21. Mergers (2): EU law

2021 ◽  
pp. 871-958
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Merger Control ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Member States ◽  
Eu Merger Control ◽  
Merger Regulation ◽  
National Competition ◽  
Control Section ◽  
The Eu

This chapter examines EU merger control. The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of EU merger control. Section 3 discusses the jurisdictional rules which determine whether a particular merger should be investigated by the European Commission in Brussels or by the national competition authorities (‘the NCAs’) of the Member States. Section 4 deals with the procedural considerations such as the mandatory pre-notification to the Commission of mergers that have a Union dimension and the timetable within which the Commission must operate. Section 5 discusses the substantive analysis of mergers under the EU Merger Regulation (EUMR), and section 6 explains the procedure whereby the Commission may authorise a merger on the basis of commitments, often referred to as remedies, offered by the parties to address its competition concerns. The subsequent sections describe the Commission’s powers of investigation and enforcement, judicial review of Commission decisions by the EU Courts and cooperation between the Commission and other competition authorities, both within and outside the EU. The chapter concludes with an examination of how the EUMR merger control provisions work in practice.

21. Mergers (2): EU law

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Merger Control ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Eu Merger Control ◽  
Merger Regulation ◽  
National Competition ◽  
The Eu

This chapter provides an overview of EU merger control and the jurisdictional rules which determine whether a particular merger should be investigated by the European Commission or by the national competition authorities. It deals with procedural considerations such as the mandatory pre-notification to the Commission of mergers that have a Union dimension and the timetable within which the Commission must operate. It discusses the substantive analysis of mergers under the EU Merger Regulation (‘the EUMR’) and explains the procedure for the Commission to authorise a merger on the basis of commitments offered by the parties to address its competition concerns. Finally, it describes the Commission’s powers of investigation and enforcement, judicial review of Commission decisions by the EU Courts and cooperation between the Commission and other competition authorities, both within and outside the EU. The chapter concludes with an examination of how the EUMR merger control provisions work in practice.

9 Merger Control

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Geradin Damien ◽  
Layne-Farrar Anne ◽  
Petit Nicolas
Keyword(s):  
Merger Control ◽  
Eu Merger Control ◽  
Merger Regulation ◽  
Control Regulation ◽  
Legal Nature ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
National Competition ◽  
Control Regime ◽  
The Eu

This concluding chapter discusses the EU merger control regime. Merger-specific law is relatively new to the EU body of law. It was not until 1974 that specific merger regulation was even proposed, and not until over a decade after that that any merger regulation was actually adopted. Regulation 4064/89 (the ‘European Merger Control Regulation’ or ‘EMCR’) sets out an ex ante notification procedure for concentration with an EU dimension. Two reasons seem to have driven the adoption of a merger control regime by the EU. The first is economic. The second reason is of a legal nature. Between 1989 and 2010, more than 4,500 operations were notified to the Commission. This number does not comprise the very many mergers notified to the national competition authorities (NCAs).

An efficiency defence for mergers: Putting an intricate puzzle together

2003 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 254-270 ◽  
Author(s):  
Götz Drauz
Keyword(s):  
Control System ◽  
European Commission ◽  
Merger Control ◽  
Horizontal Mergers ◽  
Eu Merger Control ◽  
Merger Regulation ◽  
Key Issues ◽  
The Eu

Abstract The EU merger control system is currently undergoing a reform. Alongside proposed changes to the EC Merger Regulation, the European Commission adopted draft guidelines for the appraisal of horizontal mergers. One important issue of the guidelines is the treatment of efficiencies within the appraisal of mergers. The purpose of this article is to analyse some of the key issues.

scholarly journals Insights from the Slovak Hybrid Mail Services Case. Case Comment to the Judgement of the General Court of 25 March 2015 and Order of Court of Justice of the EU of 30 June 2016 Slovenská pošta v Commission (Cases T-556/08, C-293/15P)

2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (16) ◽  
pp. 191-203
Author(s):  
Karolis Kačerauskas
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Strange Situation ◽  
Member States ◽  
Commission Decision ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Article 102 Tfeu ◽  
The Eu

The Slovak hybrid mail services case (or Slovenska posta case) is truly unique in EU jurisprudence. Within the last decade, the European Commission rarely applied Article 106(1) in conjunction with Article 102 TFEU to challenge competition distortions in individual cases. Thus Slovenska posta constitutes one of the rare examples of such enforcement. Slovenska posta also constitutes a very rare example of a judicial review of Commission decisions based on Article 106(1) and 102 TFEU. Slovenska posta is only the second case when European courts were called upon to review the application of Article 106(1) and 102 TFEU by the Commission and the first when the judicial review was conducted over a Commission decision regarding “failure to meet the demand”. Indeed, since 1989–1990 (when the Commission commenced to apply Article 106(1) and 102 TFEU to challenge competition distortions introduced by the Member States) and until 2014, when the Court of Justice adopted its decision in Greek lignite (DEI) case, none of the Commission decisions was reviewed by EU courts. Such lack of appeals resulted in a rather strange situation under which the Commission and CJEU developed their own jurisprudence on the application of Article 106(1) and 102 TFEU and occasionally interpreted the same legal criteria differently. In this regard, a court review in Slovenska posta was eagerly awaited in the hope it would reconcile these diverging positions and provide more clarity on the application of Article 106(1) and 102 TFEU.

7. Articles 101 and 102: public enforcement by the European Commission and national competition authorities under Regulation 1/2003

2021 ◽  
pp. 258-310
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Public Enforcement ◽  
Member States ◽  
The Public ◽  
National Competition ◽  
Leniency Programme

This chapter explains the public enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 by European Commission and the national competition authorities under Regulation 1/2003. It begins by describing the Commission’s powers of investigation and enforcement, including its power to accept commitments, its leniency programme, the cartel settlement procedure, and its power to impose financial penalties. It then discusses the operation of Regulation 1/2003 in practice, with particular reference to the European Competition Network (‘the ECN’) that brings together the Commission and the national competition authorities of the Member States (‘the NCAs’) and the ECN+ Directive that strengthens the powers of the NCAs. The chapter concludes by providing a brief account of judicial review of the Commission’s decisions.

The impact of data on EU merger control

2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 151-161
Author(s):  
Stephen Whitfield ◽  
Richard J. Brown ◽  
Ingrid Rogers
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Merger Control ◽  
Global Competition ◽  
Eu Merger Control ◽  
Market Shares ◽  
National Competition ◽  
Legal Frameworks ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Concentration Levels

There has been an increased focus of the European Commission and numerous national competition authorities on data-related mergers, which also fits more generally in the context of a broader global competition law focus on the ‘FAANGs’ (i.e., Facebook, Apple, Amazon, Netflix and Google) and the wider tech sector. This article considers the impact of data on EU merger control and explores the theories of harm and legal frameworks which have been applied and developed in considering data-related competition concerns, in particular the notable developments in the Commission's recent consideration of Apple's acquisition of Shazam. The article considers that the impact of these developments is that data-related mergers should no longer be assessed by reference to traditional economic indicators such as market shares and concentration levels only, but rather also in the context of the broader global competition law focus on big tech.

Controlling the Invisible: Accountability Issues in the Exercise of Implementing Powers by EU Agencies and in Harmonised Standardisation

2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-96 ◽  
Author(s):  
Annalisa Volpato
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Review ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Member States ◽  
Primary Responsibility ◽  
Democratic Control ◽  
Direct Implementation ◽  
The Eu ◽  
Blind Spots ◽  
The Invisible

The implementation of EU law is articulated in a plurality of levels. Article 291 TFEU confers the primary responsibility of implementing EU law on the Member States, but it envisages also a direct implementation at the EU level where uniform conditions are required. However, the reality is more complex than the image enshrined in Article 291 TFEU. At the EU level, the implementation is carried out not only by the Commission and the Council in duly specific cases, but also by bodies not expressly envisaged in Article 291 TFEU, such as EU agencies and private standardisation bodies. The accountability mechanisms for the exercise of such implementing powers are considerably different and, for certain aspects, problematic. The contribution will, therefore, analyse the different forms of implementation which have emerged in EU law and it will compare the mechanisms in place, shedding light on some blind spots in the democratic control and in the judicial review of these phenomena.

4. Direct actions in the Court of Justice of the European Union: Articles 258–260, 263, 265, 277, and 340 TFEU

2020 ◽  
pp. 65-89
Author(s):  
Matthew J. Homewood
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Member State ◽  
European Commission ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
The Eu

This chapter discusses articles in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) that provide for actions that are brought directly before the Court. Under Articles 258 and 259 TFEU (ex Articles 226 and 227 EC), respectively, the European Commission and Member States may bring enforcement proceedings against a Member State in breach of Treaty obligations. Article 260 TFEU (ex Article 228 EC) requires compliance with the Court’s judgment. Article 263 TFEU (ex Article 230 EC) concerns judicial review of EU acts. The outcome of a successful action is annulment. Article 265 TFEU (ex Article 232 EC) provides for actions against the EU institutions for failure to act.

scholarly journals Efforts to Ban the Routine Tail Docking of Pigs and to Give Pigs Enrichment Materials via EU Law: Where do We Stand a Quarter of a Century on?

Animals ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 132 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elena Nalon ◽  
Nancy De Briyne
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Future Scenarios ◽  
Action Plans ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Member States ◽  
Corrective Measure ◽  
Current State ◽  
Tail Docking ◽  
The Eu

In its role as guardian of the Treaties, the European Commission must ensure that Member States enforce EU law within their territories. If adequate enforcement is found to be wanting, the Commission also has the power to take infringement procedures as a corrective measure. The case of Directive 120/2008/EC on the protection of pigs is problematic, as only a few Member States are respecting the ban on routine tail docking, whilst not all pigs are given (adequate) enrichment materials. Twenty-five years after the first EU-wide legal ban on routine tail docking came into force, we are faced with an unprecedented situation that may lead to infringement procedures against more than 20 Member States. This paper describes the various steps that led to the development of the EU law designed specifically to safeguard the welfare of pigs. It lists the numerous efforts (research studies, study visits, recommendations, audits, reports, factsheets, action plans, etc.), undertaken by European decision makers to assist Member States in their efforts to better implement and enforce the relevant rules. Finally, the paper further analyses the current state of play and presents a reflection on possible future scenarios.

The Enforcement of Intra-EU BIT Awards: Micula v Romania and Beyond

2016 ◽  
Vol 17 (6) ◽  
pp. 942-963 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hanno Wehland
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Present Contribution ◽  
Member States ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
The Eu

The European Commission and a number of EU Member States have long disputed the compatibility of intra-EU BITs with EU law. As illustrated by the Micula v Romania proceedings, where an investor seeks to enforce an intra-EU BIT award, which is seen as being in conflict with EU law, this can raise questions as to the extent to which an enforcing court should take this kind of conflict into account. The present contribution systematically analyses this issue with regard to both ICSID and non-ICSID awards, differentiating between enforcement proceedings within and outside of the EU. It concludes that within the EU even the enforcement of ICSID awards cannot be entirely taken for granted where such enforcement would lead to the violation of a fundamental provision of EU law.

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