With group power comes great (individual) responsibility

2021 ◽  
pp. 1470594X2098205
Author(s):  
Erin L Miller
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Individual Responsibility ◽  
Group Members ◽  
Specific Individual

When a group does harm, sometimes there’s no obvious individual who bears moral responsibility, and yet we still intuit that someone is to blame. This apparent ‘deficit’ of moral responsibility has led some scholars to posit that groups themselves can be responsible, and that this responsibility is distributed in some uniform fashion among group members. This solution to the deficit, however, risks providing a scapegoat for individuals who have acted wrongly and shifting blame onto those who have not. Instead, this article argues that, in most deficit cases, moral responsibility is borne not by the group but by specific individual members. When an individual acts within a group, she gains an increased potential for doing harm – and, accordingly, heightened duties of care toward others. These duties can, depending on the individual’s position, require amending the group’s rules, procedures, and norms. In most deficit cases, it is individuals who have failed to fulfill these duties who are responsible.

On the Relation Between Collective Responsibility and Collective Duties

Philosophy ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 96 (1) ◽  
pp. 99-131
Author(s):  
Niels de Haan
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Good Reason ◽  
Collective Responsibility ◽  
The Other ◽  
Individual Responsibility ◽  
Type Symmetry ◽  
Moral Demands

AbstractThere is good reason to think that moral responsibility as accountability is tied to the violation of moral demands. This lends intuitive support to Type-Symmetry in the collective realm: A type of responsibility entails the violation or unfulfillment of the same type of all-things-considered duty. For example, collective responsibility necessarily entails the violation of a collective duty. But Type-Symmetry is false. In this paper I argue that a non-agential group can be collectively responsible without thereby violating a collective duty. To show this I distinguish between four types of responsibility and duty in collective contexts: corporate, distributed, collective, shared. I set out two cases: one involves a non-reductive collective action that constitutes irreducible wrongdoing, the other involves a non-divisible consequence. I show that the violation of individual or shared duties both can lead to irreducible wrongdoing for which only the group is responsible. Finally, I explain why this conclusion does not upset any work on individual responsibility.

Socializing Responsibility

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Neil Levy
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Proper Names ◽  
Individual Responsibility ◽  
Urgent Task ◽  
The World ◽  
Institutional Actors ◽  
The Way

There is a near universal consensus that the bearers of moral responsibility are the individuals people identify with proper names. In this chapter, it is suggested that if people take the exercise of agency as a guide to the identification of agents, they may find that agents sometimes extend into the world: they may be constituted by several individuals and/or by institutions. These extended agents may be responsible for morally significant outcomes. The chapter argues that institutions or extended agents may also be responsible for the failure of individuals to satisfy the epistemic conditions on moral responsibility. Individuals may believe virtuously but falsely, due to the way in which cues to reliability are socially distributed. The chapter concludes by suggesting that a focus on individual responsibility may have distracted people from the urgent task of reforming the institutional actors responsible for widespread ignorance about morally significant facts.

Marketing to Inner-City Blacks: PowerMaster and Moral Responsibility

1998 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
George G. Brenkert
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Inner City ◽  
Shared Responsibility ◽  
Individual Responsibility ◽  
Market Segment ◽  
Market System ◽  
Marketing Campaign ◽  
Unfair Advantage ◽  
Marketing Program ◽  
Moral Responsibilities

Abstract:PowerMaster was a malt liquor which Heileman Brewing Company sought to market to inner-city blacks in the early 1990s. Due to widespread opposition, Heileman ceased its marketing of PowerMaster. This paper begins by exploring the moral objections of moral illusion, moral insensitivity and unfair advantage brought against Heileman’s marketing campaign. Within the current market system, it is argued that none of these criticism was clearly justified. Heileman might plausibly claim it was fulfilling its individual moral responsibilities.Instead, Heileman’s marketing program must be viewed as part of a group of marketing programs which all targeted inner-city blacks. It is argued that those marketers who target this particular market segment constitute a group which is collectively responsible for the harms imposed by their products on inner-city blacks. This responsibility is reducible neither to individual responsibility nor to a shared responsibility. It constitutes a dimension of moral responsibility to which marketers must pay attention.

scholarly journals CONCEPTIONS OF SELF-DETERMINATION IN FOURTH/TENTH-CENTURY MUSLIM THEOLOGY: AL-BĀQILLĀNĪ'S THEORY OF HUMAN ACTS IN ITS HISTORICAL CONTEXT

2016 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 245-269 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan Thiele
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Historical Context ◽  
Tenth Century ◽  
Self Determination ◽  
Individual Responsibility ◽  
Central Concern ◽  
Central Notion ◽  
Theories Of Action ◽  
Freedom Of Action

AbstractMan's individual responsibility is a very central notion in Muslim theology. Rational foundations for moral responsibility presuppose, however, that man has in some way control over his actions. It was therefore of central concern to theologians to formulate theories of action that were coherent enough to account for human self-determination. This article examines al-Bāqillānī's reflections on human acts and attempts to contextualise his thought within the discussions of his time. I will briefly review the Muʿtazilites’ theory of freedom of action, against which the Ašʿarite school developed its own position. I will then outline the fundamentals of the opposing standpoint adopted by Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ašʿarī, who proposed to base human self-determination on voluntariness. Finally, I will discuss how al-Bāqillānī drew on and further developed al-Ašʿarī's ideas. Based on the extant volumes of al-Bāqillānī's Hidāyat al-mustaršidīn, I argue that he attempts to coherently organise the school's understanding of the famous theory of “acquisition” (kasb) by affirming two fundamental principles: a) that human acts are created by God and b) that there is nevertheless a real correlation between man and his “acquired” acts.

scholarly journals The program is perfect

2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (5) ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Christensen
Keyword(s):  
Personal Responsibility ◽  
Safety Net ◽  
The United States ◽  
Individual Responsibility ◽  
Narcotics Anonymous ◽  
Social Safety Net ◽  
The Social ◽  
Group Members ◽  
The Individual ◽  
The Life Course

This article examines Narcotics Anonymous (NA) membership in two ways: how blame for failure is displaced from the ‘perfect’ organizational program and onto the individual addict working to remain sober and how this displacement is accompanied by notions of individual responsibility and work. These discourses illustrate the influence of a neoliberal outlook on the life course among ‘clean’ NA members, particularly as the social safety net in the United States has been systematically reduced and replaced by a system that focuses attention on personal responsibility. I show how NA’s ideological approach blinds group members and the larger public to the complexity of addiction, turning addicts who struggle with recovery into failures, through internalized ideological trajectories that root responsibility in the self while discounting context.

Theodicy and Moral Responsibility in the Myth of Er

Apeiron ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 51 (3) ◽  
pp. 259-278 ◽  
Author(s):  
Viktor Ilievski
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Personal Identity ◽  
Memory Loss ◽  
Infinite Regress ◽  
Individual Responsibility ◽  
Freedom Of Choice

Abstract This paper focuses on Plato’s compressed theodicy in the Republic’s Myth of Er, which stems from the famous αἰτία ἑλομένου· θεὸς ἀναίτιος verdict, found at 617e4–5. Its direct implication is the understanding that the souls of the Myth are autonomous in making their choices, and therefore morally responsible for their decisions and actions. God is thus exonerated of all blame for the disappointments and sufferings they are going through, and his beneficent nature is defended, at least within the confines of the Myth’s rudimentary theodicy. It is my opinion that Plato is indeed justified in upholding such views. In order to demonstrate that, I shall try to argue that the claim of individual responsibility – upon which Plato’s theodicy in the Myth of Er is exclusively founded – withstands the charges of determinism and infinite regress of accountability, leveled against it by Annas, Halliwell, et al., and McPherran, Inwood, et al., respectively. I shall also try to make a case against Annas’ and Thayer’s allegations that the memory loss, which is one of the consequences of the reincarnation process, absolves the agent from culpability for the mistakes committed in his/her previous lives, because such loss implicates discontinuity of personal identity. Before engaging with this issues, however, I shall attempt to provide a possible Platonic account of the concept of freedom of choice – the basic precondition for moral responsibility – as employed in the Myth of Er.

scholarly journals Who should fight domination? Individual responsibility and structural injustice

2021 ◽  
pp. 1470594X2110033
Author(s):  
Dorothea Gädeke
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Individual Responsibility ◽  
Power Dynamics ◽  
Social Connection ◽  
Political Responsibility ◽  
Structural Dimension ◽  
Structural Injustice ◽  
The Social ◽  
In Virtue Of

Who is responsible for fighting domination? Answering this question, I argue, requires taking the structural dimension of domination seriously to avoid unwillingly reproducing domination in the name of justice. Having cast domination as a structural injustice that refers to structurally constituted positions of power and disempowerment, I show that the outcome-based, the capacity-based and the social connection model suggested in literature on responsibility, fail to fully meet this challenge. Drawing on insights from all of them, I propose an account that proves more sensitive towards the power dynamics at play in fighting domination. It is based on a fundamental duty of justice, which gives rise to two kinds of responsibility. Dominators, dominated and peripheral agents share political responsibility for domination in virtue of reproducing domination by occupying a position within structures of dominating power; they are required to acknowledge and undermine their position of power or disempowerment rather than simply using and thus tacitly reaffirming it. Political responsibility for domination is distinct from moral responsibility for acting within contexts of domination; in fact, ignoring this difference risks reproducing rather than transforming relations of domination. Bystanders who are not implicated in reproducing domination bear limited remedial responsibility to support this struggle.

scholarly journals The moral responsibility of governments and individuals in the context of the coronavirus pandemic

2021 ◽  
pp. 140349482199025 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jessica Nihlén Fahlquist
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Individual Responsibility ◽  
Character Traits ◽  
National Council ◽  
Ethical Values ◽  
Individual Values ◽  
Building Trust ◽  
Primary Responsibility ◽  
The Government ◽  
Ethics Council

Aim: Not only is the coronavirus pandemic about science and facts, it also raises a number of ethical questions. Some of the most important questions in this context are related to responsibility. First, what is a government’s primary responsibility? Second, how should both the government and individuals consider personal moral responsibility in this context? Method: This paper uses conceptual and normative analysis to address responsibility in the context of the pandemic. The paper also refers to reports published by the German Ethics Council, the Malaysian Bioethics Community and the Swedish National Council on Medical Ethics. Results: The primary responsibility of governments is to create a balance between individual values and rights, one hand, and the health of the population, on the other. There are good reasons to conceive of individual responsibility as a virtue, having to do with the development of crucial character traits and habits. The responsibility of governments is connected to individual responsibility through the values of trust and solidarity. Conclusions: Governments need to communicate clearly (a) how they balance conflicts between collective health and individual rights and values and (b) what the chosen strategy entails in terms of collective and individual responsibility. Success requires attention to ethical values from all involved. Individuals will need to develop new character traits to help manage this pandemic and to prevent new ones. Governments must facilitate the development of such character traits by building trust and solidarity with and among citizens.

Homeowners' Activism in Beijing: Leaders with Mixed Motivations

2013 ◽  
Vol 215 ◽  
pp. 513-532 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yongshun Cai ◽  
Zhiming Sheng
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Crucial Role ◽  
Group Solidarity ◽  
Residential Communities ◽  
Number Of Factors ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Group Members ◽  
Community Pressure

AbstractIt is commonly accepted that leaders play a crucial role in collective action. Existing literature has suggested a number of factors that contribute to the emergence of leaders including, among others, personality, sense of moral responsibility, community pressure, self-interest and institutional exclusion. However, current research tends to suggest that activists are driven by a particular reason to become leaders and that their motivation is static. Based on intensive fieldwork in residential communities in Beijing, this article illustrates that leaders' motivations can be mixed or multiple and that leaders may re-prioritize or adjust their objectives over the course of collective action. The re-prioritizing tends to alter the leaders' behaviour and affect group solidarity and interactions with other group members.

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