“Because We Have Nothing”

2020 ◽  
pp. 94-115
Author(s):  
Brenda Elsey

The case of the 1962 World Cup sheds light on the relationship between the global Cold War and local popular culture in Latin America. Matches between teams from different sides of the Iron Curtain provoked commentaries on life in the Soviet Union and the possible advantages of state-controlled economies. It spoke volumes about the political scenario in Chile rather than in the United States or the Soviet Union. At the same time, football directors navigated Cold War divisions within FIFA to procure their support for Chile’s bid to host the Cup. When hoping to sway the Eastern bloc countries, directors emphasized the vibrant Chilean labor movement and respect for Socialist and Communist parties. This strategy paid off, garnering the vote of both the Soviet Union and the United States. The reluctance of the conservative Chilean government of Jorge Alessandri to invest in the event made it clear that Alessandri had little interest in using the World Cup to promote a political agenda. Nonetheless, the World Cup of 1962 demonstrates how informal actors understood themselves as ambassadors, debated the Cold War, and rendered sport a site of political performance.

2016 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 135-156
Author(s):  
Mediel Hove

This article evaluates the emergence of the new Cold War using the Syrian and Ukraine conflicts, among others. Incompatible interests between the United States (US) and Russia, short of open conflict, increased after the collapse of the former Soviet Union. This article argues that the struggle for dominance between the two superpowers, both in speeches and deed, to a greater degree resembles what the world once witnessed before the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1991. It asserts that despite the US’ unfettered power, after the fall of the Soviet Union, it is now being checked by Russia in a Cold War fashion.


2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-31
Author(s):  
Jakub Majkowski

This essay will firstly address the extent of Stalin’s achievements in leading the course for domestic policy of the Soviet Union and its contribution towards maintaining the country’s supremacy in the world, for example the rapid post-war recovery of industry and agriculture, and secondly, the foreign policy including ambiguous relations with Communist governments of countries forming the Eastern Bloc, upkeeping frail alliances and growing antagonism towards western powers, especially the United States of America.   The actions and influence of Stalin’s closest associates in the Communist Party and the effect of Soviet propaganda on the society are also reviewed. This investigation will cover the period from 1945 to 1953. Additionally, other factors such as the impact of post-war worldwide economic situation and attitude of the society of Soviet Union will be discussed.    


Author(s):  
Andrew Preston

The modern era was the American century, but it was also very much the communist century. Between them, the United States and the Soviet Union held the fate of the world in their hands. If there was to be a just and durable peace after 1945, an understanding between Washington and Moscow would have to be its foundation. Instead, in a conflict quickly dubbed “the Cold War,” the world suffered through four decades of existential tension between the Soviets and the Americans. ‘Superpower’ explains why the Soviets and Americans moved from cooperating in a world war to resisting each other in the Cold War, before exploring the events and ending of the Cold War in the 1980s.


Author(s):  
Vladimir K. Кantor ◽  

The author examines a geopolitical line in the development of Russian philoso­phy in emigration. Not only the Russian revolution of 1917, not only the Nazi revolution of 1933–1935, but the Second World War changed the balance of power on the intellectual map of the world. Hitler was defeated by the Soviet Union with the help of the Anglo-American allies. As a result, two blocks emerged. They got a taste for the disposal of Europe and other countries of the United States, the USSR also strengthened, expanding the area of its influence (“Eastern bloc”). Should emigrants return to Russia? Bunin tried, but at the bor­der he turned back after reading articles about Akhmatova and Zoshchenko in the Pravda newspaper. Remain in a devastated and half-starved Europe, which has no time for emigrants? Or choose the third path where the track has al­ready been paved. Russian intellectuals from Germany have already settled in the United States, many have taken root there, some have returned. This, in essence, was the second emigration, the continuation of the first. There was already an experience of flight, but there was also a craving for German culture, which, despite the German Nazism sweeping through the world, Russian thinkers highly valued. They – as it should be in trouble – held on to each other. An example of this intellectual collaboration is Karpovich and Stepun.


2018 ◽  
pp. 29-47
Author(s):  
Alexander Lanoszka

This chapter chronicles how the United States designed and adjusted its alliance commitments in Western Europe and East Asia during the first three decades of the Cold War (1949-1980). The purpose of this chapter is not only to introduce historical events to readers, but also to highlight key variation decision-makers implemented changes in American strategic posture and, by extension, the security guarantees provided to American allies. It covers how the United States expanded its commitments around the world early in the Cold War before contracting them by the late 1960s amid changes to the nuclear balance between it and the Soviet Union.


1996 ◽  
Vol 10 ◽  
pp. 149-163
Author(s):  
Arthur M. Schlesinger

Building on an earlier argument that isolationism may well be America's natural state, Schlesinger explains how the apparent rejection of isolationism during the long standoff with the Soviet Union during the Cold War was nothing more than a reaction to what was perceived as a direct and urgent threat to the security of the United States. In the wake of the Cold War's end, the incompatibility between collective international action and conceptions of national interest has highlighted the difficulties of democracies in sending their armies to war, especially those that do not directly threaten national security. While much more can and should be done to enhance the effectiveness of global organizations already in place, what is needed, Schlesinger argues, is both a reexamination of the Wilsonian doctrine of collective security and a greater concentration on preventive diplomacy.


1991 ◽  
Vol 6 (0) ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Chong-Ki Choi

Order is not always the same as justice. But after radical changes of the Soviet Union and east Europe, most analysts and specialists of international politics are trying to predict new world order after Cold War. Of course order gives us concrete situation for making foreign policies and economic cooperation and pursuing them. And order at least frees us from instability of international politics. But order, at the same time, limits each country's right to take alternatives for her interests. At any rate, we need to analyze the international situation and predict new world order after Cold War. What will be the shape of the new world order? Some analyst, such as Prof. Paul Kennedy in the Rise and Fall of Great Powers describe the change in the world as the decline of the superpowers, including both the Soviet Union and the United States. Other specialists such as Prof. Joseph Nye in Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power describes that while the United States will remain the largest state, the world will see a diffusion of power and a growth of multiple inter-dependencies.


Author(s):  
Simon Miles

This chapter recounts how foreign policymakers operate in a world shaped by the end of the Cold War when the Soviet flag was lowered one last time over the Kremlin in 1991. It traces the events from 1985 to 1991 as the story of a crumbling Soviet Union and a United States that inexorably headed for its unipolar moment. It also elaborates why Washington has not done as it pleased in the world, such as expanding NATO eastward and dismissing Moscow's protestations. The chapter explores how expanding the temporal scope of the end of the Cold War makes for a very different story as taking five earlier years into account changes the picture. It highlights the Soviet Union trying desperately to stop its decline and remain a coequal superpower to the United States, and the United States being keen to speed Moscow's decay, which is a dramatic reversal of fortunes that left an indelible mark on the minds of Kremlin policymakers today.


Worldview ◽  
1959 ◽  
Vol 2 (11) ◽  
pp. 3-6
Author(s):  
E. Raymond Platig

Many well-intentioned people have long recognized the absence in our century of any effective international law, government and mores. They have also wasted a lot of time attempting to conjure up constitutional governments for the world, to codify, revise and extend international law, and to call forth a mostly non-existent world public opinion. In a world rent by such basic ideological and cultural splits as is ours, these efforts are foredoomed to failure.The much more relevant question for one interested in peace in this nuclear-missile’ age is whether or not the United States and the Soviet Union can settle through negotiation some of the political problems of the Cold War. If they cannot agree to “live and let live” as sovereign states in a world of sovereign states, on what basis can we expect that they will engage in that much more intimate collaboration out of which mores, law and government can grow?


MCU Journal ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 128-148
Author(s):  
Donald M. Bishop

Disinformation, the disruptive effects of social media, and the prospect of information warfare increasingly preoccupy national security thinkers. In the twentieth century, years of prewar and wartime propaganda by the Axis powers and the Soviet Union made the World Wars and the Cold War longer and more costly. In this century, China and North Korea represent two nations that have propagandized their populations for 70 years, hardening them against informational initiatives. What are the lessons? How should the United States assemble a strategy to counter propaganda’s effects?


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