Political bullshit receptivity and its correlates: a cross-cultural validation of the concept

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vukašin Gligorić ◽  
Allard Feddes ◽  
Bertjan Doosje

Frankfurt defined persuasive communication that has no regard for truth, knowledge, or evidence as bullshit. Although there has been a lot of psychological research on pseudo-profound bullshit, no study examined this type of communication in politics. In the present research, we operationalize political bullshit receptivity as endorsing vague political statements, slogans, and political bullshit programs. We investigated the relationship of these three measures with pseudo-profound bullshit, ideology (political ideology, support for neoliberalism), populism, and voting behavior. Three pre-registered studies in different cultural settings (the United States, Serbia, The Netherlands; total N = 534) yielded medium to high intercorrelations between political bullshit measures and pseudo-profound bullshit, and good construct validity (hypothesized one-factor solution). A Bayesian meta-analysis showed that all political bullshit measures positively correlated with support for the free market, while only some positively correlated with social (political statements and programs) and economic conservatism (programs), and populism (programs). In the U.S., higher receptivity to political bullshit was associated with a higher probability that one voted for Trump (vs Clinton) in the past and higher intentions to vote for Trump (vs Biden and Sanders). In the Netherlands, higher receptivity to political bullshit predicted the intention to vote for the conservative-liberal People's Party for Freedom and Democracy. Exploratory analyses on merged datasets showed that higher receptivity to political bullshit was associated with a higher probability to vote for right-wing candidates/parties and lower probability for the left-wing ones. Overall, political bullshit endorsement showed good validity, opening avenues for research in political communication, especially when this communication is broad and meaningless.

2021 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 58-85
Author(s):  
Michael Haman ◽  
Milan Školník

In our research, we focus on the image of the United States in Latin America. We use mainly data from Latinobarómetro, and we analyse Obama’s last year and Trump’s first year in the presidency in 18 countries in Latin America. We use logistic regression to reach conclusions. We also analyse Trump’s tweets to see his Twitter rhetoric. We find that Trump’s election has strongly worsened the image of the United States in the public opinion of Latin America. However, we find that people that believe more in democracy, the free market and national political institutions are more likely to have a positive opinion of the United States. Also, we find that the more left-wing citizens are, the more likely they have a bad opinion of the United States. This article contributes to the theory of trust and research on the public opinion across nations. Also, this article offers insights into the topical research agenda concerning the influence of political ideology on public opinion.


2021 ◽  
pp. 002085232110463
Author(s):  
Jiahuan Lu ◽  
Wan-Ju Hung

Contracting back-in has received growing scholarly attention, but there is little empirical consensus in the literature as to what drives governments to bring previously contracted work back in-house and to what extent. This study performs a meta-analysis to synthesize 332 effect sizes from 16 existing studies concerning the antecedents of contracting back-in across different countries. The analysis indicates that contracting back-in is a market management strategy driven by low levels of market competition, high proportions of for-profit contractors, insufficient cost savings, and inadequate contract management. Meanwhile, contracting back-in is a political move shaped by left-wing political ideology and employee opposition to outsourcing. Environmental factors including unemployment rate, population size, and population density also play a role. This study provides empirical generalizations of previous results and contributes a more coherent knowledge base for future studies. Points for practitioners Our analysis indicates that contracting back-in is driven by a mix of both pragmatic and political factors, but pragmatic factors related to contracting management complexity shape contracting back-in in a more forceful way. Our findings also suggest that factors pushing governments to contract out do not necessarily have an impact on contracting back-in. Government decisions to contract out and contract back-in may be based on different considerations.


2012 ◽  
Vol 36 (4) ◽  
pp. 583-615 ◽  
Author(s):  
Margaret O’Mara

The rise of the global university is often associated with the concomitant wave of late twentieth-century neoliberalism and privatization and correlated with universities embracing “corporate” models of governance. However, it is a phenomenon with roots in the earliest years of the Cold War that emerged out of a set of institutions and policies with diplomatic rather than explicitly economic aims. Notable among these were the programs aimed at bringing foreign students and scholars to the United States and exporting American-style educational experiences abroad. While only a fraction of these foreign visitors had the US government as their primary financial sponsor, they as a class became the object onto which political values of a particular era were projected, from the postwar internationalism of the Truman years to the Great Society liberalism of Lyndon B. Johnson to the free market ethos of Richard M. Nixon and Ronald Reagan. The decentralized and privatized means by which policy makers administered these measures obscured the degree to which they influenced the shape of the higher education system and their wider impacts on the American economy and society. This article explores international educational exchange as a critical element of American universities’ evolving public identity during the Cold War and post–Cold War periods and as an example of the governmental use of the university as an agent of state power and as a tool of political ideology.


Water Policy ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 147-169 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefan M. Kuks

Legally adopted in France and the UK, privatization of water services is still vigorously debated in the Netherlands. Advocates of privatization believe it is the best way to save on utility costs and to increase their transparency. Opponents believe that the Dutch water sector already provides high quality services for low prices, including an additional public performance that is expected to be excluded in a free market. The author argues that the performance of water service providers should not be assessed only in terms of efficiency, but in terms of the effects on the entire water system as well as the protection of small customers. It is quite possible that without privatization, a public agency could also improve its efficiency and become more competitive in relation to other service providers. Privatization seems to be more a matter of political ideology (based on a belief that the public sector operates inefficiently) than a matter of hard facts. The success of privatization depends at least on the performance of a complementary public regulatory regime. The question should not be whether the public or the private sector performs better hypothetically, but how the actual performance regarding public goods and services can be improved.


2017 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 380-401
Author(s):  
Daniel Stevens ◽  
Barbara Allen

Much of the conventional wisdom about partisan media effects is based on the single case of the United States. Without more comparative research, we know little about whether the findings are generalizable, however, and thus cannot be certain of their causes. But comparative research presents several challenges. This paper takes advantage of the case of the War on Iraq to examine the effects of partisan press coverage on perceptions of leaders and ultimately on voting behavior in two countries, the United States and Britain. We test three competing hypotheses of partisan media effects. We find support for the argument that the reputation of the incumbent party moderates the influence of partisan coverage on perceptions of war but also show that opposition partisan media coverage undermines perceptions of the qualities of incumbent leaders. Media outlets that support the incumbent do not have similar positive effects. We conclude that the war cost a left-wing leader, Blair, more than a right-wing leader, Bush, because of (1) the ambivalence of incumbent-supporting newspapers in Britain, (2) the absence of a parallel to the boost in approval that incumbent-supporting newspapers provided for Bush, and (3) greater damage to perceptions of Blair’s attributes among readers of opposition-supporting newspapers.


Author(s):  
Sean Phelan ◽  
Simon Dawes

Neither liberalism nor neoliberalism can be grasped coherently without talking about capitalism and democracy. If liberalism names the political ideology aligned to the historical emergence of “free market” capitalism and Western-style representative democracy, neoliberalism signifies a particular regime of liberalism, capitalism, and democracy that has been globalized since the 1970s, in the form of an active state promotion of market and competition principles that critics see as antithetical to democracy. Liberalism also can be described as the hegemonic common sense of communication research. The political philosophy and ideology that shaped the establishment and trajectory of American democracy was inscribed in the US-foundations of the field. It was internalized in a teaching curriculum—the vaunted liberal arts degree—that inculcated the liberal reflexes of the professions and institutions that employed communication graduates. However, for critical communication scholars—all the way back to the Frankfurt School—liberalism has functioned as an exemplary ideological antagonist: a signifier of political values inseparable from the workings and class dynamics of the capitalist system. This interrogatory view of liberalism underpinned the historical distinction between critical and administrative or empirical communication research; the former signified a desire to interrogate the presuppositions of a liberal democratic capitalist social order that were essentially taken for granted by the latter. It also textured the emergence of British cultural studies in the 1970s and 1980s, which questioned the pluralist assumptions and motifs of liberal media and journalism cultures. In contrast, neoliberalism is sometimes constructed as an ideological antagonist of both critical theorists and progressive liberal identities. Marxist scholars conceptualize neoliberalism as a particular historical regime of capitalism, more corrosive and iniquitous than the “embedded liberalism” of the post-war era in Europe and the United States. Similarly, socially progressive liberals criticize neoliberalism for subordinating public life to market forces and for displacing the welfare state commitments of the Keynesian era. Some on the political left collapse the distinction between liberalism and neoliberalism, seeing them as simply two ways of ideologically justifying capitalist rule. Conversely, some of those most likely to be identified as neoliberals are motivated by a deep hostility to political liberals, particularly in right-wing political discourses where liberal operates as code for left-liberal, even socialist, values that are opposed to a free market identity. Any discussion of the relationship between liberalism and neoliberalism must therefore start by recognizing the contested and nebulous nature of both categories, and their variegated use as signifiers of political identification and disidentification. This article begins by outlining some of the philosophical foundations of liberal thought, highlighting the historical tensions between discourses that privilege economic freedom and those that stress the social character of liberalism. The next section considers different critical perspectives on liberalism, including discussions of the limitations of the account of free speech and press freedom inherited from 19th century liberals. Neoliberalism’s status is examined as a distinct political project that reshaped Western and global political economy from the 1970s onwards, but which had its intellectual origins in 1920s and 1930s debates about the nature of liberalism and its antagonistic relationship with socialism. Following that is an overview of research on neoliberalism and media, where, as in other fields, neoliberalism is commonly invoked as a name for the dominant ideology and social formation. The penultimate section identifies the outlines of a future research program for critical communication researchers, based on critical interrogation of the relationship between neoliberalism and liberalism. The article ends with an overview of further reading suggestions for those interested in making their own contributions to the field. The nature of the topic necessitates an interdisciplinary register that moves between general reflections on liberalism and neoliberalism to questions of particular interest to communication, media, and journalism researchers. There is no attempt to refer to all the communication research of relevance to our topic; liberalism’s hegemonic status would make that an impossible task. Liberal assumptions are arguably most authoritative when they are not named at all, but simply presupposed as part of the common sense framing of the research question.


2017 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 578-593 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kate A. Ratliff ◽  
Liz Redford ◽  
John Conway ◽  
Colin Tucker Smith

This research investigated the role of gender attitudes in the United States 2016 presidential election between Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump. The results of three studies (combined N = 2,816) showed that, as expected, Trump voters were higher in hostile and benevolent sexism than were Clinton voters. Even after controlling for political ideology and gender (Studies 1, 2, and 3) and minority group attitudes (Study 3), greater hostile sexism predicted more positive attitudes toward Trump, less positive attitudes toward Clinton, and retrospective reports of having voted for Trump over Clinton (Studies 2 and 3). Benevolent sexism did not predict additional variation in voting behavior beyond political ideology and hostile sexism. These results suggest that political behavior is based on more than political ideology; even among those with otherwise progressive views, overtly antagonistic views of women could be a liability to women—and an asset to men—running for office.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gordon Pennycook ◽  
David Gertler Rand

Simply failing to consider accuracy when deciding what to share on social media has been shown to play an important role in the spread of online misinformation. Interventions that shift users’ attention towards the concept of accuracy – accuracy prompts or nudges – are therefore a promising approach to improve the quality of news content that users share and therefore reduce misinformation online. Here we test the replicability and generalizability of this effect by conducting a personal meta-analysis of 20 accuracy prompt survey experiments (total N=26,245) that our group ran using American participants between 2017 and 2020. These experiments used a wide range of different accuracy prompts tested using a large variety of headline sets and with participants recruited from qualitatively different subject pools. We find that overall, accuracy prompts increased sharing discernment (difference in sharing intentions for true relative to false headlines) by 72% relative to the control, and that this effect was primarily driven by reducing sharing intentions for false headlines (10% reduction relative to the control). The magnitude of the accuracy prompt effect on sharing discernment did not significantly differ for headlines about politics versus COVID-19, and was larger for headline sets where users were less likely to distinguish between true and false headlines at baseline. With respect to individual-level variables, the treatment effect on sharing discernment was not significantly moderated by gender, race, or political ideology, and was significantly larger for older participants, participants who were higher on cognitive reflection, and participants who passed more attention check questions. These results suggest that accuracy prompt effects are replicable and generalize across prompts and headlines, and thus offer a promising approach for fighting against misinformation.


2021 ◽  
pp. 136843022110488
Author(s):  
Sheridan Stewart ◽  
Robb Willer

Prior theory and research suggest that threats to the status of White Americans may increase support for Donald Trump. Consistent with this, one previous experiment conducted in early 2016 documented this effect (Major et al., 2018), finding that making salient the declining White majority in the United States increased support for Trump’s presidential candidacy among White participants with high levels of ethnic identification. We report the results of five very similar experiments (total N = 3,076) also conducted in 2016, including one conducted on a national probability sample. The first experiment (conducted in January 2016) found that racial status threat increased Whites’ support for Trump. The other four (conducted from February to October 2016), however, all found null results, and an internal meta-analysis of the five studies found no significant main effect overall. Additionally, none of the studies found an interaction of racial demographic shift and ethnic identification in which racial demographic shift increased Trump support among high-identifying Whites. We conclude by discussing a variety of potential explanations for our findings, including (a) that racial status threats did not increase Whites’ Trump support, (b) that racial status threats increased Trump support early in the 2016 election cycle, but the role of this factor in Trump support declined over time, or (c) that this pattern is an example of a broader tendency of declining experimental treatment effects on candidate support over time in campaigns (Kalla & Broockman, 2018).


2021 ◽  
Vol 53 (198) ◽  
pp. 9
Author(s):  
María del Pilar Bueno Rubial

The main objective of this work lies in exposing the evolution and the main features of the US climate policies expressed in its national, subnational, and foreign dimensions that are naturally interwoven. Thus, we assert some of the main features of traditional political approach to climate change include: an emphasis on costs and the impact of measures to address climate change in the American economy and its economic growth; the questioning of climate science as insufficient to justify the costs of the action; the questioning of the differentiation between developed and developing countries as a valid argument for the US to take the lead in international climate action; the resistance to assume mitigation commitments that collide with the principle of national sovereignty and fundamental freedoms inherited from the founding fathers and the related tension between the role of States and free market value. We also recognize that political ideology and partisanship continue to play a key role in climate change polices in the US. While political and economic denialism has not been able to immobilize subnational governmental and non-governmental climate initiatives, it has undermined the opportunity and the responsibility of the US to sustain leadership as international projection. This contribution follows a qualitative approach based on the analysis of climate change policies at different scales. It is based mainly on documentary and qualitative data analysis.


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