The Use of Human Factors Principles in Power Plant Design

1980 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 128-128
Author(s):  
James A. Oliver

The achievement of maximum electric power plant availability has, in the past decade, become a matter of economic necessity, and recently, a matter of increasing political necessity. It has been estimated by knowledgeable utility personnel that the average fossil fuel steam generating system currently has an availability level of approximately 70 percent and that 50 percent of the lost availability is due to human error. It has further been determined that many of these errors are situation induced. The causitive problem is then the design process.

Author(s):  
Kenji Mashio ◽  
Kodo Ito

Integrated process of human error management in human factors engineering (HFE) process provides a systematic direction for the design countermeasures development to prevent potential human errors. The process analyzes performance influence factors (PIFs) for crew failure modes (CFMs) and human failure events (HFEvs) in human reliability analysis (HRA). This paper provides applications of the process to the event evaluation for nuclear power plant design, especially PWR. In this application, the HRA/HFE integrated process had specified further detail for PIF attributes which had not been obtained in HRA, and showed further investigations to treat how operators induced their human errors through their cognitive task process in their work environment. This application showed effectiveness of the process in order to provide design countermeasures for preventing potential human errors occurrence based on the extensive PIFs and their error forcing context in HRA.


Author(s):  
John T. Langaker ◽  
Christopher Hamker ◽  
Ralph Wyndrum

Large natural gas fired combined cycle electric power plants, while being an increasingly efficient and cost effective technology, are traditionally large consumers of water resources, while also discharging cooling tower blowdown at a similar rate. Water use is mostly attributed to the heat rejection needs of the gas turbine generator, the steam turbine generator, and the steam cycle condenser. Cooling with air, i.e. dry cooling, instead of water can virtually eliminate the environmental impact associated with water usage. Commissioned in the fall of 2010 with this in mind, the Halton Hills Generating Station located in the Greater Toronto West Area, Ontario, Canada, is a nominally-rated 700 Megawatt combined cycle electric generating station that is 100 percent cooled using various air-cooled heat exchangers. The resulting water consumption and wastewater discharge of this power plant is significantly less than comparably sized electric generating plants that derive cooling from wet methods (i.e, evaporative cooling towers). To incorporate dry cooling into such a power plant, it is necessary to consider several factors that play important roles both during plant design as well as construction and commissioning of the plant equipment, including the dry cooling systems. From the beginning a power plant general arrangement and space must account for dry cooling’s increase plot area requirements; constraints therein may render air cooling an impossible solution. Second, air cooling dictates specific parameters of major and auxiliary equipment operation that must be understood and coordinated upon purchase of such equipment. Until recently traditional wet cooling has driven standard designs, which now, in light of dry cooling’s increase in use, must be re-evaluated in full prior to purchase. Lastly, the construction and commissioning of air-cooling plant equipment is a significant effort which demands good planning and execution.


Author(s):  
H.-J. Hamel ◽  
Walter Jaeger ◽  
Volker Fattinger ◽  
Heinz Termuehlen

Since roughly 95 % of the fossil fuel reserves in the US are coal and only 5 % natural gas and crude oil, we need clean coal-fired power plants. Today, about 1400 pulverized-coal-fired power plant units are generating roughly 50 % of the US electric power.


Author(s):  
F. J. Moody

Even in the absence of depraved terrorist threats, nuclear plants have been designed to respond safely to postulated accidents. Redundant safety features are built into plants to trigger safe shutdown and containment of possible accidents. The defined accidents range from minor leakage and operator errors to a complete loss of coolant from the reactor. Post-accident scenarios are postulated by experts in reactor and containment thermal-hydraulics, and all other sciences embraced by nuclear power plant design. The probability of failure is determined for all engineered safety systems. Then analytical and experimental programs are employed to predict the long term post-accident thermal-hydraulic state of a plant and its effect on the environment. The postulated accidents and safety system responses include effects resulting from mechanical damage and component malfunctions, such as pipe ruptures and the failure of pumps and valves. The initiating causes can be material failure, human error, and environmental effects from earthquakes, floods, and other severe acts of nature. It is prudent to build on an already established safety and accident technology to include the effects of external, planned attacks on a nuclear plant. This process includes “matching wits” with the minds of those who plot evil, and reinforcing protective security barriers where potential vulnerabilities are detected. Hard questions to ask and answer are, “What are the greatest potential security threats to a nuclear power plant? What possible human activity could make them happen? How can they be prevented?” Reactor and containment thermal-hydraulics contributes significantly to answering these questions.


Author(s):  
Stephen A. Fleger ◽  
Michael R. McWilliams

This paper presents the results of a preliminary assessment of human factors concerns associated with the six reactor control rooms at the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant in Bulgaria. This initiative was sponsored by the Committee of Energy, Bulgaria, as part of a multi-faceted project that examined emergency operating procedures, training, and risk-based maintenance practices at Kozloduy. The goal of the study was to determine the overall adequacy of the interfaces, from a human error prevention perspective, between operator and plant processes as found in the control rooms, and if warranted, to develop a program plan for conducting subsequent detailed control room design reviews. The need for this study was stimulated in part by a report prepared by the International Atomic Energy Agency which found that WWER-440 model 230 reactor control rooms were in urgent need of human factors attention. This paper summarizes the findings from the human factors portion of the study, and discusses potential concerns associated with applying U.S. developed human factors engineering criteria to an eastern European nuclear power plant.


IEEE Expert ◽  
1987 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 56-66 ◽  
Author(s):  
John J. Jansen ◽  
Hans B. Puttgen

2013 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 136-145

<p>The Alfeios River is the greatest in length and flow-rate river in Peloponnisos and constitutes an important water resource and ecosystem of Western Greece. A number of infrastructure works and human activities have been constructed and are operating in Alfeios River Basin, while in the past extensive gravel extraction occurred. The impacts of infrastructure works and gravel extraction mainly in the Lower Alfeios Basin on the hydromorphological river characteristics are described and analyzed. Increased conductivity values were observed at the position close to the steam electric power plant due to the discharge of wastewater. The results show that gravel extraction and infrastructure works, in conjunction with the reduced sediment transport rates, cause long-term adverse effects on riverbed erosion as well as on the water level.</p>


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