Equality and Affirmative Action in International Human Rights Law and its Relevance to the European Union

2000 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-45 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ursula O'Hare

Human rights norms have played an increasingly important role in recent equality cases before the European Court of Justice, including the Marschall case on positive action. This paper aims to contribute to the positive action debate in Community law by exploring the meaning of the equality principle in human rights law and outlining the potential relevance of the human rights approach to affirmative action for the development of the equality principle in Community law. The paper suggests that the equality principle in human rights law, not only permits, but arguably may, in certain circumstances, require states to adopt affirmative action in fulfilment of their obligations to respect the equality principle. Human rights law thus represents a valuable resource upon which the Court could draw in developing the equality principle in Community law. Should the Court have regard to human rights law in framing the future scope of the equality principle in Community law this may result in a bolder approach to positive action in Community law than hitherto adopted by the Court. The paper, however, also recognises the limits of human rights law and concludes with an assessment of those steps which the international community may need to take if the Court is to be expected to draw upon human rights norms in informing its interpretation of Community equality law.

2004 ◽  
Vol 5 (12) ◽  
pp. 1449-1467 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexandra Kemmerer

That the Law is never frozen in time and space is quite a trivial insight – but one, however, that is nonetheless particularly true for the area of international human rights law and the jurisdiction to see human rights norms respected and enforced. No less is it true for international criminal law and European law. It is, of course, true at the intersection of these three fields of the law as well, exactly the place I intend to explore in this paper. And, as we shall see, poetry, that rarely unveiled subtext of the law, is never steady in its foundations.


2016 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 409-441
Author(s):  
Céline Bauloz

While non-refoulement is an absolute principle of international human rights law, its application to seriously ill individuals exposed to premature death and physical and mental suffering because of the substandard medical system in their country of origin seems to have followed a double standard in Europe. On the one hand, medical cases are increasingly treated at the margin of the non-refoulement principle by the European Court of Human Rights, being only covered in highly exceptional cases. On the other hand, seriously ill individuals have been excluded from the scope of subsidiary protection in the European Union as confirmed by the Court of Justice of the European Union. Against such restrictive interpretations, the present article calls for an integrated approach where all non-refoulement claims, including those on medical grounds, are to be assessed along the same criteria so as to ensure seriously ill individuals a genuine right to live in dignity.


2020 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-126
Author(s):  
Tilmann Altwicker

Abstract It is popular to view international human rights law as universal. In a normative sense, human rights universality refers to certain qualities of human rights norms. These qualities have long been under attack, most recently by what is called here human rights nationalism. The main point made in this article is that some of the criticism levelled against normative human rights universality can be accommodated through interpretation. To this end, non-universality of human rights is judicially created (argumentative non-universality). This article offers an analysis of argumentative non-universality in the context of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). It shows that the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) operationalizes argumentative non-universality through a conception of asymmetric protection, by using context as a difference-making fact and by allowing, in certain cases, for a decentralized interpretation of rights under the ECHR. As argued here, resorting to argumentative non-universality sometimes makes sense because non-universality takes seriously the fact that individual freedom is, to some extent, socially and politically conditioned. Furthermore, non-universality allows for reasonable interpretive pluralism, and it contributes to the institutional legitimacy of the ECtHR. In conclusion, the ECtHR is, rightly so, an ‘interpreter of universality’ (as quoted by Judge Pinto de Albuquerque) as it is an interpreter of the non-universality of convention rights.


Author(s):  
Monique Fernandes Santos Matos

ADESÃO DA UNIÃO EUROPEIA À CONVENÇÃO EUROPEIA DE DIREITOS DO HOMEM E A INTERAÇÃO ENTRE O TRIBUNAL DE JUSTIÇA DA UNIÃO EUROPEIA E A CORTE EUROPEIA DE DIREITOS HUMANOS EUROPEAN UNION’S ACCESSION TO THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE INTERACTION BETWEEN THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS Monique Fernandes Santos MatosRESUMO: Dentre os valores que devem fundamentam a União Europeia - UE, o Tratado de Lisboa prescreve: o respeito à dignidade humana, liberdade, democracia, igualdade, Estado de Direito e respeito aos direitos humanos, incluídos os direitos das pessoas pertencentes às minorias. Neste contexto, é importante a análise da importância do papel exercido pela corte supranacional (Tribunal de Justiça da União Europeia - TJUE) e pela corte internacional (Corte Europeia de Direitos Humanos – Corte EDH), ambas atuantes no cenário europeu, especialmente a interação de suas jurisprudências em matéria de direitos humanos. Para tanto, cabe retratar a forma institucional de interação de tais cortes após a adesão da UE à Convenção Europeia de Direitos Humanos, especialmente as atribuições e competências e observância às jurisprudências adotadas por cada uma delas. Não será objeto deste estudo, dado aos limites do objeto, o conteúdo material das jurisprudências de tais cortes em matéria de direitos humanos, nem as questões políticas envolvidas nessa interação institucional. Observa-se uma crescente fertilização e fecundação cruzadas, bem como um diálogo de juízes entre esses tribunais, contribuindo para a harmonização da jurisprudência em matéria de direitos humanos no Direito comunitário. O estudo desse processo é importante para a compreensão da harmonização de direitos humanos no Direito comunitário, bem como para outros contextos regionais que possam porventura utilizar o modelo europeu como referência. PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Direito Internacional dos Direitos Humanos; Direito Comunitário; Sistema Europeu de Proteção aos Direitos Humanos; Tribunal de Justiça da União Europeia; Diálogo de juízes. ABSTRACT: Among the values that ought to base the European Union - EU, the Lisbon Treaty prescribes: respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, rule of law, and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. In this context, it is important to analyze the relevance of the role played by the supranational court (Court of Justice of the European Union) and the international court (European Court of Human Rights), both active on the European scene, especially the interaction of its case law on human rights. To do so, it is worth to delineate the institutional form of interaction of these courts after the EU’s accession to the European Convention of Human Rights, especially the tasks and powers, and the abiding by the case law adopted by each of them. It will not be the object of this study, given the limits of the object, neither the substantive content of the case law of such human rights courts nor the political issues involved in this institutional interaction. It is observed a growing cross-fertilization, as well as a dialogue of judges between these courts, contributing to the harmonization of case law on human rights in the context of EU law. The study of this process is important for the understanding of the harmonization of human rights in community law, as well as for other regional contexts that may possibly use the European model as reference.KEYWORDS: International Law of Human Rights; Community law; European System of Human Rights Protection; Court of Justice of the European Union; Dialogue of judges.SUMÁRIO: 1. Introdução: a importância da proteção aos direitos humanos para o Direito comunitário. 2. Estática das organizações europeias na proteção aos direitos humanos. 2.1. O Tribunal de Justiça da União Europeia - TJUE. 2.2. O Sistema Europeu de Proteção aos Direitos Humanos - SEDH: marco regulatório, estrutura e funcionamento. A Corte Europeia de Direitos Humanos – Corte EDH.  3. Dinâmica da interação entre o TJUE e a Corte EDH.  3.1. Adesão da União Europeia à Convenção Europeia de Direitos Humanos - CEDH. 3.2. Fertilização e fecundação cruzadas e diálogo de juízes entre o TJUE e a Corte EDH. 4. Considerações finais. 5. Referências.


Author(s):  
John Linarelli ◽  
Margot E Salomon ◽  
Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah

This chapter recaps the main themes of the volume, ie that the international law of the global economy is in a state of disorder. Claims about the justice, fairness, or benefits of the current state of international law as it relates to the global economy are fanciful. A more credible picture emerges when one considers who is protected, against what, and those relations that are valued and those that are not. Moreover, these claims above all require a suspension of a reflective attitude about what international law actually says and does. When it comes to international economic law, power is masked behind a veil of neutrality when it certainly is not neutral in the interests it protects and offends. As for international human rights law, it overlooks the ways in which it props up extreme capitalism foreclosing the possibility of transformative structural change to neoliberal capitalism. In its most radical areas, human rights norms have been blocked from making demands on the design of the global economy precisely because of their transformative potential. Among the central critiques of international law presented in this book is that international law must be justifiable to those who are subject to it.


Author(s):  
Phillip Drew

The years since the beginning of the twenty-first century have seen a significant incursion of international human rights law into the domain that had previously been the within the exclusive purview of international humanitarian law. The expansion of extraterritorial jurisdiction, particularly by the European Court of Human Rights, means that for many states, the exercise of physical power and control over an individual outside their territory may engage the jurisdiction of human rights obligations. Understanding the expansive tendencies of certain human rights tribunals, and the apparent disdain they have for any ambiguity respecting human rights, it is offered that the uncertain nature of the law surrounding humanitarian relief during blockades could leave blockading forces vulnerable to legal challenge under human rights legislation, particularly in cases in which starvation occurs as a result of a blockade.


2020 ◽  
pp. 203228442097974
Author(s):  
Sibel Top ◽  
Paul De Hert

This article examines the changing balance established by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) between human rights filters to extradition and the obligation to cooperate and how this shift of rationale brought the Court closer to the position of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in that respect. The article argues that the ECtHR initially adopted a position whereby it prioritised human rights concerns over extraditions, but that it later nuanced that approach by establishing, in some cases, an obligation to cooperate to ensure proper respect of human rights. This refinement of its position brought the ECtHR closer to the approach adopted by the CJEU that traditionally put the obligation to cooperate above human rights concerns. In recent years, however, the CJEU also backtracked to some extent from its uncompromising attitude on the obligation to cooperate, which enabled a convergence of the rationales of the two Courts. Although this alignment of the Courts was necessary to mitigate the conflicting obligations of European Union Member States towards both Courts, this article warns against the danger of making too many human rights concessions to cooperation in criminal matters.


2020 ◽  
Vol 43 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Kirby

This article examines the decision in Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562. It revisits the suggested ‘heresy‘ that international human rights law may influence the interpretation of the Australian Constitution and other legal texts. Accessing universal human rights law, including in constitutional adjudication, was endorsed in the Bangalore Principles on the Domestic Application of International Human Rights Norms 1988. The author suggests that interpreting statutory language in this way is not dissimilar to the common-law principle of interpreting statutes so as to uphold basic rights. But should an analogous approach be permissible in deciding the meaning of constitutional language? Although arguably invoked by the majority of the High Court in Mabo v Queensland [No 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1, in the context of declaring the common-law, so far this approach has not been accepted for constitutional elaboration in Australia. But should this be so in the age of global problems and internationalism?


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