The Emergence of the New Cold War: The Syrian and Ukraine Conflicts

2016 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 135-156
Author(s):  
Mediel Hove

This article evaluates the emergence of the new Cold War using the Syrian and Ukraine conflicts, among others. Incompatible interests between the United States (US) and Russia, short of open conflict, increased after the collapse of the former Soviet Union. This article argues that the struggle for dominance between the two superpowers, both in speeches and deed, to a greater degree resembles what the world once witnessed before the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1991. It asserts that despite the US’ unfettered power, after the fall of the Soviet Union, it is now being checked by Russia in a Cold War fashion.

Author(s):  
N. Gegelashvili ◽  
◽  
I. Modnikova ◽  

The article analyzes the US policy towards Ukraine dating back from the time before the reunification of Crimea with Russia and up to Donald Trump coming to power. The spectrum of Washington’s interests towards this country being of particular strategic interest to the United States are disclosed. It should be noted that since the disintegration of the Soviet Union Washington’s interest in this country on the whole has not been very much different from its stand on all post-Soviet states whose significance was defined by the U,S depending on their location on the world map as well as on the value of their natural resources. However, after the reunification of Crimea with Russia Washington’s stand on this country underwent significant changes, causing a radical transformation of the U,S attitude in their Ukrainian policy. During the presidency of Barack Obama the American policy towards Ukraine was carried out rather sluggishly being basically declarative in its nature. When President D. Trump took his office Washington’s policy towards Ukraine became increasingly more offensive and was characterized by a rather proactive stance not only because Ukraine became the principal arena of confrontation between the United States and the Russian Federation, but also because it became a part of the US domestic political context. Therefore, an outcome of the “battle” for Ukraine is currently very important for the United States in order to prove to the world its role of the main helmsman in the context of a diminishing US capability of maintaining their global superiority.


2016 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 39
Author(s):  
Novita Mujiyati ◽  
Kuswono Kuswono ◽  
Sunarjo Sunarjo

United States and the Soviet Union is a country on the part of allies who emerged as the winner during World War II. However, after reaching the Allied victory in the situation soon changed, man has become an opponent. United States and the Soviet Union are competing to expand the influence and power. To compete the United States strive continuously strengthen itself both in the economic and military by establishing a defense pact and aid agencies in the field of economy. During the Cold War the two are not fighting directly in one of the countries of the former Soviet Union and the United States. However, if understood, teradinya the Korean War and the Vietnam War is a result of tensions between the two countries and is a direct warfare conducted by the United States and the Soviet Union. Cold War ended in conflict with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the United States emerged as the winner of the country.


1999 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 34-37
Author(s):  
Amadu Sesay ◽  
Charles Ukeje

The end of the cold war has made democratization, and its barest essential component elections, imperative for all nondemocratic forms of government. This is to be expected, given the dismal failure of the socialist alternative even in the first socialist country, the former Soviet Union. The United States, which is not only the foremost democracy in the world but also the only superpower, has been in the vanguard of democracy salesmanship. Africa, the continent with the least democratic space, has not been left out, as witnessed by President Bill Clinton’s unprecedented tour of the continent in March 1998.Understandably, Nigeria, arguably the most important country in Africa, was left out of the tour, since it was then under the obnoxious, undemocratic, and oppressive military regime of the late General Sani Abacha.


Author(s):  
Andrew Preston

The modern era was the American century, but it was also very much the communist century. Between them, the United States and the Soviet Union held the fate of the world in their hands. If there was to be a just and durable peace after 1945, an understanding between Washington and Moscow would have to be its foundation. Instead, in a conflict quickly dubbed “the Cold War,” the world suffered through four decades of existential tension between the Soviets and the Americans. ‘Superpower’ explains why the Soviets and Americans moved from cooperating in a world war to resisting each other in the Cold War, before exploring the events and ending of the Cold War in the 1980s.


1986 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 163-185 ◽  
Author(s):  
V. Kubalkova ◽  
A. A. Cruickshank

In the historiography of the Cold War a small but active group of American historians influenced by New Left radicalism rejected the view prevailing in the USA at the time in regard to the assignation of responsibility for the beginning and continuation of the Cold War.1 Although their reasoning took them along different routes and via different perceptions as to key dates and events, there were certain features all US revisionists had in common (some more generally recognized than others). Heavily involved as they were in the analysis of the US socio-economic system, the Soviet Union was largely left out of their concerns and it was the United States who had been found the ‘guilty’ party. The revisionists, of course inadvertently, corroborated Soviet conclusions, a fact gratefully acknowledged by Soviet writers.2


2018 ◽  
pp. 29-47
Author(s):  
Alexander Lanoszka

This chapter chronicles how the United States designed and adjusted its alliance commitments in Western Europe and East Asia during the first three decades of the Cold War (1949-1980). The purpose of this chapter is not only to introduce historical events to readers, but also to highlight key variation decision-makers implemented changes in American strategic posture and, by extension, the security guarantees provided to American allies. It covers how the United States expanded its commitments around the world early in the Cold War before contracting them by the late 1960s amid changes to the nuclear balance between it and the Soviet Union.


Author(s):  
Olof Kronvall

Relations between the British colonies in North America and the three Scandinavian countries—Norway, Denmark, and Sweden—predate American independence. Government-level interaction was rather limited until WWII, but cultural links emerged through the extensive settlement of Swedish, Norwegian, and Danish immigrants in mid- and later nineteenth-century America, especially in the American Midwest. During WWII, the United States and Norway became allies in 1941, Denmark became a de facto Allied nation in 1944, and Sweden remained formally neutral while becoming a non-belligerent on the Allied side in 1944–1945. By the end of the war, the United States emerged as a superpower. After initial disinterest, America strived to integrate Scandinavia into the US–led Western security system. Norway and Denmark became US allies and joined NATO as founding members in 1949. Sweden remained non-aligned, but formed close military ties to the United States in 1949–1952. Throughout the Cold War, US–Scandinavian relations were characterized by ambivalence. America and Scandinavia shared the perception of the Soviet Union as a threat and cooperated militarily, but the Scandinavian countries limited the cooperation in important respects. For example, Sweden never joined NATO, and Denmark and Norway did not allow foreign bases or nuclear weapons on their territories in peacetime. America was often frustrated with these limitations but nevertheless accepted them. The Scandinavian restrictions were partially founded on a desire to reduce the risk of a Soviet attack, but there were also fears of being controlled or dominated by the American superpower. Broader ideological factors also played a role. Mainstream Scandinavian attitudes to America, both among policymakers and the general public, ranged from strongly pro-American to highly skeptical. Americans and Scandinavians shared democratic values, but they organized their societies differently in important respects. Scandinavians were exposed to American ideas and products, of which they rejected some and accepted some. After the Cold War, US–Scandinavian relations were increasingly defined by issues outside Western Europe. Denmark abandoned its Cold War reservations toward America and aligned itself closely with the United States when it came to participation in expeditionary military operations. Norway and Sweden have also participated, but to a more limited extent than Denmark. For Sweden, cooperating closely and openly with the United States and NATO nevertheless contrasted with its non-aligned tradition and often conflicted Cold War relations with the United States. After the Russian invasion of Crimea, questions about territorial defense again became more prominent in US–Scandinavian relations. Under the Trump administration, US–Scandinavian relations have been characterized by turbulence and great uncertainty, even though cooperation continues in many areas.


1996 ◽  
Vol 10 ◽  
pp. 149-163
Author(s):  
Arthur M. Schlesinger

Building on an earlier argument that isolationism may well be America's natural state, Schlesinger explains how the apparent rejection of isolationism during the long standoff with the Soviet Union during the Cold War was nothing more than a reaction to what was perceived as a direct and urgent threat to the security of the United States. In the wake of the Cold War's end, the incompatibility between collective international action and conceptions of national interest has highlighted the difficulties of democracies in sending their armies to war, especially those that do not directly threaten national security. While much more can and should be done to enhance the effectiveness of global organizations already in place, what is needed, Schlesinger argues, is both a reexamination of the Wilsonian doctrine of collective security and a greater concentration on preventive diplomacy.


1991 ◽  
Vol 6 (0) ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Chong-Ki Choi

Order is not always the same as justice. But after radical changes of the Soviet Union and east Europe, most analysts and specialists of international politics are trying to predict new world order after Cold War. Of course order gives us concrete situation for making foreign policies and economic cooperation and pursuing them. And order at least frees us from instability of international politics. But order, at the same time, limits each country's right to take alternatives for her interests. At any rate, we need to analyze the international situation and predict new world order after Cold War. What will be the shape of the new world order? Some analyst, such as Prof. Paul Kennedy in the Rise and Fall of Great Powers describe the change in the world as the decline of the superpowers, including both the Soviet Union and the United States. Other specialists such as Prof. Joseph Nye in Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power describes that while the United States will remain the largest state, the world will see a diffusion of power and a growth of multiple inter-dependencies.


2020 ◽  
pp. 94-115
Author(s):  
Brenda Elsey

The case of the 1962 World Cup sheds light on the relationship between the global Cold War and local popular culture in Latin America. Matches between teams from different sides of the Iron Curtain provoked commentaries on life in the Soviet Union and the possible advantages of state-controlled economies. It spoke volumes about the political scenario in Chile rather than in the United States or the Soviet Union. At the same time, football directors navigated Cold War divisions within FIFA to procure their support for Chile’s bid to host the Cup. When hoping to sway the Eastern bloc countries, directors emphasized the vibrant Chilean labor movement and respect for Socialist and Communist parties. This strategy paid off, garnering the vote of both the Soviet Union and the United States. The reluctance of the conservative Chilean government of Jorge Alessandri to invest in the event made it clear that Alessandri had little interest in using the World Cup to promote a political agenda. Nonetheless, the World Cup of 1962 demonstrates how informal actors understood themselves as ambassadors, debated the Cold War, and rendered sport a site of political performance.


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