scholarly journals Approval of Euthanasia: Differences Between Cohorts and Religion

SAGE Open ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 215824401983592 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miles S. Marsala

Studying the role of social change, I investigated trends in approval for euthanasia between cohorts in the United States and how those trends are influenced by cohort replacement and religious attitudes. Using 16 waves from the General Social Survey (1985 to 2014; n = 6,638), I estimated differences in approval ratings between cohorts using logistic regression models. Models accounted for religious preference, religiosity, age, sex, race/ethnicity, socioeconomic status, marital status, and political ideology. Members of the baby boomer cohort are significantly more likely to approve of euthanasia than either their predecessors or successors, suggesting a cohort effect. Individuals who belong to more conservative religious groups and display higher levels of religiosity are less likely to approve. Cohort has a meaningful effect on approval of euthanasia, successors to the baby boomer cohort might increase their approval as their religiosity decreases and their parents and grandparents increasingly face end-of-life decisions.

2009 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 54-75 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patricia K. Freeman ◽  
David J. Houston

AbstractIs the origins of life debate occurring in the United States an illustration of the culture wars? To address this question we examine attitudes toward evolution using data from the 2006 General Social Survey. Multinomial logistic regression models indicate that attitudes about whether humans today evolved from earlier species of life are more fully explained by orthodox Christian doctrine, not religious tradition, as the culture wars thesis suggests. However, an isomorphism between orthodox Christine doctrine and conservative political ideology has not occurred. While a liberal political ideology is strongly related to acceptance of evolution, these data suggest that only a certain group of political conservatives, those who accept orthodox Christian doctrine, reject evolution as sound scientific theory. Additionally, respondents who “don't know” if evolution is “true” or “false” differ from both the believers and skeptics in that they appear to lack the exposure to either science or orthodox Christian doctrine that would give them clear guidance about what to think in regards to evolution.


Author(s):  
Michael Hout ◽  
Andrew Greeley

This chapter discusses the link between happiness and religion. It draws on meaning-and-belonging theory to deduce that a religious affiliation heightens happiness through participation in collective religious rituals. Attendance and engagement appear key: a merely nominal religious affiliation makes people little happier. Notably, two religious foundations of happiness—affiliation with organized religious groups and attendance at services—have fallen. Softened religious engagement, then, may contribute to the slight downturn in general happiness. In fact, steady happiness is reported among those who participate frequently in religious services, but falling levels among those who are less involved. The chapter also considers the association between religion and happiness outside the United States using data from the International Social Survey Program, an international collaborative survey to which the General Social Survey contributes the American data.


2016 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Victor Puac-Polanco ◽  
Katherine M. Keyes ◽  
Guohua Li

2020 ◽  
Vol 85 (3) ◽  
pp. 507-536 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel DellaPosta

Despite widespread feeling that public opinion in the United States has become dramatically polarized along political lines, empirical support for such a pattern is surprisingly elusive. Reporting little evidence of mass polarization, previous studies assume polarization is evidenced via the amplification of existing political alignments. This article considers a different pathway: polarization occurring via social, cultural, and political alignments coming to encompass an increasingly diverse array of opinions and attitudes. The study uses 44 years of data from the General Social Survey representing opinions and attitudes across a wide array of domains as elements in an evolving belief network. Analyses of this network produce evidence that mass polarization has increased via a process of belief consolidation, entailing the collapse of previously cross-cutting alignments, thus creating increasingly broad and encompassing clusters organized around cohesive packages of beliefs. Further, the increasing salience of political ideology and partisanship only partly explains this trend. The structure of U.S. opinion has shifted in ways suggesting troubling implications for proponents of political and social pluralism.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jae Eui Soh ◽  
Mohammed A. Khan ◽  
William W. Thompson ◽  
Lauren Canary ◽  
Claudia J. Vellozzi ◽  
...  

ObjectiveUsing a large nationally representative dataset, we estimated the prevalence of self-reported hepatitis C testing among individuals who were recommended to be tested (i.e., baby boomer cohort born between 1945 and 1965) by the CDC and United States Preventive Services Task Force.IntroductionHepatitis C virus (HCV) infection is the most common blood-borne disease in the US and the leading cause of liver-related morbidity and mortality. Approximately 3.5 million individuals in the US were estimated to have been living with hepatitis C in 2010 and approximately half of them were unaware that they were infected. Among HCV infected individuals, those born between 1945 and 1965 (usually referred to as the baby boomer cohort) represents approximately 75% of current cases. Because of the substantial burden of disease among this age group, CDC expanded its existing hepatitis C risk-based testing recommendations to include a one-time HCV antibody test for all persons born between 1945 and 1965. The United States Preventive Services Task Force (USPSTF) subsequently made the same recommendation in June 2013.DescriptionMethodsThe following question "Have you ever had a blood test for hepatitis C?" has been administered annually from 2013 through 2017 on the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS). The NHIS is a nationally representative cross-sectional face-to-face household interview of civilian noninstitutionalized individuals in the U.S. The NHIS survey uses a complex multistage probability design that includes stratification, clustering, and oversampling. We estimated the prevalence of hepatitis C testing for adults in the US during the study period from 2013 to 2017. In addition, we carried out stratified analyses comparing those with private insurance to those who did not have private insurance. We reported weighted estimates taking into account the NHIS survey design. The R statistical software (R Core Team, 2018) was used to estimate weighted prevalence estimates for hepatitis C testing.ResultsDuring the study period from 2013-2017, there were 148,674 adults who responded to the ever tested for hepatitis C question. In addition, 33.56% of these individuals were born between 1945 and 1965; among all adults, the weighted percentage of individuals that responded yes they had received a hepatitis C screening test was 12.82% (95% CI: 12.54-13.10%) while for baby boomers the estimate was 13.93% (95% CI: 13.51-14.35%).Figure 1 presents the annual trend in the hepatitis C test prevalence over the study period by birth cohorts. For both cohorts, there were significant increases over time in hepatitis C testing prevalence. The two trend lines began to diverge in 2015 with the baby boomer cohort reporting higher rates of hepatitis C testing. For the baby boomer cohort, there was also a substantial increase in reported hepatitis C testing in 2017 relative to 2016. Similar trends were found for the samples when we restricted the sample to only those with private insurance. Compared to the people with private insurance, the baby boomers with 'Non-private’ insurance, including Medicaid, Medicare, or military- government sponsored insurances, reported higher rates of testing.ConclusionAcross the five-year period from 2013 through 2017, we found increasing rates of self-reported hepatitis C testing among non-institutionalized U.S. adults. For the baby boomer cohort, we saw a substantial increase in testing in 2017, which was likely due in part, to increased awareness among both physicians and patients of the CDC and USPSTF recommendation to have all baby boomers tested. Efforts to increase the awareness of these recommendations should continue. Additional targeted promotions among hard to reach populations should also be considered.How the Moderator Intends to Engage the Audience in Discussions on the TopicThis panel will discuss strengths and weaknesses for monitoring hepatitis C testing using alternative data sources including self-reported data, insurance claims data, and laboratory testing data. 


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Landon Schnabel

This study considers the assertion that religion is the opiate of the masses. Using a special module of the General Social Survey, I first demonstrate that religion functions as a compensatory resource for structurally-disadvantaged groups—women, racial minorities, those with lower incomes, and, to a lesser extent, sexual minorities. I then demonstrate that religion—operating as both compensatory resource and values-shaping schema—suppresses what would otherwise be larger group differences in political ideology. This study provides empirical support for the general “opiate” claim that religion is the “sigh of the oppressed creature” and suppressor of emancipatory political values. I expand and refine the theory, however, showing how religion provides (1) compensatory resources for lack of social, and not just economic, status, and (2) traditional-values-oriented schemas that, rather than just distracting people, shape their politics in accordance with the content of religious belief systems.


Social Forces ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Landon Schnabel

Abstract This study considers the assertion that religion is the opiate of the masses. Using a special module of the General Social Survey, I first demonstrate that religion functions as a compensatory resource for structurally disadvantaged groups—women, racial minorities, those with lower incomes, and, to a lesser extent, sexual minorities. I then demonstrate that religion—operating as both compensatory resource and values-shaping schema—suppresses what would otherwise be larger group differences in political ideology. This study provides empirical support for the general “opiate” claim that religion is the “sigh of the oppressed creature” and suppressor of emancipatory political values. I expand and refine the theory, however, showing how religion provides (1) compensatory resources for lack of social, and not just economic, status, and (2) traditional-values-oriented schemas that, rather than just distracting people, shape their politics in accordance with the content of religious belief systems.


2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (6) ◽  
pp. 247
Author(s):  
Thomas Husted ◽  
David Nickerson

Despite its growing economic and political importance, this is the first study in economics to investigate public opinion in the United States regarding both the allocation of government disaster aid to stricken households and communities as well as total expenditures by government on such aid. This is also the first study to bridge a gap in previous research on disasters by comparing and contrasting our results to related behavioral studies from political science, social psychology and sociology. Combining individual data from the 2006 General Social Survey with county-level information about the local environment of survey respondents, we estimate probit models to ascertain the magnitude and significance of the socioeconomic, demographic, political and experiential determinants of public opinion on these issues. Among other results, we find that Black survey respondents strongly support increasing total aid expenditures and aid to affected households and communities while income, age and a conservative political ideology largely exert a negative influence on these same variables. Surprisingly, the effects of prior experience with disasters and educational level have only a weak effect on the allocation of aid and none on the level of expenditures on aid. These and other results are consistent with only a portion of previous findings from other disciplines. Several implications of our results for current federal disaster policy are discussed and we also suggest directions for further research into this important topic.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vukašin Gligorić ◽  
Allard Feddes ◽  
Bertjan Doosje

Frankfurt defined persuasive communication that has no regard for truth, knowledge, or evidence as bullshit. Although there has been a lot of psychological research on pseudo-profound bullshit, no study examined this type of communication in politics. In the present research, we operationalize political bullshit receptivity as endorsing vague political statements, slogans, and political bullshit programs. We investigated the relationship of these three measures with pseudo-profound bullshit, ideology (political ideology, support for neoliberalism), populism, and voting behavior. Three pre-registered studies in different cultural settings (the United States, Serbia, The Netherlands; total N = 534) yielded medium to high intercorrelations between political bullshit measures and pseudo-profound bullshit, and good construct validity (hypothesized one-factor solution). A Bayesian meta-analysis showed that all political bullshit measures positively correlated with support for the free market, while only some positively correlated with social (political statements and programs) and economic conservatism (programs), and populism (programs). In the U.S., higher receptivity to political bullshit was associated with a higher probability that one voted for Trump (vs Clinton) in the past and higher intentions to vote for Trump (vs Biden and Sanders). In the Netherlands, higher receptivity to political bullshit predicted the intention to vote for the conservative-liberal People's Party for Freedom and Democracy. Exploratory analyses on merged datasets showed that higher receptivity to political bullshit was associated with a higher probability to vote for right-wing candidates/parties and lower probability for the left-wing ones. Overall, political bullshit endorsement showed good validity, opening avenues for research in political communication, especially when this communication is broad and meaningless.


2021 ◽  
pp. 073112142110246
Author(s):  
Adam Mayer

In the last few decades, the United States has experienced several related and significant societal trends—the transition of the energy system away from coal, the intensification of partisan polarization, and the rise of a populist right-wing political ideology, perhaps best exemplified by the election of Donald Trump. We build Gramling and Freudenberg’s little-explored concept of “development channelization” to argue that nostalgic right-wing populism, grievances directed toward the federal government, and partisanship converge to potentially thwart efforts to transition and diversify rural economies. Populist nostalgia and blame are associated with support for expanding the collapsing coal industry but do not predict support for other types of development. There are patterns of partisan polarization in support for extractive industries and wind power, but many development options appear to be relatively nonpartisan. We discuss these findings in terms of populism, nostalgia, partisan polarization, and the potential for rural renewal in the United States.


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