scholarly journals US Foreign-Born Workers in the Global Pandemic: Essential and Marginalized

2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 282-300
Author(s):  
Donald Kerwin* ◽  
Robert Warren*

Executive Summary This article provides detailed estimates of foreign-born (immigrant) workers in the United States who are employed in “essential critical infrastructure” sectors, as defined by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) of the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (DHS 2020). Building on earlier work by the Center for Migration Studies (CMS), the article offers exhaustive estimates on essential workers on a national level, by state, for large metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs), and for smaller communities that heavily rely on immigrant labor. It also reports on these workers by job sector; immigration status; eligibility for tax rebates under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act); and other characteristics. It finds that: Sixty-nine percent of all immigrants in the US labor force and 74 percent of undocumented workers are essential workers, compared to 65 percent of the native-born labor force. Seventy percent of refugees and 78 percent of Black refugees are essential workers. In all but eight US states, the foreign-born share of the essential workforce equals or exceeds that of all foreign-born workers, indicating that immigrant essential workers are disproportionately represented in the labor force. The percentage of undocumented essential workers exceeds that of native-born essential workers by nine percentage points in the 15 states with the largest labor force. In the ten largest MSAs, the percentages of undocumented and naturalized essential workers exceed the percentage of native-born essential workers by 12 and 6 percent, respectively. A total of 6.2 million essential workers are not eligible for relief payments under the CARES Act, as well as large numbers of their 3.8 million US citizen children (younger than age 17), including 1.2 million US citizen children living in households below the poverty level. The foreign-born comprise 33 percent of health care workers in New York State, 32 percent in California, 31 percent in New Jersey, 28 percent in Florida, 25 percent in Nevada and Maryland, 24 percent in Hawaii, 23 percent in Massachusetts, and 19 percent in Texas. Section I of the article describes the central policy paradox for foreign-born workers during the COVID-19 pandemic: that they are “essential” at very high rates, but many lack status and they have been marginalized by US immigration and COVID-19-related policies. Section II sets forth the article’s main findings. Section III outlines major policy recommendations.

2020 ◽  
pp. 231150242095275
Author(s):  
Donald Kerwin* ◽  
Robert Warren*

This article provides detailed estimates of foreign-born (immigrant) workers in the United States who are employed in “essential critical infrastructure” sectors, as defined by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) of the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (DHS 2020). Building on earlier work by the Center for Migration Studies (CMS), the article offers exhaustive estimates on essential workers on a national level, by state, for large metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs), and for smaller communities that heavily rely on immigrant labor. It also reports on these workers by job sector; immigration status; eligibility for tax rebates under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act); and other characteristics. It finds that: Sixty-nine percent of all immigrants in the US labor force and 74 percent of undocumented workers are essential workers, compared to 65 percent of the native-born labor force. Seventy percent of refugees and 78 percent of Black refugees are essential workers. In all but eight US states, the foreign-born share of the essential workforce equals or exceeds that of all foreign-born workers, indicating that immigrant essential workers are disproportionately represented in the labor force. The percentage of undocumented essential workers exceeds that of native-born essential workers by nine percentage points in the 15 states with the largest labor force. In the ten largest MSAs, the percentages of undocumented and naturalized essential workers exceed the percentage of native-born essential workers by 12 and 6 percent, respectively. A total of 6.2 million essential workers are not eligible for relief payments under the CARES Act, as well as large numbers of their 3.8 million US citizen children (younger than age 17), including 1.2 million US citizen children living in households below the poverty level. The foreign-born comprise 33 percent of health care workers in New York State, 32 percent in California, 31 percent in New Jersey, 28 percent in Florida, 25 percent in Nevada and Maryland, 24 percent in Hawaii, 23 percent in Massachusetts, and 19 percent in Texas. Section I of the article describes the central policy paradox for foreign-born workers during the COVID-19 pandemic: that they are “essential” at very high rates, but many lack status and they have been marginalized by US immigration and COVID-19-related policies. Section II sets forth the article’s main findings. Section III outlines major policy recommendations.


2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 32-41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Warren

Executive Summary This report presents estimates of the undocumented population residing in the United States in 2018, highlighting demographic changes since 2010. The Center for Migration Studies of New York (CMS) compiled these estimates based primarily on information collected in the US Census Bureau’s American Community Survey (ACS). The annual CMS estimates of undocumented residents for 2010 to 2018 include all the detailed characteristics collected in the ACS. 1 A summary of the CMS estimation procedures, as well as a discussion of the plausibility of the estimates, is provided in the Appendix . The total undocumented population in the United States continued to decline in 2018, primarily because large numbers of undocumented residents returned to Mexico. From 2010 to 2018, a total of 2.6 million Mexican nationals left the US undocumented population; 2 about 1.1 million, or 45 percent of them, returned to Mexico voluntarily. The decline in the US undocumented population from Mexico since 2010 contributed to declines in the undocumented population in many states. Major findings include the following: The total US undocumented population was 10.6 million in 2018, a decline of about 80,000 from 2017, and a drop of 1.2 million, or 10 percent, since 2010. Since 2010, about two-thirds of new arrivals have overstayed temporary visas and one-third entered illegally across the border. The undocumented population from Mexico fell from 6.6 million in 2010 to 5.1 million in 2018, a decline of 1.5 million, or 23 percent. Total arrivals in the US undocumented population from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras — despite high numbers of Border Patrol apprehensions of these populations in recent years — remained at about the same level in 2018 as in the previous four years. 3 The total undocumented population in California was 2.3 million in 2018, a decline of about 600,000 compared to 2.9 million in 2010. The number from Mexico residing in the state dropped by 605,000 from 2010 to 2018. The undocumented population in New York State fell by 230,000, or 25 percent, from 2010 to 2018. Declines were largest for Jamaica (−51 percent), Trinidad and Tobago (−50 percent), Ecuador (−44 percent), and Mexico (−34 percent). The results shown here reinforce the view that improving social and economic conditions in sending countries would not only reduce pressure at the border but also likely cause a large decline in the undocumented population. Two countries had especially large population changes — in different directions — in the 2010 to 2018 period. The population from Poland dropped steadily, from 93,000 to 39,000, while the population from Venezuela increased from 65,000 to 172,000. Almost all the increase from Venezuela occurred after 2014.


2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 577-592 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Warren ◽  
Donald Kerwin

Executive Summary1 This report presents detailed statistical information on the US Temporary Protected Status (TPS) populations from El Salvador, Honduras, and Haiti. TPS can be granted to noncitizens from designated nations who are unable to return to their countries because of armed conflict, environmental disaster, or other extraordinary and temporary conditions. In January 2017, an estimated 325,000 migrants from 13 TPS-designated countries resided in the United States. This statistical portrait of TPS beneficiaries from El Salvador, Honduras, and Haiti reveals hardworking populations with strong family and other ties to the United States. In addition, high percentages have lived in the United States for 20 years or more, arrived as children, and have US citizen children. The paper finds that: • The labor force participation rate of the TPS population from the three nations ranges from 81 to 88 percent, which is well above the rate for the total US population (63 percent) and the foreign-born population (66 percent). • The five leading industries in which TPS beneficiaries from these countries work are: construction (51,700), restaurants and other food services (32,400), landscaping services (15,800), child day care services (10,000), and grocery stores (9,200). • TPS recipients from these countries live in 206,000 households: 61,000 of these households (about 30 percent) have mortgages. • About 68,000, or 22 percent, of the TPS population from these nations arrived as children under the age of 16.


2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Warren ◽  
Donald Kerwin

Executive Summary1 This paper provides a statistical portrait of the US undocumented population, with an emphasis on the social and economic condition of mixed-status households - that is, households that contain a US citizen and an undocumented resident. It is based primarily on data compiled by the Center for Migration Studies (CMS). Major findings include the following: • There were 3.3 million mixed-status households in the United States in 2014. • 6.6 million US-born citizens share 3 million households with undocumented residents (mostly their parents). Of these US-born citizens, 5.7 million are children (under age 18). • 2.9 million undocumented residents were 14 years old or younger when they were brought to the United States. • Three-quarters of a million undocumented residents are self-employed, having created their own jobs and in the process, creating jobs for many others. • A total of 1.3 million, or 13 percent of the undocumented over age 18, have college degrees. • Of those with college degrees, two-thirds, or 855,000, have degrees in four fields: engineering, business, communications, and social sciences. • Six million undocumented residents, or 55 percent of the total, speak English well, very well, or only English. • The unemployment rate for the undocumented was 6.6 percent, the same as the national rate in January 2014.2 • Seventy-three percent had incomes at or above the poverty level. • Sixty-two percent have lived in the United States for 10 years or more. • Their median household income was $41,000, about $12,700 lower than the national figure of $53,700 in 2014 (US Census Bureau 2015). Based on this profile, a massive deportation program can be expected to have the following major consequences: • Removing undocumented residents from mixed-status households would reduce median household income from $41,300 to $22,000, a drop of $19,300, or 47 percent, which would plunge millions of US families into poverty. • If just one-third of the US-born children of undocumented residents remained in the United States following a mass deportation program, which is a very low estimate, the cost of raising those children through their minority would total $118 billion. • The nation's housing market would be jeopardized because a high percentage of the 1.2 million mortgages held by households with undocumented immigrants would be in peril. • Gross domestic product (GDP) would be reduced by 1.4 percent in the first year, and cumulative GDP would be reduced by $4.7 trillion over 10 years. CMS derived its population estimates for 2014 using a series of statistical procedures that involved the analysis of data collected by the US Census Bureau's American Community Survey (ACS). The privacy of all respondents in the survey is legally mandated, and, for the reasons listed in the Appendix, the identity of undocumented residents cannot be derived from the data. A detailed description of the methodology used to develop the estimates is available at the CMS website.3


2015 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 275-292 ◽  
Author(s):  
John H. Aldrich ◽  
Daniel J. Lee

Duverger’s Law suggests that two parties will dominate under first-past-the-post (FPTP) within an electoral district, but the law does not necessarily establish two-party competition at the national level. United States is unique among FPTP countries in having the only durable and nearly pure, two-party system. Following this observation, we answer two questions. First, what contributes to the same two parties competing in districts all across the country and at different levels of office? Second, why is the US two-party system so durable over time, dominated by the same two parties? That is, “Why two parties?” As an answer, we propose the APP: ambition, the presidency, and policy. The presidency with its national electorate and electoral rules that favor two-party competition establishes two national major parties, which frames the opportunity structure that influences party affiliation decisions of ambitious politicians running for lower offices. Control over the policy agenda helps reinforce the continuation of a particular two-party system in equilibrium by blocking third parties through divergence on the main issue dimension and the suppression of latent issue dimensions that could benefit new parties. The confluence of the three factors explains why the United States is so uniquely a durable two-party system.


Author(s):  
Scott Edwards

From 6 June to 20 August, 2020, I undertook a 76-day, ~3800 mile bicycle trip across the United States from the Atlantic to the Pacific oceans. In this talk I will share with you some of the amazing people, landscapes and birds I encountered, mostly in rural towns and along blue highways. The gradually changing birdscape, both in sight and sound, underscored the sensitive ecological gradients to which birds respond, as well as the ability of some species to thrive in agricultural monocultures. Rivers large and small regularly benchmarked my progress, as well as the western journey of Lewis & Clark over 200 years ago. The recent incidents in the US involving African Americans as targets of white violence inexorably caused me to festoon my bicycle with #BlackLivesMatter (#BLM) signs and share my experiences on social media. I encountered a variety of reactions, often positive and occasionally sharply negative, in a sea of generosity and extraordinary kindness as I wheeled my way through towns on the brink of collapse, vast private ranches and the occasional city. Rural America exhibits an abundance of loyalty and empathy for local communities, yet it is sometimes hard for Americans – myself included – to empathize with people they have never met in person. Two imperatives I took away, with ramifications for both biodiversity and political stability, were the need to somehow bring divergent communities together and to encourage empathy at the national level, among communities that otherwise experience each other only on TV.


2018 ◽  
Vol 115 (11) ◽  
pp. 2776-2781 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lucas E. Nave ◽  
Grant M. Domke ◽  
Kathryn L. Hofmeister ◽  
Umakant Mishra ◽  
Charles H. Perry ◽  
...  

Soils are Earth’s largest terrestrial carbon (C) pool, and their responsiveness to land use and management make them appealing targets for strategies to enhance C sequestration. Numerous studies have identified practices that increase soil C, but their inferences are often based on limited data extrapolated over large areas. Here, we combine 15,000 observations from two national-level databases with remote sensing information to address the impacts of reforestation on the sequestration of C in topsoils (uppermost mineral soil horizons). We quantify C stocks in cultivated, reforesting, and natural forest topsoils; rates of C accumulation in reforesting topsoils; and their contribution to the US forest C sink. Our results indicate that reforestation increases topsoil C storage, and that reforesting lands, currently occupying >500,000 km2 in the United States, will sequester a cumulative 1.3–2.1 Pg C within a century (13–21 Tg C·y−1). Annually, these C gains constitute 10% of the US forest sector C sink and offset 1% of all US greenhouse gas emissions.


Stroke ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 47 (suppl_1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jing Fang ◽  
Keming Yuan ◽  
Carma Ayala ◽  
Renee Gindi ◽  
Brian Ward

Introduction: The proportion of US adults who are foreign-born has almost tripled since 1970. While foreign-born adults have lower cardiovascular disease mortality and risk factors (e.g., hypertension) than US-born adults, less is known about the morbidity of stroke in this population. Objective: To compare the prevalence of stroke among US adults by birthplace. Methods: We used data on 223,842 non-institutionalized adults from the 2006-2013 National Health Interview Survey. Birthplace was categorized as US- and foreign-born, and foreign-born was then grouped into 7 regions. Data on years of living in the US was included. Self-reported stroke was defined as ever being told by doctor or other health professional that s/he had a stroke. Select descriptive (age, sex, race/ethnicity, education, health insurance, language of interview, use of interpreter) and health characteristics (hypertension, diabetes, body mass index, alcohol use, smoking status) were used in analysis. Age-standardized prevalence of stroke was compared between US- and foreign-born and then by birthplace regions among foreign-born. Adjusted odd ratios (AORs) were used to assess stroke risk between US- and foreign-born after adjusting for demographic and health characteristics. Results: Sixteen percent of US adults were classified as foreign-born. Age-standardized prevalence of stroke was higher among US- than foreign-born adults overall (2.7% vs 2.0%, p<0.0001) and by race/ethnicity: non-Hispanic blacks (4.1% (US) vs 2.2% (foreign-born), p<0.0001), Hispanics (2.8% vs 2.2%, p=0.03) and non-Hispanic whites (2.5% vs 1.7%, p<0.0001). Compared to US-born men, AORs of stroke for foreign-born men by region of birth, ranged from 0.24 (95% confidence interval 0.08-0.69) for Africa to 1.05 (0.74-1.51) for Europe. Among foreign-born women, AORs ranged from 0.07 (0.01-0.43) for the Middle East to 1.13 (0.54-2.34) for Africa, after adjustment for selected characteristics. Among foreign-born adults, there was no association between age-standardized stroke prevalence and the number of years living in the US. Conclusion: Overall, foreign-born US adults had a lower prevalence of stroke than US-born adults. However, considerable heterogeneity of stroke risk was noted by region of birth.


Author(s):  
Francisco García Martínez

The creation of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) constituted an enormous advance in data privacy, empowering the online consumers, who were doomed to the complete loss of control of their personal information. Although it may first seem that it only affects companies within the European Union, the regulation clearly states that every company who has businesses in the EU must be compliant with the GDPR. Other non-EU countries, like the United States, have seen the benefits of the GDPR and are already developing their own privacy laws. In this article, the most important updates introduced by the GDPR concerning US corporations will be discussed, as well as how American companies can become compliant with the regulation. Besides, a comparison between the GDPR and the state of art of privacy in the US will be presented, highlighting similarities and disparities at the national level and in states of particular interest.


1989 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 267-288 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yinon Cohen

Relying on the 1980 U. S. Census of Foreign-Born Population and the 1979 INS Public Use File, this article compares Israeli-born Americans (including Arabs) to both the United States and Israeli populations with respect to age, marital status, unemployment, education, industry, occupation and income as of 1979–80. Some of the results, mainly those pertaining to the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of Israeli immigrants as compared to their society of origin, corroborate previous research. Thus, Israeli-born immigrants in the United States held top white-collar jobs and were less likely to be unemployed than the rest of the Israeli labor force. Once in America, however, it seems that not all Israeli-born Americans are as successful as portrayed by past research. In fact, the Census data reveal occupational and economic dualism among the population of Israeli-born Americans. The reasons for this dualism are discussed.


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