scholarly journals The protection of confidential communication between a lawyer and a client in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights

2021 ◽  
Vol 93 (2) ◽  
pp. 479-493
Author(s):  
Dimitrije Đukić

Confidentiality of communication is a very important human right that gains in importance when the communication is conducted between a lawyer and a client. Namely, for a lawyer to be able to adequately represent their client, the client must be sure that the information they entrust to the lawyer will not reach third parties, i.e. that the communication will remain confidential. In this sense, protecting the confidentiality of communication between a lawyer and a client is very important not only for representing the client in each case, but also for the proper functioning of the legal system. This paper aims to establish which articles of the European Convention protect the right to a confidential communication between a lawyer and a client and how this communication is protected in practice by the European Court of Human Rights. The paper also examines whether it is possible to prescribe a measure by which such an important right as the right to privileged and confidential communication between a lawyer and a client could be limited and if so under what conditions.

2021 ◽  
pp. 159-170
Author(s):  
Majida Lubura

A basic human right - the right to life, even today faces numerous questions when it comes to its scope. One of those questions is the issue of the right to abortion, which is the subject of numerous controversies among lawyers, philosophers, medical workers, theologists, as well as among citizens in the broadest sense. Debates that exist in various scientific disciplines indicate the complexity of these issues that needs to be legally regulated at the domestic and international level. For that reason, it is necessary to follow and study the judgments of international bodies that have been passed in connection with this issue. As the most developed system of Human Rights protection has been established within the European Convention on Human Rights, and at the same time the most relevant for our country, in this paper the author studies the current practice of the European Court of Human Rights related to the right to abortion. It is evident, from the case law presented in this paper that the Court had a very delicate and difficult task to balance between diametrically opposing rights and interests of various interested parties. The Court's judgments show a consensus only regarding the question of the existence of the right to abortion in cases where the right to life and health of women is endangered. Opponents of abortion claim that in this case, it is not the right to abortion, but the right to life of a woman and that only then an abortion is allowed and justified to be performed, as well as that it is a conclusion that can be deduced from the Court's case law. However, the author of this paper believes that even though the practice of the court is quite neutral, it still tends more towards granting the right to safe abortion.


2012 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 31-41
Author(s):  
Anita Nagy

As for the right to a fair trial sanctioned by the convention, our most determining deficiencies arise regarding the compliance with a reasonable period of time. Despite of the relatively small number of the Hungarian infringements of the European Convention on Human Rights, the expectation of sufficiently efficient dispositions eliminating the prolongation of the judicial procedures applies for Hungary as well. In general, it can be concluded that the Hungarian legal system provides the basic human right to fair trial. This claim is supported by the low number of infringements in Hungary. In this study I sought to present the data related to the Hungarian cases proceeding at the European Court of Human Rights, as well as elementswarranting the emergence of the right to a fair trial assured by Article 6, together with the aspects during the monitoring of the cases of the prolongation of the judicial procedures respected by the Court of Strasbourg. Finally I aimed to delineate the aforesaid apropos of a representative and an exceptional case in respect of the practice of the Court as well.


2019 ◽  
Vol 56 (2) ◽  
pp. 443-467
Author(s):  
Hamdija Šarkinović

The paper deals with property, which is guaranteed by Article 58 of the Constitution of Montenegro and Article 1 of Protocol No.1 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The constitutional-law concept of the right to property in Montenegro is broader than the traditional civil law concept, as it includes all real rights, as the European Court under the notion of property, in addition to the usual, includes all acquired rights of a person. The autonomous concept of property and possessions within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms was separately covered, consisting of three rules: principle of peaceful enjoyment of possessions, deprivation of possessions, and control of the use of property. The application of the text of justification of interference with property in the case law of the European Court is explained, which includes the text of legality, the text of a legitimate aim in the general or public interest and the text of proportionality. However, the case law of the ordinary courts in the field of guarantees of property rights, constitutional and convention’s is not harmonized with the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and represents one of the main tasks of the Constitutional Court in the coming period. The Constitutional Court of Montenegro follows the concept of property enshrined in the Constitution and gives the property meaning as the constitutional and convention human right guaranteed by the Constitution, and its inviolability as one of the fundamental values of the constitutional order, although the case law of the Constitutional Court has not fully and always been coherent with the aforementioned principles.


2014 ◽  
pp. 33-48
Author(s):  
Przemysław Florjanowicz-Błachut

The core function of the judiciary is the administration of justice through delivering judgments and other decisions. The crucial role for its acceptance and legitimization by not only lawyers, but also individulas (parties) and the hole society plays judicial reasoning. It should reflect on judge’s independence within the exercise of his office and show also judicial self-restraint or activism. The axiology and the standards of proper judicial reasoning are anchored both in constitutional and supranational law and case-law. Polish Constitutional Tribunal derives a duty to give reasoning from the right to a fair trial – right to be heard and bring own submissions before the court (Article 45 § 1 of the Constitution), the right to appeal against judgments and decisions made at first stage (Article 78), the rule of two stages of the court proceedings (Article 176) and rule of law clause (Article 2), that comprises inter alia right to due process of law and the rule of legitimate expactation / the protection of trust (Vertrauensschutz). European Court of Human Rights derives this duty to give reasons from the guarantees of the right to a fair trial enshrined in Article 6 § 1 of European Convention of Human Rights. In its case-law the ECtHR, taking into account the margin of appreciation concept, formulated a number of positive and negative requirements, that should be met in case of proper reasoning. The obligation for courts to give sufficient reasons for their decisions is also anchored in European Union law. European Court of Justice derives this duty from the right to fair trial enshrined in Articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Standards of the courts reasoning developed by Polish constitutional court an the European courts (ECJ and ECtHR) are in fact convergent and coherent. National judges should take them into consideration in every case, to legitimize its outcome and enhance justice delivery.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Léon E Dijkman

Abstract Germany is one of few jurisdictions with a bifurcated patent system, under which infringement and validity of a patent are established in separate proceedings. Because validity proceedings normally take longer to conclude, it can occur that remedies for infringement are imposed before a decision on the patent’s validity is available. This phenomenon is colloquially known as the ‘injunction gap’ and has been the subject of increasing criticism over the past years. In this article, I examine the injunction gap from the perspective of the right to a fair trial enshrined in Art. 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. I find that the case law of the European Court of Human Rights interpreting this provision supports criticism of the injunction gap, because imposing infringement remedies with potentially far-reaching consequences before the validity of a patent has been established by a court of law arguably violates defendants’ right to be heard. Such reliance on the patent office’s grant decision is no longer warranted in the light of contemporary invalidation rates. I conclude that the proliferation of the injunction gap should be curbed by an approach to a stay of proceedings which is in line with the test for stays as formulated by Germany’s Federal Supreme Court. Under this test, courts should stay infringement proceedings until the Federal Patent Court or the EPO’s Board of Appeal have ruled on the validity of a patent whenever it is more likely than not that it will be invalidated.


2011 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 165-176 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dennis Kurzon

In two English cases which reached the European Court of Human Rights in the mid-2000s, it was argued that the statutory requirement on the part of a motorist who has been caught speeding to give the police information concerning the identity of the driver of the car at the time of the offence is a violation of the right of silence by which a person should not be put into a position that s/he incriminates him/herself. The right of silence is one of the conventional interpretations of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. As well as a study on the right of silence with regard to written texts, this paper also investigates the two cases in terms of icons and indices: a text may be indexical of a basic human right, and then may become an icon of that right. The European Court of Human Rights considers the particular section of the relevant statute as an icon of the "regulatory regime".


2017 ◽  
Vol 6 (s2) ◽  
pp. 9-17
Author(s):  
Pir Ali Kaya ◽  
Ceyhun Güler

Abstract According to The European Social Charter, the European Convention on Human Rights, the ILO Conventions, the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, the decisions of the European Social Rights Committee and the ILO supervisory bodies, the right to collective action is a democratic right that aims to protect and correct the economic and social interests of workers in the workplace or in another place appropriate for the purpose of action. The above-mentioned institutions accept the right to collective action as a fundamental human right. According to the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, the right to collective action is regarded as a democratic right, including strike. In particular, the right to collective action is being used as a resistance mechanism against new working relations, which are imposed on working conditions, right to work and the right to organize. However, the tendency of this right to political field, leads to some debate about the legality of the right to collective action. In this context, In the decision of the European Court of Human Rights, the ILO's supervisory bodies and the European Committee on Social Rights, it is emphasized that collective action rights should be a basic human right. In this study, the legal basis of the right to collective action will be discussed in accordance with the decisions and requirements of the European Court of Human Rights and the decisions of the ILO supervisory bodies.


2009 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 353-375 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Hilson

Abstract The aim of this chapter is to provide an initial attempt at analysis of the place of risk within the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and, where appropriate, the Commission, focusing on the related issues of public concern and perception of risk and how the ECHR dispute bodies have addressed these. It will argue that, for quite some time, the Court has tended to adopt a particular, liberal conception of risk in which it stresses the right of applicants to be provided with information on risk to enable them to make effective choices. Historically, where public concerns in relation to particular risks are greater than those of scientific experts—nuclear radiation being the prime example in the case law—the Court has adopted a particularly restrictive approach, stressing the need for risk to be ‘imminent’ in order to engage the relevant Convention protections. However, more recently, there have been emerging but as yet still rather undeveloped signs of the Court adopting a more sensitive approach to risk. One possible explanation for this lies in the Court’s growing awareness of and reference to the Aarhus Convention. What we have yet to see—because there has not yet been a recent, post-Aarhus example involving such facts—is a case where no imminent risk is evident. Nevertheless, the chapter concludes that the Court’s old-style approach to public concern in such cases, in which it rode roughshod over rights to judicial review, is out of line with the third, access to justice limb of Aarhus.


2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 244-269
Author(s):  
Christine Carpenter

Abstract Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights protects the right to freedom of religion and conscience. The language of Article 9(1) has been interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights as including protections for acts of proselytism, when properly committed and respectful of the rights and freedoms of others. This was the view taken in the foundational Article 9 case of the Court, Kokkinakis v. Greece. In the decades since Kokkinakis, however, the view of the Court on proselytism appears to have shifted, in particular in Article 9 cases involving religious garments. This article seeks to determine whether the Court is consistent in its views on proselytism between these religious garment cases and earlier examples of Article 9 case law.


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