Varieties of embodiment in cognitive science

2017 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 227-248 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicolás Alessandroni

This article presents an epistemological multilevel analysis of the embodied cognition studies’ programme. It is proposed that within the cognitive-embodied type it is possible to find at least four distinct hypotheses regarding the role of the body in human cognition: (a) body-in-action hypothesis, (b) extended body hypothesis, (c) ecological body hypothesis, and (d) body-as-a-physical-datum hypothesis. The foundations of these hypotheses and some philosophical debates underlying embodiment are discussed in-depth. After briefly addressing the key contributions of social embodied theories, the article presents a hierarchical model that allows for the analysis of the epistemological consequences derived from each embodiment conception. Finally, a prospective epistemological criticism is introduced to provide a comprehensive and contemporary overview of the issue.

Synthese ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maurizio Meloni ◽  
Jack Reynolds

AbstractThe role of the body in cognition is acknowledged across a variety of disciplines, even if the precise nature and scope of that contribution remain contentious. As a result, most philosophers working on embodiment—e.g. those in embodied cognition, enactivism, and ‘4e’ cognition—interact with the life sciences as part of their interdisciplinary agenda. Despite this, a detailed engagement with emerging findings in epigenetics and post-genomic biology has been missing from proponents of this embodied turn. Surveying this research provides an opportunity to rethink the relationship between embodiment and genetics, and we argue that the balance of current epigenetic research favours the extension of an enactivist approach to mind and life, rather than the extended functionalist view of embodied cognition associated with Andy Clark and Mike Wheeler, which is more substrate neutral.


2017 ◽  
Vol 73 (3) ◽  
pp. 386-406 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew M. Cox ◽  
Brian Griffin ◽  
Jenna Hartel

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to reconsider the role of the body in information in serious leisure by reviewing existing work in information behaviour that theorises the role of the body, and by drawing selectively on literature from beyond information studies to extend our understanding. Design/methodology/approach After finding a lack of attention to the body in most influential works on information behaviour, the paper identifies a number of important authors who do offer theorisations. It then explores what can be learnt by examining studies of embodied information in the hobbies of running, music and the liberal arts, published outside the discipline. Findings Auto-ethnographic studies influenced by phenomenology show that embodied information is central to the hobby of running, both through the diverse sensory information the runner uses and through the dissemination of information by the body as a sign. Studies of music drawing on the theory of embodied cognition, similarly suggest that it is a key part of amateur music information behaviour. Even when considering the liberal arts hobby, the core activity, reading, has been shown to be in significant ways embodied. The examples reveal how it is not only in more obviously embodied leisure activities such as sports, in which the body must be considered. Research limitations/implications Embodied information refers to how the authors receive information from the senses and the way the body is a sign that can be read by others. To fully understand this, more empirical and theoretical work is needed to reconcile insights from practice theory, phenomenology, embodied cognition and sensory studies. Originality/value The paper demonstrates how and why the body has been neglected in information behaviour research, reviews current work and identifies perspectives from other disciplines that can begin to fill the gap.


Studia Humana ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-30
Author(s):  
Paweł Balcerak

Abstract In their work McCulloch and Pitts describe an idea of representing all of nervous activity in terms of propositional logic. This idea was quickly challenged. One of reasons for this challenge was rising believe that logic is unable to describe most of human cognitive processes. In this paper we will analyse premises of original McCulloch and Pitts proposition. Following that, we will ask about ability of symbolic (logical) systems to represent human cognition. We will finish by analysing relation between symbolic and subsymbolic computing, in hope of bridging the gap between the two.


2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 260-267
Author(s):  
Virve-Anneli Vihman ◽  
Diane Nelson

AbstractMost, if not all, languages exhibit “animacy effects”: grammatical structures interact with the relative animacy of noun referents, as represented on various versions of animacy scales, with human discourse participants at one end and inanimate objects at the other. Cross-linguistic evidence attests to a range of linguistic phenomena conditioned by animacy, with complex effects requiring (a) subtler distinctions than a binary contrast [± animate] and (b) more sophisticated analyses than mapping higher animacy to higher grammatical role.This paper introduces the Special Issue, “Effects of Animacy in Grammar and Cognition”, in which the linguistic interest in grammatical effects of animacy is aligned with broader questions concerning animacy in cognition, including the origins of animacy in language, the biases underlying how we attend to animacy distinctions and how animacy affects discourse. Recent work in cognitive science and adjacent fields has contributed to the understanding of the role of animacy across linguistic domains. Yet, despite the consensus that sensitivity to animacy is a property central to human cognition, there is no agreement on how to incorporate animacy within linguistic theories. This SI focusses on the cognitive construal of animacy, aiming to extend our understanding of its role in grammar(s) and theory.


Author(s):  
Evan Thompson

Cognitive neuroscience tends to conceptualize mindfulness meditation as inner observation of a private mental realm of thoughts, feelings, and body sensations, and tries to model mindfulness as instantiated in neural networks visible through brain imaging tools such as EEG and fMRI. This approach confuses the biological conditions for mindfulness with mindfulness itself, which, as classically described, consists in the integrated exercise of a whole host of cognitive and bodily skills in situated and ethically directed action. From an enactive perspective, mindfulness depends on internalized social cognition and is a mode of skillful, embodied cognition that depends directly not only on the brain, but also on the rest of the body and the physical, social, and cultural environment.


2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 366-386
Author(s):  
Tobias Tan

Scholars have recently identified resemblances between pragmatist thought and contemporary trends in cognitive science in the area of ‘embodied cognition’ or ‘4E cognition.’ In this article I explore these resemblances in the account of religious belief provided by the classical pragmatist philosopher William James. Although James’s psychology does not always parallel the commitments of embodied cognition, his insights concerning the role of emotion and socio-cultural context in shaping religious belief, as well as the action-oriented nature of such beliefs, resonate with embodied and embedded accounts of religious belief. James’s insights are readily extended in light of contemporary embodied cognition research to highlight the interdependency between religious belief of individuals and the cognitive scaffolding provided by embodied religious practices.


2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 76
Author(s):  
Jihye Ryu ◽  
Elizabeth Torres

While attempting to bridge motor control and cognitive science, the nascent field of embodied cognition has primarily addressed intended, goal-oriented actions. Less explored, however, have been unintended motions. Such movements tend to occur largely beneath awareness, while contributing to the spontaneous control of redundant degrees of freedom across the body in motion. We posit that the consequences of such unintended actions implicitly contribute to our autonomous sense of action ownership and agency. We question whether biorhythmic activities from these motions are separable from those which intentionally occur. Here we find that fluctuations in the biorhythmic activities of the nervous systems can unambiguously differentiate across levels of intent. More important yet, this differentiation is remarkable when we examine the fluctuations in biorhythmic activity from the autonomic nervous systems. We find that when the action is intended, the heart signal leads the body kinematics signals; but when the action segment spontaneously occurs without instructions, the heart signal lags the bodily kinematics signals. We conclude that the autonomic nervous system can differentiate levels of intent. Our results are discussed while considering their potential translational value.


Author(s):  
Raymond W. Gibbs Jr ◽  
Ana Cristina Pelosi Silva de Macedo

The present paper briefly describes recent advances in cognitive science on the embodied nature of human cognition with the aim to better situating contemporary work on embodied metaphor in language and thought. We do this by talking about key experimental findings in five areas main areas of research in cognitive science: perception, concepts, mental imagery, memory, and language processing (Gibbs 2006a) We also describe some psycholinguistic studies on embodied metaphor understanding, and offer some details on one series of experiments in regard to people's embodied understanding of the DIFFICULTIES ARE WEIGHTS primary metaphor. Our conclusion draws connections between the research on embodied cognition and contemporary linguistic and psychological work on embodied metaphor.


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