must operate. Section 5 discusses the substantive analysis of mergers under the EU Merger Regulation (EUMR), and section 6 explains the procedure whereby the Commission may authorise a merger on the basis of commitments, often referred to as remedies, offered by the parties to address its competition concerns. The subsequent sections describe the Commission’s powers of investigation and enforcement, judicial review of Commission decisions by the EU Courts and cooperation between the Commission and other competition authorities, both within and outside the EU. The chapter concludes with an examination of how the EUMR merger control provisions work in practice.

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The impact of data on EU merger control

Competition Law Journal ◽

10.4337/clj.2019.04.03 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 18 (4) ◽

pp. 151-161

Author(s):

Stephen Whitfield ◽

Richard J. Brown ◽

Ingrid Rogers

Keyword(s):

European Commission ◽

Competition Law ◽

Merger Control ◽

Global Competition ◽

Eu Merger Control ◽

Market Shares ◽

National Competition ◽

Legal Frameworks ◽

The Impact ◽

Concentration Levels

There has been an increased focus of the European Commission and numerous national competition authorities on data-related mergers, which also fits more generally in the context of a broader global competition law focus on the ‘FAANGs’ (i.e., Facebook, Apple, Amazon, Netflix and Google) and the wider tech sector. This article considers the impact of data on EU merger control and explores the theories of harm and legal frameworks which have been applied and developed in considering data-related competition concerns, in particular the notable developments in the Commission's recent consideration of Apple's acquisition of Shazam. The article considers that the impact of these developments is that data-related mergers should no longer be assessed by reference to traditional economic indicators such as market shares and concentration levels only, but rather also in the context of the broader global competition law focus on big tech.

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9 Merger Control

EU Competition Law and Economics ◽

10.1093/law-ocl/9780199566563.003.0009 ◽

2012 ◽

Author(s):

Geradin Damien ◽

Layne-Farrar Anne ◽

Petit Nicolas

Keyword(s):

Merger Control ◽

Eu Merger Control ◽

Merger Regulation ◽

Control Regulation ◽

Legal Nature ◽

Ex Ante ◽

National Competition ◽

Control Regime ◽

The Eu

This concluding chapter discusses the EU merger control regime. Merger-specific law is relatively new to the EU body of law. It was not until 1974 that specific merger regulation was even proposed, and not until over a decade after that that any merger regulation was actually adopted. Regulation 4064/89 (the ‘European Merger Control Regulation’ or ‘EMCR’) sets out an ex ante notification procedure for concentration with an EU dimension. Two reasons seem to have driven the adoption of a merger control regime by the EU. The first is economic. The second reason is of a legal nature. Between 1989 and 2010, more than 4,500 operations were notified to the Commission. This number does not comprise the very many mergers notified to the national competition authorities (NCAs).

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21. Mergers (2): EU law

Competition Law ◽

10.1093/law-ocl/9780198779063.003.0021 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Richard Whish ◽

David Bailey

Keyword(s):

European Commission ◽

Judicial Review ◽

Merger Control ◽

Eu Law ◽

Eu Merger Control ◽

Merger Regulation ◽

National Competition ◽

The Eu

This chapter provides an overview of EU merger control and the jurisdictional rules which determine whether a particular merger should be investigated by the European Commission or by the national competition authorities. It deals with procedural considerations such as the mandatory pre-notification to the Commission of mergers that have a Union dimension and the timetable within which the Commission must operate. It discusses the substantive analysis of mergers under the EU Merger Regulation (‘the EUMR’) and explains the procedure for the Commission to authorise a merger on the basis of commitments offered by the parties to address its competition concerns. Finally, it describes the Commission’s powers of investigation and enforcement, judicial review of Commission decisions by the EU Courts and cooperation between the Commission and other competition authorities, both within and outside the EU. The chapter concludes with an examination of how the EUMR merger control provisions work in practice.

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