Creating a comprehensive peaceful assembly law for Ukraine: Idea and ideal

2021 ◽  
pp. 2336825X2098374
Author(s):  
Galyna Mykhailiuk ◽  
Larry A DiMatteo

The right to freedom of peaceful assembly is guaranteed by Article 39 of the Ukrainian Constitution. However, there is no stand-alone law or case law that defines, regulates and supports the process of organizing and conducting peaceful assemblies. This is largely due to the fact that until the 2014 Maidan Revolution (Euromaidan), Ukraine’s history was one of autocratic rule. This article argues that given this historical context, secondary legislation is needed to safeguard this freedom and entrench it into Ukrainian legal culture. The idea of the right to peaceful assembly is sacrosanct. This article analyses the key elements needed to transform this idea into an ideal law. For example, any such legislation should follow the spirit of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), especially in the area of limitations of the personal freedom. Ukraine has moved forward on a broad reform agenda including reforms of the judiciary in order to create an independent and competent court system. It is widely recognized that such a system is needed to fight widespread corruption. The article argues that now is the time to enact a law on peaceful assembly in order to elevate Ukraine’s legal system to EU and international standards.

2021 ◽  
Vol 93 (2) ◽  
pp. 479-493
Author(s):  
Dimitrije Đukić

Confidentiality of communication is a very important human right that gains in importance when the communication is conducted between a lawyer and a client. Namely, for a lawyer to be able to adequately represent their client, the client must be sure that the information they entrust to the lawyer will not reach third parties, i.e. that the communication will remain confidential. In this sense, protecting the confidentiality of communication between a lawyer and a client is very important not only for representing the client in each case, but also for the proper functioning of the legal system. This paper aims to establish which articles of the European Convention protect the right to a confidential communication between a lawyer and a client and how this communication is protected in practice by the European Court of Human Rights. The paper also examines whether it is possible to prescribe a measure by which such an important right as the right to privileged and confidential communication between a lawyer and a client could be limited and if so under what conditions.


Author(s):  
Andrés Gascón-Cuenca ◽  
Alejando Año-Ibiza ◽  
Marcos Diago-Sanz ◽  
Olga Lenzi ◽  
Lorena Mercader-Jiménez ◽  
...  

he Public Safety Organic Act 4/2015, also known as Spanish "gag law", has been harshly criticized by both national and international experts, and several worldwide institutions, due to the fact that it may be considered contrary to human rights and fundamental freedoms. This report focuses on the identification of the standards of protection of the right to peaceful public assembly and the challenges this new regulation poses to it. Therefore, we will cover the following areas: On the one hand, we shall analyze the Spanish legal framework, that includes the following: Article 21 of the Spanish Constitution, which offers a special protection to the right to peaceful public assembly. The constitutional standards of protection. The problem of the definition of this right. The case-law of the Constitutional Court, in order to identify the standards of protection set by it. Articles 513 and 557 of the Criminal Code. The Private Security Services Act, as it regulates some aspects that may interfere with fundamental rights, as the one we are studying in this report. Finally, we will analyze the regulation established by the new Public Safety Organic Act, entered into force in 2015, and also the Peaceful Public Assembly Regulatory Act. On the other hand, we will research into the international standards of protection of the right to peaceful public assembly, which are mainly settled in three international legal instruments: The Human Rights Council, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the European Convention on Humans Rights, and its case-law. Finally, we shall conclude this report with a critical approach to the new regulation established by the Public Safety Organic Act, as we consider it precludes the standards of protection we will identify throughout the report.


2014 ◽  
pp. 33-48
Author(s):  
Przemysław Florjanowicz-Błachut

The core function of the judiciary is the administration of justice through delivering judgments and other decisions. The crucial role for its acceptance and legitimization by not only lawyers, but also individulas (parties) and the hole society plays judicial reasoning. It should reflect on judge’s independence within the exercise of his office and show also judicial self-restraint or activism. The axiology and the standards of proper judicial reasoning are anchored both in constitutional and supranational law and case-law. Polish Constitutional Tribunal derives a duty to give reasoning from the right to a fair trial – right to be heard and bring own submissions before the court (Article 45 § 1 of the Constitution), the right to appeal against judgments and decisions made at first stage (Article 78), the rule of two stages of the court proceedings (Article 176) and rule of law clause (Article 2), that comprises inter alia right to due process of law and the rule of legitimate expactation / the protection of trust (Vertrauensschutz). European Court of Human Rights derives this duty to give reasons from the guarantees of the right to a fair trial enshrined in Article 6 § 1 of European Convention of Human Rights. In its case-law the ECtHR, taking into account the margin of appreciation concept, formulated a number of positive and negative requirements, that should be met in case of proper reasoning. The obligation for courts to give sufficient reasons for their decisions is also anchored in European Union law. European Court of Justice derives this duty from the right to fair trial enshrined in Articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Standards of the courts reasoning developed by Polish constitutional court an the European courts (ECJ and ECtHR) are in fact convergent and coherent. National judges should take them into consideration in every case, to legitimize its outcome and enhance justice delivery.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Léon E Dijkman

Abstract Germany is one of few jurisdictions with a bifurcated patent system, under which infringement and validity of a patent are established in separate proceedings. Because validity proceedings normally take longer to conclude, it can occur that remedies for infringement are imposed before a decision on the patent’s validity is available. This phenomenon is colloquially known as the ‘injunction gap’ and has been the subject of increasing criticism over the past years. In this article, I examine the injunction gap from the perspective of the right to a fair trial enshrined in Art. 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. I find that the case law of the European Court of Human Rights interpreting this provision supports criticism of the injunction gap, because imposing infringement remedies with potentially far-reaching consequences before the validity of a patent has been established by a court of law arguably violates defendants’ right to be heard. Such reliance on the patent office’s grant decision is no longer warranted in the light of contemporary invalidation rates. I conclude that the proliferation of the injunction gap should be curbed by an approach to a stay of proceedings which is in line with the test for stays as formulated by Germany’s Federal Supreme Court. Under this test, courts should stay infringement proceedings until the Federal Patent Court or the EPO’s Board of Appeal have ruled on the validity of a patent whenever it is more likely than not that it will be invalidated.


Global Jurist ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 13 (2-3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Can Öztaş

AbstractEuropean human rights protection, ensured by the European Convention and Court of Human Rights, is declared to be universal and inclusive, protecting not only citizens of Europe but also anybody residing within the jurisdiction of the signatory countries. This article challenges this declaration and argues, with the help of some examples from the case law, that European human rights protection is based on the defined concepts of European-ness that exclude the perceived non-European within the Convention and the Court system.


2009 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 353-375 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Hilson

Abstract The aim of this chapter is to provide an initial attempt at analysis of the place of risk within the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and, where appropriate, the Commission, focusing on the related issues of public concern and perception of risk and how the ECHR dispute bodies have addressed these. It will argue that, for quite some time, the Court has tended to adopt a particular, liberal conception of risk in which it stresses the right of applicants to be provided with information on risk to enable them to make effective choices. Historically, where public concerns in relation to particular risks are greater than those of scientific experts—nuclear radiation being the prime example in the case law—the Court has adopted a particularly restrictive approach, stressing the need for risk to be ‘imminent’ in order to engage the relevant Convention protections. However, more recently, there have been emerging but as yet still rather undeveloped signs of the Court adopting a more sensitive approach to risk. One possible explanation for this lies in the Court’s growing awareness of and reference to the Aarhus Convention. What we have yet to see—because there has not yet been a recent, post-Aarhus example involving such facts—is a case where no imminent risk is evident. Nevertheless, the chapter concludes that the Court’s old-style approach to public concern in such cases, in which it rode roughshod over rights to judicial review, is out of line with the third, access to justice limb of Aarhus.


2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 244-269
Author(s):  
Christine Carpenter

Abstract Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights protects the right to freedom of religion and conscience. The language of Article 9(1) has been interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights as including protections for acts of proselytism, when properly committed and respectful of the rights and freedoms of others. This was the view taken in the foundational Article 9 case of the Court, Kokkinakis v. Greece. In the decades since Kokkinakis, however, the view of the Court on proselytism appears to have shifted, in particular in Article 9 cases involving religious garments. This article seeks to determine whether the Court is consistent in its views on proselytism between these religious garment cases and earlier examples of Article 9 case law.


Author(s):  
Bernadette Rainey ◽  
Elizabeth Wicks ◽  
Andclare Ovey

This chapter examines the protection of the right to free elections in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). It discusses the provisions of Article 3 of Protocol 1 and highlights the increasing number of complaints of violations of this Article, which indicates that the Strasbourg Court is giving fresh emphasis to this provision as essential to the foundations of democratic legitimacy of the State. The chapter also discusses case-law on the nature of the legislature, electoral systems, the right to vote, and the right to stand for election.


2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 342-362
Author(s):  
Ergul Celiksoy

In November 2018, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights delivered its judgment in the case of Beuze v Belgium. Relying on Ibrahim and Others v the United Kingdom, the Grand Chamber held that the Salduz principles require a two-stage test of analysis, and hence, ruled out that systematic statutory restriction of a general and mandatory nature would in itself constitute an automatic violation of Article 6 § 3(c) of the European Convention on Human Rights. However, the Beuze judgment appears to be very controversial, since the Grand Chamber failed to put forward any convincing reason why it departed from previous case law, particularly Dayanan v Turkey and other judgments against Turkey. In their separate opinion, the concurring Judges in Beuze were concerned that the Beuze judgment overruled ‘ Salduz itself and all other cases that have applied the Salduz test’, and thus, ‘actually distorts and changes the Salduz principle and devalues the right that the Court established previously’. This article analyses the Beuze judgment in the light of the Court’s recent jurisprudence in order to examine whether it contradicts and dilutes the principles previously set out. Further, it discusses the implications of the new standards established in Ibrahim and Others and in subsequent cases, particularly Beuze. Particular attention is paid to the questions of how ‘fair’ is the application of overall fairness assessment in every case, how may the Court’s changing direction of approach concerning the right to access to a lawyer affect the increasing trend of recognition thereof, as a rule, by the contracting states, and finally, to what extent the new principles, especially those established in Beuze, comply with Directive 2013/48/EU on the right of access to a lawyer.


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