scholarly journals The hidden cost of consensus: How coordinated market economies insulate politics

2015 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 205316801561487 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence Ezrow ◽  
Timothy Hellwig
2019 ◽  
Vol 45 (7-8) ◽  
pp. 967-981 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bob Jessop

Although both promote a free market and strong state, ordoliberalism is usefully contrasted with neoliberalization. Ordoliberals aim to achieve this goal by creating a juridico-political institutional fix that provides a stable framework for accumulation. Promoters of neoliberal regime shifts pursue it through strategies of destabilization that exploit resulting crises. Ordoliberalism governs through order, neoliberalization through disorder. Further, ordoliberalism corresponds more to an accumulation regime and mode of régulation-cum-governance based on a productivist concept of capital, reflecting the dominance of profit-producing capital in coordinated market economies. But it also has limited conditions of possibility and is relatively rare. In contrast, neoliberalization corresponds more to what Weber described as politically oriented capitalism, especially a finance-dominated accumulation regime, which is aligned with interest-bearing capital. It occurs in many more varieties of capitalism.


2015 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 56-69
Author(s):  
Nicholas Toloudis

AbstractThis paper tests the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) framework to explain variation in fiscal stimulus measures across OECD countries in response to the 2008-2010 economic crisis. Following Soskice (2007), I argue that coordinated market economies are less flexible with fiscal policy than liberal market economies. Multivariate analysis across 23 OECD countries demonstrates that VoC is more powerful than three competing theories: fiscal institutions, which hypothesizes more stimulus in countries with less restrictive budgetary rules; debt credibility, which hypothesizes more stimulus in less indebted countries; and political partisanship, which hypothesizes more stimulus in countries governed by the left.


2011 ◽  
Vol 13 ◽  
pp. 415-434
Author(s):  
Jukka Snell

AbstractThis chapter considers European economic integration from the perspective of varieties of capitalism. It notes the main threats that integration potentially entails both for liberal and coordinated market economies, and assesses the likelihood of damage to the different models, in particular following the Lisbon Treaty. It is argued descriptively that both types of capitalism can continue to coexist in the European Union, and normatively that it is vital that the integration project is managed in a way that does not fundamentally endanger them.


2007 ◽  
Vol 60 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-36 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cathie Jo Martin ◽  
Kathleen Thelen

This article investigates the politics of change in coordinated market econo\mies, and explores why some countries (well known for their highly cooperative arrangements) manage to sustain coordination when adjusting to economic transformation, while others fail. The authors argue that the broad category of “coordinated market economies” subsumes different types of cooperative engagement: macrocorporatut forms of coordination are characterized by national-level institutions for fostering cooperation and feature a strong role for the state, while forms of coordination associated with enterprise cooperation more typically occur at the level of sector or regional institutions and are often privately controlled. Although these diverse forms of coordination once appeared quite similar and functioned as structural equivalents, they now have radically different capacities for self-adjustment.The role of the state is at the heart of the divergence among European coordinated countries. A large public sector affects the political dynamics behind collective outcomes, through its impact both on the state's construction of its own policy interests and on private actors' goals. Although a large public sector has typically been written off as an inevitable drag on the economy, it can provide state actors with a crucial political tool for shoring up coordination in a postindustrial economy. The authors use the cases of Denmark and Germany to illustrate how uncontroversially coordinated market economies have evolved along two sharply divergent paths in the past two decades and to reflect on broader questions of stability and change in coordinated market economies. The two countries diverge most acutely with respect to the balance of power between state and society; indeed, the Danish state—far from being a constraint on adjustment (a central truism in neoliberal thought)—plays the role of facilitator in economic adjustment, policy change, and continued coordination.


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