21. Mergers (2): EU law

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Merger Control ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Eu Merger Control ◽  
Merger Regulation ◽  
National Competition ◽  
The Eu

This chapter provides an overview of EU merger control and the jurisdictional rules which determine whether a particular merger should be investigated by the European Commission or by the national competition authorities. It deals with procedural considerations such as the mandatory pre-notification to the Commission of mergers that have a Union dimension and the timetable within which the Commission must operate. It discusses the substantive analysis of mergers under the EU Merger Regulation (‘the EUMR’) and explains the procedure for the Commission to authorise a merger on the basis of commitments offered by the parties to address its competition concerns. Finally, it describes the Commission’s powers of investigation and enforcement, judicial review of Commission decisions by the EU Courts and cooperation between the Commission and other competition authorities, both within and outside the EU. The chapter concludes with an examination of how the EUMR merger control provisions work in practice.

21. Mergers (2): EU law

2021 ◽  
pp. 871-958
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Merger Control ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Member States ◽  
Eu Merger Control ◽  
Merger Regulation ◽  
National Competition ◽  
Control Section ◽  
The Eu

This chapter examines EU merger control. The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of EU merger control. Section 3 discusses the jurisdictional rules which determine whether a particular merger should be investigated by the European Commission in Brussels or by the national competition authorities (‘the NCAs’) of the Member States. Section 4 deals with the procedural considerations such as the mandatory pre-notification to the Commission of mergers that have a Union dimension and the timetable within which the Commission must operate. Section 5 discusses the substantive analysis of mergers under the EU Merger Regulation (EUMR), and section 6 explains the procedure whereby the Commission may authorise a merger on the basis of commitments, often referred to as remedies, offered by the parties to address its competition concerns. The subsequent sections describe the Commission’s powers of investigation and enforcement, judicial review of Commission decisions by the EU Courts and cooperation between the Commission and other competition authorities, both within and outside the EU. The chapter concludes with an examination of how the EUMR merger control provisions work in practice.

9 Merger Control

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Geradin Damien ◽  
Layne-Farrar Anne ◽  
Petit Nicolas
Keyword(s):  
Merger Control ◽  
Eu Merger Control ◽  
Merger Regulation ◽  
Control Regulation ◽  
Legal Nature ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
National Competition ◽  
Control Regime ◽  
The Eu

This concluding chapter discusses the EU merger control regime. Merger-specific law is relatively new to the EU body of law. It was not until 1974 that specific merger regulation was even proposed, and not until over a decade after that that any merger regulation was actually adopted. Regulation 4064/89 (the ‘European Merger Control Regulation’ or ‘EMCR’) sets out an ex ante notification procedure for concentration with an EU dimension. Two reasons seem to have driven the adoption of a merger control regime by the EU. The first is economic. The second reason is of a legal nature. Between 1989 and 2010, more than 4,500 operations were notified to the Commission. This number does not comprise the very many mergers notified to the national competition authorities (NCAs).

An efficiency defence for mergers: Putting an intricate puzzle together

2003 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 254-270 ◽  
Author(s):  
Götz Drauz
Keyword(s):  
Control System ◽  
European Commission ◽  
Merger Control ◽  
Horizontal Mergers ◽  
Eu Merger Control ◽  
Merger Regulation ◽  
Key Issues ◽  
The Eu

Abstract The EU merger control system is currently undergoing a reform. Alongside proposed changes to the EC Merger Regulation, the European Commission adopted draft guidelines for the appraisal of horizontal mergers. One important issue of the guidelines is the treatment of efficiencies within the appraisal of mergers. The purpose of this article is to analyse some of the key issues.

The impact of data on EU merger control

2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 151-161
Author(s):  
Stephen Whitfield ◽  
Richard J. Brown ◽  
Ingrid Rogers
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Merger Control ◽  
Global Competition ◽  
Eu Merger Control ◽  
Market Shares ◽  
National Competition ◽  
Legal Frameworks ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Concentration Levels

There has been an increased focus of the European Commission and numerous national competition authorities on data-related mergers, which also fits more generally in the context of a broader global competition law focus on the ‘FAANGs’ (i.e., Facebook, Apple, Amazon, Netflix and Google) and the wider tech sector. This article considers the impact of data on EU merger control and explores the theories of harm and legal frameworks which have been applied and developed in considering data-related competition concerns, in particular the notable developments in the Commission's recent consideration of Apple's acquisition of Shazam. The article considers that the impact of these developments is that data-related mergers should no longer be assessed by reference to traditional economic indicators such as market shares and concentration levels only, but rather also in the context of the broader global competition law focus on big tech.

EU merger control: life without the UK – Brexit and beyond

2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-31
Author(s):  
Gavin Bushell ◽  
Emma Whyte
Keyword(s):  
Merger Control ◽  
Control Analysis ◽  
Eu Merger Control ◽  
Merger Regulation ◽  
Additional Burden ◽  
One Stop ◽  
The One ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Practical Implications ◽  
The Eu

Since 1 January 2021, the ‘one-stop shop’ principle under the EU Merger Regulation (EUMR) no longer applies to the UK, and UK turnover is no longer relevant for determining whether a merger satisfies the EUMR jurisdictional thresholds. Merger control analysis will now need to factor in possible interactions with both the European Commission (Commission) and the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA). The two regimes have different procedures, timelines and substantive tests, which will impact on deal planning and strategy. Dual reviews by both authorities will likely lead to an additional burden on merging parties as well as a risk of a deal being cleared by the Commission but blocked by the CMA, or vice-versa. This article assesses the procedural and practical implications of these changes and highlights some of the key risks businesses may face in merger control looking ahead.

EU merger review of the acquisition of non-controlling minority shareholdings: where to now?

2015 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 69-92
Author(s):  
Frank Montag ◽  
Mary Wilks
Keyword(s):  
White Paper ◽  
Merger Control ◽  
Eu Merger Control ◽  
Potential Benefits ◽  
One Year ◽  
Minority Shareholdings ◽  
Minority Interests ◽  
Policy Proposals ◽  
Benefits And Costs ◽  
The Eu

AbstractOn 9 July 2014, the European Commission (the Commission) published its White Paper “Towards more effective EU merger control”, which reviewed the operation of the EU Merger Regulation (EUMR) ten years after the introduction of the substantive test of “significant impediment to substantial competition” (SIEC) and proposed certain specific improvements, including the review of non-controlling minority interests under the EUMR. The 2014 White Paper followed approximately one year of consultation with Member States and interested parties, and was accompanied by a Staff Working Document, which analyses in more detail the considerations underlying the policy proposals in the 2014 White Paper, and an Impact Assessment, which analyses the potential benefits and costs of the various policy options considered.Less than six months after the consultation on the 2014 White Paper closed, Competition Commissioner Margrethe Vestager indicated that the Commission is reconsidering its proposals to allow it to review the acquisition of non-controlling minority shareholdings under the EUMR. This decision has been welcomed by many in the business and legal community as the “targeted transparency system” proposed by the Commission had raised a number of concerns regarding proportionality, legal certainty, cost and administrative burden.Whilst we await the Commission’s next move, this article considers whether non-controlling minority shareholdings should be subject to EU merger control and the extent to which the Commission’s originally envisaged system adequately dealt with the issues it sought to address. This article also proposes a number of principles that the authors suggest should be taken into account when designing a balanced system of merger review for acquisitions of non-controlling minority shareholdings in which the burden of the additional review is proportionate to the goals pursued.

scholarly journals Insights from the Slovak Hybrid Mail Services Case. Case Comment to the Judgement of the General Court of 25 March 2015 and Order of Court of Justice of the EU of 30 June 2016 Slovenská pošta v Commission (Cases T-556/08, C-293/15P)

2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (16) ◽  
pp. 191-203
Author(s):  
Karolis Kačerauskas
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Strange Situation ◽  
Member States ◽  
Commission Decision ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Article 102 Tfeu ◽  
The Eu

The Slovak hybrid mail services case (or Slovenska posta case) is truly unique in EU jurisprudence. Within the last decade, the European Commission rarely applied Article 106(1) in conjunction with Article 102 TFEU to challenge competition distortions in individual cases. Thus Slovenska posta constitutes one of the rare examples of such enforcement. Slovenska posta also constitutes a very rare example of a judicial review of Commission decisions based on Article 106(1) and 102 TFEU. Slovenska posta is only the second case when European courts were called upon to review the application of Article 106(1) and 102 TFEU by the Commission and the first when the judicial review was conducted over a Commission decision regarding “failure to meet the demand”. Indeed, since 1989–1990 (when the Commission commenced to apply Article 106(1) and 102 TFEU to challenge competition distortions introduced by the Member States) and until 2014, when the Court of Justice adopted its decision in Greek lignite (DEI) case, none of the Commission decisions was reviewed by EU courts. Such lack of appeals resulted in a rather strange situation under which the Commission and CJEU developed their own jurisprudence on the application of Article 106(1) and 102 TFEU and occasionally interpreted the same legal criteria differently. In this regard, a court review in Slovenska posta was eagerly awaited in the hope it would reconcile these diverging positions and provide more clarity on the application of Article 106(1) and 102 TFEU.

scholarly journals Local nexus in merger control regimes

2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 155-160
Author(s):  
Daniela Lukáčová
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Negative Impact ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Potential Effect ◽  
The State ◽  
Merger Control ◽  
National Legislation ◽  
Market Shares ◽  
Economic Size ◽  
The Eu

Merger control is one of the competition law tools. While competition authorities in EU act primarily on the basis of national legislation, European Commission controls mergers with EU dimension. The jurisdictional tests relate only to the economic size of the parties and do not depend on the market shares of the parties or substantive impact of the transaction, or on whether the concentration will have any effects within the state. Globalization increases the number of multijurisdictional mergers that are subject to control of several competition authorities within or outside the EU. Differences in merger control proceedings in such cases with regard to the timeframe, or the result of the proceeding, could have a negative impact on the economy in another country. Parties to the concentration could decide to neglect the merger notification due to the timeframe, or complications connected with approving of multijurisdictional merger in other countries with jurisdiction. Therefore, the national authorities’ effort to set in their legislation turnover criteria with local nexus could help to control concentrations with potential effect on competition in their country.

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