Cross-border exchange of tax information upon request and fundamental rights – Can the right balance be struck?: Joined cases C-245/19 and C-246/2019, État luxembourgeois contre B EU:C:2020:795

2021 ◽  
pp. 1023263X2110215
Author(s):  
Saturnina Moreno González
Keyword(s):  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Minimum Standard ◽  
Advocate General ◽  
Cross Border ◽  
Information Order ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Judicial Remedy ◽  
National Tax ◽  
The Right

On 6 October 2020, in joined cases C-245/19 and C-246/19, État luxembourgeois contre B, the Court of Justice delivered a landmark ruling about the fundamental right to a judicial remedy against an information order issued by the national tax authorities of a Member State in the application of Directive 2011/16/EU. The Court ruled that the holders of the taxpayer’s information have the right to directly challenge the request to provide information but, differing from the Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, the Court decided that, when other remedies are available, the taxpayer under tax investigation and other third parties concerned do not have the right to direct judicial remedy against the information order. Likewise, the Court clarified how specific and precise the information requested must be in order to admit that the request for information is foreseeably relevant for the taxation of the concerned taxpayer. Following the Berlioz case, the ruling at hand continues to outline the content, scope and limits of fundamental rights in cross-border exchanges of tax information upon request in the European Union. However, this casuistic approach will not necessarily result in the development of a coherent and general framework of protection, which underlines the need for a common minimum standard to enhance the protection of fundamental rights in cross-border situations.

scholarly journals On The Limits of Judicial Intervention:EU Citizenship and Family Reunification Rights

2011 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 443-466 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Van Elsuwege ◽  
Peter Van Elsuwege ◽  
Dimitry Kochenov
Keyword(s):  
Family Reunification ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Citizenship Rights ◽  
Member States ◽  
Legislative Action ◽  
Cross Border ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
The Right

Abstract This article scrutinises the logic behind the recent judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in Ruiz Zambrano and McCarthy focusing on their implications for the right to family reunification under EU law. Specific attention is devoted to the phenomenon of reverse discrimination in the context of the new jurisdiction test established by the Court, which is based on the severity of the Member States’ interference with EU citizenship rights rather than on a pure cross-border logic. EU citizens unable to establish a link with EU law are often subject to stricter family reunification requirements in comparison to their migrant compatriots and even certain third country nationals. It is argued that this situation is difficult to accept in light of the principles of legal certainty, equality and the protection of fundamental rights. A new balance between EU citizenship and Member States’ regulatory autonomy is established but legislative action is required to solve the outstanding problems.

Case C-176/12 Association de Médiation Sociale: Some Reflections on the Horizontal Effect of the Charter and the Reach of Fundamental Employment Rights in the European Union

2014 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 332-348 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eleni Frantziou
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Advocate General ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Charter Of Fundamental Rights ◽  
The Right ◽  
Employment Rights ◽  
First Time ◽  
The Eu

On 15 January 2014, the Court of Justice (hereafter ‘the Court’) delivered its judgment in Association de Médiation Sociale (hereafter ‘AMS’). AMS brought for the first time before the Court the issue of horizontal applicability in relation to a provision of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (hereafter ‘Charter’), namely Article 27 thereof, which enshrines the right of workers to information and consultation within the undertaking. The case therefore raised questions of ‘undeniable constitutional significance’, as Advocate-General Cruz Villalón had put it in his Opinion, regarding the post-Lisbon enforcement and interpretation of the Charter and, in particular, its application to disputes between private parties.

scholarly journals Case C-243/19 A v. Veselības ministrija

2021 ◽  
pp. 1023263X2110424
Author(s):  
Jaan Paju
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Healthcare System ◽  
Religious Beliefs ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Personal Choice ◽  
Cross Border ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Charter Of Fundamental Rights ◽  
The Right

The issue at stake in Case C-243/19 A v. Veselības ministrija is whether a personal choice on the part of a patient, based on religious beliefs, must be considered when assessing the need for cross-border healthcare. The Court of Justice of the European Union holds that the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union is applicable and the right to freedom of religion can be invoked, in addition to medical criteria. However, the sustainability of the healthcare system can be an objective justification for refusal to grant authorisation for cross-border healthcare. Furthermore, the case clarifies – to a certain extent – the parallel tracks for claiming cross-border healthcare.

European Arrest Warrants and Minimum Standards for Trials in absentia – Blind Trust vs. Transnational Direct Effect?

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 275-287
Author(s):  
Martin Böse
Keyword(s):  
Mutual Recognition ◽  
Minimum Standard ◽  
Minimum Standards ◽  
Cross Border ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Arrest Warrant ◽  
The Right ◽  
Procedural Rights ◽  
Cross Border Cooperation ◽  
The Eu

The right of the accused person to be present at the trial and defend himself in person forms an essential part of the right to a fair trial. In this regard, the minimum standard enshrined in Art. 6 ECHR has been further developed by the minimum rules on procedural rights established by the EU legislator. According to a recent judgment of the Union’s Court of Justice, the Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant still allows the executing state to surrender a person convicted in absentia even if the EU minimum standard is not met. This paper will argue that common minimum standards have repercussions on cross-border cooperation based on mutual recognition and may emerge as a ground for refusal.

scholarly journals The right to paid annual leave as an EU fundamental social right. Comment on Bauer et al.: Joined Cases C-569/16 and C-570/16 Stadt Wuppertal v. Maria Elisabeth Bauer and Volker Willmeroth v. Martina Broßonn, EU:C:2018:871

2019 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 441-448
Author(s):  
Maria Antonia Panascì
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Case Note ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Charter Of Fundamental Rights ◽  
Scope Of Application ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Horizontal Direct Effect

This case note examines the judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union delivered in Joined Cases C-569/16 and C-570/16 Stadt Wuppertal v. Maria Elisabeth Bauer and Volker Willmeroth v. Martina Broßonn on 6 November 2018. It engages with the noteworthy aspects of the ruling, such as the horizontal direct effect of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the Charter), the relationship between primary and secondary law in the European Union legal order and the scope of application of the Charter.

scholarly journals «X and X v Belgium»: the need for EU legislation on humanitarian visa

sui generis ◽  
2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Margarite Helena Zoeteweij-Turhan ◽  
Andrea Romano
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Advocate General ◽  
Eu Legislation ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Charter Of Fundamental Rights ◽  
The Eu

This article examines the recent judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union in the case of X and X v. Belgium (C-638/16 PPU). The issue at stake concerns an application for a visa with limited territorial validity (LTV) requested by a Syrian family at the Belgian embassy in Beirut in order to apply for asylum in Belgium. The article discusses the different interpretations given by the Advocate General and the Court of Justice and agrees with the AG that the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights leaves a limited margin of discretion to Member Sates and imposes a positive obligation to issue a LTV Visa in cases like X and X. It also concludes that the judgment in question clearly shows the need for the EU to adopt legislation regulating the issuance of humanitarian visas under the Visa Code.

Bridge Is Down, Data Truck Can’t Get Through …

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oreste Pollicino ◽  
Marco Bassini
Keyword(s):  
Data Protection ◽  
Personal Data ◽  
Private Life ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Technological Environment ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
The Us ◽  
Charter Of Fundamental Rights ◽  
The Right

The decision of the Court of Justice in Schrems follows the Digital Rights Ireland and Google Spain stances in the Court process of revisiting the data protection framework in Europe in light of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Through the invalidation of Decision 2000/520/EC of the Commission on the adequacy of the US safe harbor principles, the Court of Justice has relied on a very extensive interpretation of the right to private life and data protection. As in the former decisions that have let emerge the existence of a new digital right to privacy, this judgment mirrors some degree of manipulation by the Court of Justice, justified by the goal of protecting as much as possible personal data in the new technological environment.

scholarly journals Data eetention in CJEU Case Law

2020 ◽  
Vol 54 (4) ◽  
pp. 1231-1252
Author(s):  
Tatjana Bugarski ◽  
Milana Pisarić
Keyword(s):  
Personal Data ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Data Retention ◽  
Electronic Communications ◽  
Member States ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Fundamental Rights And Freedoms ◽  
The Right

Possession of accurate, complete and reliable relevant data on electronic communications traffic and timely access of authorized competent state bodies to such data is without a doubt a useful tool in the fight against modern forms of crime. For that reason, it is justified to establish an obligation for providers of electronic communications services to keep certain data on communications for a certain period of time in the realization of which they mediate and to hand over that data at the request of authorized state bodies, in order to use them for legitimate purposes. For this reason, the Data Retention Directive was adopted in 2006, which Member States were required to transpose into national law. However, data retention poses a risk to basic human rights and freedoms, if the regulation establishing this obligation does so without respecting the essence of these rights and freedoms, especially the right to privacy and rights related to the processing of personal data, for which reason the Court of Justice of the European Union declared the Directive invalid is 2014. Despite this decision, Member States continue to regulate the obligation to retain data in their national regulations. In this regard, the question of compliance of these regulations with the fundamental rights and freedoms and principles of the Union is raised. The subject of the paper is the analysis of the case law of the Court of Justice of the EU on this issue after the annulment of the Data Retention Directive.

scholarly journals Limits on Limitations: The Essence of Fundamental Rights in the EU

2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (6) ◽  
pp. 779-793 ◽  
Author(s):  
Koen Lenaerts
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Present Contribution ◽  
Competing Interests ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Charter Of Fundamental Rights ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Eu

AbstractThe concept of the essence of a fundamental right—set out in Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the “Charter”)—operates as a constant reminder that our core values as Europeans are absolute. In other words, they are not up for balancing. As the seminal judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (the “CJEU”) in Schrems shows, where a measure imposes a limitation on the exercise of a fundamental right that is so intense and so comprehensive that it calls into question that right as such, that measure is incompatible with the Charter, as it deprives the right at issue of its essence. This is so without the need for a balancing exercise of competing interests, because a measure that compromises the very essence of a fundamental right is automatically disproportionate. Therefore, the present contribution supports the contention that in order for the concept of essence to function in a constitutionally meaningful way, both EU and national courts should apply the “respect-for-the-essence test” before undertaking a proportionality assessment.

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