scholarly journals Corporations, Politics, and Democracy: Corporate political activities as political corruption

2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 263178772098261
Author(s):  
Daniel Nyberg
Keyword(s):  
Political Corruption ◽  
Political Activity ◽  
Corporate Political Activity ◽  
Liberal Democracies ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Political Activities ◽  
Political Preferences ◽  
Nuanced Understanding ◽  
Political Decision Making ◽  
Corporate Capture

Corporate involvement in democratic processes typically takes the form of corporate political activity (CPA). In this paper, I develop a framework of political corruption to explain the corroding influence of CPA on democratic processes. CPA corrupts democratic processes by excluding (a) citizen representation from political decision making, (b) citizens’ voices from public deliberation, and (c) citizens’ interests from private deliberations about political preferences. By attending to the power relations within the three key democratic spheres in society—political, public, and private—I explain how corporations influence democratic processes and how these processes in turn become dependent on corporate involvement. My theorization explicates the corporate capture of democratic processes and provides a nuanced understanding of corruption in Western liberal democracies. Finally, I suggest ways to halt this process and thereby defend democracy as a system of governance from undue corporate interests.

Disaggregating and Explaining Corporate Political Activity: Domestic and Foreign Corporations in National Politics

2000 ◽  
Vol 94 (4) ◽  
pp. 891-903 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wendy L. Hansen ◽  
Neil J. Mitchell
Keyword(s):  
Charitable Giving ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Political Action ◽  
Political Activity ◽  
Political Action Committees ◽  
National Politics ◽  
Corporate Political Activity ◽  
Political Activities ◽  
Empirical Level ◽  
Foreign Corporations

Corporate political activity is usually operationalized and analyzed as financial contributions to candidates or political parties through political action committees (PACs). Very little attention has been paid to other dimensions, such as lobbying, in a systematic way. On a theoretical level we address the issue of how to conceive of PAC contributions, lobbying, and other corporate activities, such as charitable giving, in terms of the strategic behavior of corporations and the implications of “foreignness” for the different types of corporate political activity. On an empirical level we examine the political activities of Fortune 500 firms, along with an oversampling of U.S. affiliates of large foreign investors for the 1987–88 election cycle.

Franchise systems and lobbying: implications for Olsonian collective action theory

2018 ◽  
Vol 56 (11) ◽  
pp. 2357-2372
Author(s):  
Richard S. Brown
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Action Theory ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
System Size ◽  
Industry Structure ◽  
Political Activity ◽  
Corporate Political Activity ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Political Activities

Purpose Previous research combining corporate political activity and collective action theory has focused solely on industry structure and its role in predicting group lobbying or PAC participation. The purpose of this paper is to use a different context—franchise systems—to apply Olsonian collective action theory to political activities. Design/methodology/approach Using a random-effects technique in STATA on an unbalanced panel data set, this paper empirically models the effects of franchise system size and degree of franchising on the level of lobbying intensity. Findings Since franchise systems are made up of differing unit ownership structure, the author first model if those systems that are fully franchised lobby less than those with franchisor unit ownership (supported). Next, since collective action theory predicts that more participants in a space will lead to less collective action, the author predict that franchise systems with larger unit counts will lobby less than those with smaller counts (not supported). Finally, the author test the interaction of these two effects as systems that are fully franchised and of higher unit totals should have an even greater negative relationship with political activity (supported). Originality/value This paper uses both a novel data set and a novel context to study collective action. Previous research has utilized an industry structure context to model the level of lobbying and collective action, while the current research uses an analogous logic, but in the context of franchise systems.

scholarly journals Banning Illegal Political Financing as an Anti-Corruption Standard of Business Conduct

2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 209-216
Author(s):  
Victoria V. Kostrykina ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Political Corruption ◽  
Legal Regulation ◽  
Political Activity ◽  
Social Significance ◽  
Political Activities ◽  
Protection Mechanism ◽  
Reported Study ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Commercial Organizations ◽  
Commercial Organization

The problem of political corruption is of particular relevance for criminological science. The processes of formation and functioning of power, due to their high social significance, have long been subject to negative corruption influences, and therefore they need a special protection mechanism. The subject of the research is the legal regulation of the ban on illegal financing of political activity, as well as its reflection in local regulations of commercial organizations. The article examines one of the forms of political corruption as illegal financing of political activity by officials of commercial organizations. The author used the dialectical method of cognition, as well as the system-structural, formal-logical and other methods of scientific cognition. To study the practice of regulating the ban on illegal financing of political activity at the level of local regulations of commercial organizations, the author monitored the official websites of 250 largest Russian companies. The monitoring of the content of local regulations showed that commercial organizations have not yet developed a unified approach to regulating the ban on illegal financing of political activity. In addition, in more than 50% of the surveyed commercial organizations, this prohibition is absent in local regulations. One of the reasons for the low level of anti-corruption activity of organizations is the lack of motivation of companies to conduct business with integrity. The results of the study allow us to conclude that it is necessary to take a set of measures aimed at stimulating commercial organizations to consolidate in their local regulations a ban on the financing of political activities, as well as measures aimed at limiting the possibility of committing corresponding corruption offenses. Keywords: corruption, political system, elections, electoral process, campaign finance, electoral fund, anti-corruption standard, commercial organization, business, prevention of corruption. Научная специальность: 12.00.08 – Уголовное право и криминология; уголовно-исполнительное право Исследование выполнено при финансовой поддержке РФФИ в рамках научного проекта № 20-311-90028 The reported study was funded by RFBR according to the research project № 20-311-90028

scholarly journals Industry vs. Government: Leveraging Media Coverage in Corporate Political Activity

2020 ◽  
pp. 017084062096416
Author(s):  
John Murray ◽  
Daniel Nyberg
Keyword(s):  
Mass Media ◽  
Media Coverage ◽  
Mining Industry ◽  
Political Influence ◽  
Political Activity ◽  
Corporate Political Activity ◽  
Political Activities ◽  
Media Frames ◽  
The Media ◽  
The Public Sphere

This article investigates how an industry leveraged media coverage to publicly oppose governmental policy. Based on a frame analysis of the political contest between the mining industry and the Australian government over a proposed tax on resource corporations, we show how the industry aligned its position with mass media to (a) make the policy contest salient, (b) frame their position in the contest as legitimate and (c) construct negative representations of the policy as dominant. The analysis reveals how the industry’s corporate political activities leveraged media coverage to align disparate frames into a consistent message against the policy in the public sphere. This contributes to the literature on corporate political activity by explaining the process of alignment with mass media frames to legitimize corporate positions on salient issues. Second, we contribute to the framing literature by demonstrating the process of frame alignment between non-collaborative actors. Finally, we contribute to the broader discussion on corporations’ role in society by showing how corporate campaigns can leverage the media to facilitate the favourable settlement of contentious issues. These contributions highlight the pitfalls of corporate political influence without necessary democratic standards.

The Use of Union Dues for Political Activity-Current Status

2002 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 121-129 ◽  
Author(s):  
Suzanne M. Crampton ◽  
John W. Hodge ◽  
Jitendra M. Mishra
Keyword(s):  
Legal History ◽  
Legal Issues ◽  
Financial Information ◽  
Organized Labor ◽  
Political Activity ◽  
Current Status ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Political Activities ◽  
Know How ◽  
History Of

The NLRB, in a significant ruling for organized labor, recently ruled that employees who are forced to pay union dues are entitled to know how their money is being spent. The NLRB ruled in January 1997 that unions must supply financial information to workers who pay dues but who have elected not to join the union. The use of union dues for political activity continues to be a controversial issue for both public and private unions. This paper will provide a brief overview of the legal history of unions in America and the current issues they are encountering. Legal issues relating to the use of union dues for political activities for both public and private unions will also be discussed.

scholarly journals The political activities of American corporate leaders

2013 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 493-527 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anthony J. Nownes ◽  
Nurgul R. Aitalieva
Keyword(s):  
Mail Survey ◽  
Strong Relationship ◽  
Political Activity ◽  
The Political ◽  
National Politics ◽  
Corporate Political Activity ◽  
Political Activities ◽  
Corporate Leaders ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Politically Active

What is the nature and extent of corporate leader involvement in American national politics? The results of a mail survey of nearly 100 such individuals show that leaders are quite active, devoting an average of nearly 1 hour per day to national political activity. We also show that corporate leaders engage in a wide range of advocacy activities. Monetary activities loom particularly large in the political lives of American corporate leaders, as large numbers are approached by members of Congress for contributions, and many who are approached answer the call. In addition, we find that corporate leaders, unlike advocacy professionals, do a great deal of their advocacy work in private; for the most part they eschew public activities such as testifying before congressional committees. Speaking to the question of which leaders are most politically active, our data evince a strong relationship between firm political activity and firm leader political activity. In sum, politically active firms have politically active leaders. We thus contribute to the ongoing academic discussion of corporate political activity by showing that the CEO's office is an additional locus of political power within business firms, and that CEO political activity is instrumental rather than consumptive in nature.

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