An overview of near-field evolution research in support of the UK geological disposal programme

2012 ◽  
Vol 76 (8) ◽  
pp. 2995-3001 ◽  
Author(s):  
T. M. Beattie ◽  
S. J. Williams

AbstractThe near field, together with the containment and isolation provided by the geosphere, contributes to the long-term safety provided by a geological disposal facility (GDF) after closure. The different engineered barriers can prevent or limit the release of radionuclides and their migration to the undisturbed host rock or geosphere and are expected to fulfil their post-closure safety functions for many thousands to hundreds of thousands of years. They will continue to contribute to containment after their eventual degradation when there would no longer be confidence that they would continue to fulfil all of their safety functions in their totality. By that time, significant radioactive decay will have occurred, substantially reducing the hazard associated with the wastes. Therefore, demonstration of long-term safety requires an understanding of the evolution of the engineered barriers and the consequences for the generic safety functions that the different barriers provide. This paper provides an overview of the research of the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority Radioactive Waste Management Directorate into the evolution of the near field of a GDF.

2012 ◽  
Vol 76 (8) ◽  
pp. 3271-3278 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. J. Williams

AbstractGases will be generated in waste packages during their transport to a geological disposal facility (GDF), this generation will continue during GDF operations and after GDF closure. The range of gases produced will include flammable, radioactive and chemotoxic species. These must be managed to ensure safety during transport and operations, and the post-closure consequences need to be understood. The two primary post-closure gas issues for a GDF are the need for the system pressure to remain below a value at which irreversible damage to the engineered barrier system and host geology could occur, and the need to ensure that any flux of gas (in particular gaseous radionuclides) to the biosphere does not result in unacceptable risk. This paper provides an overview of the research of the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority, Radioactive Waste Management Directorate into gas generation and its migration from a GDF.


Author(s):  
Philip G. P. Rendell ◽  
Henry J. P. O’Grady ◽  
Malcolm F. Currie

The Radioactive Waste Management Directorate (RWMD) of the United Kingdom’s (UK) Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) has been given the responsibility for delivery of a Geological Disposal Facility (GDF) for the UK’s higher activity wastes in accordance with government policy. As part of this process, the RWMD has developed a project lifecycle, which addresses the overall lifecycle of the GDF in terms of five phases, from Preparatory Studies through to Operation and finally Closure, and is developing a staged approach to engineering design. The Engineering Design Process is broken down into seven stages, encompassing option development, requirements definition and preliminary and detailed design through to “design development during closure”. Each stage finishes with a formally defined milestone (a “gate”) comprising a technical review and a specific set of engineering deliverables. This paper describes the background to the UK GDF development programme, the organisational issues associated with the RWMD’s evolving role, the relationship between the top-level UK Government’s Managing Radioactive Waste Safely programme [1] and the RWMD engineering lifecycle, the formal reviews, the milestones and the overall contribution this makes to RWMD organisational development and UK regulatory approval. It also describes some of the lessons learnt.


2012 ◽  
Vol 76 (8) ◽  
pp. 3373-3380 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Vines ◽  
R. Beard

AbstractIn the UK, radioactive wastes currently planned for disposal in a geological disposal facility (GDF) are intermediate-level waste, some low-level waste and high-level waste. Disposal of other materials, including spent fuel, separated uranium and separated plutonium are also included in the planning of a GDF, if such materials are classified as wastes in the future. This paper gives an overview of the radionuclide behaviour research studies of the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority Radioactive Waste Management Directorate (NDA RWMD). The NDA RWMD's current understanding of the processes that control radionuclide behaviour in groundwater and how the engineered and natural barriers in a GDF would contain radionuclides is presented. Areas requiring further work are also identified.


2019 ◽  
Vol 482 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Simon Norris

AbstractGeological disposal provides the safe long-term management solution for higher-activity radioactive waste. The development of a repository (or geological disposal facility) requires a systematic and integrated approach, taking into account the characteristics of the waste to be emplaced, the enclosing engineered barriers, and the host rock and its geological setting.Clays and clayey material are important in the development of many national geological disposal systems. Clays exhibit many interesting properties, and are proposed both as host rocks and as material for engineered barriers. Whatever their use, clays present various characteristics that make them high-quality barriers to the migration of radionuclides and chemical contaminants. As host rocks, clays are, in addition, hydrogeologically, geochemically and mechanically stable over geological timescales (i.e. millions of years).


Author(s):  
Bruno Kursten ◽  
Frank Druyts ◽  
Pierre Van Iseghem

Abstract The current worldwide trend for the final disposal of conditioned high-level, medium-level and long-lived alpha-bearing radioactive waste focuses on deep geological disposal. During the geological disposal, the isolation between the radioactive waste and the environment (biosphere) is realised by the multibarrier principle, which is based on the complementary nature of the various natural and engineered barriers. One of the main engineered barriers is the metallic container (overpack) that encloses the conditioned waste. In Belgium, the Boom Clay sediment is being studied as a potential host rock formation for the final disposal of conditioned high-level radioactive waste (HLW) and spent fuel. Since the mid 1980’s, SCK•CEN has developed an extensive research programme aimed at evaluating the suitability of a wide variety of metallic materials as candidate overpack material for the disposal of HLW. A multiple experimental approach is applied consisting of i) in situ corrosion experiments, ii) electrochemical experiments (cyclic potentiodynamic polarisation measurements and monitoring the evolution of ECORR as a function of time), and iii) immersion experiments. The in situ corrosion experiments were performed in the underground research facility, the High Activity Disposal Experimental Site, or HADES, located in the Boom clay layer at a depth of 225 metres below ground level. These experiments aimed at predicting the long-term corrosion behaviour of various candidate container materials. It was believed that this could be realised by investigating the medium-term interactions between the container materials and the host formation. These experiments resulted in a change of reasoning at the national authorities concerning the choice of over-pack material from the corrosion-allowance material carbon steel towards corrosion-resistant materials such as stainless steels. The main arguments being the severe pitting corrosion during the aerobic period and the large amount of hydrogen gas generated during the subsequent anaerobic period. The in situ corrosion experiments however, did not allow to unequivocally quantify the corrosion of the various investigated candidate overpack materials. The main shortcoming was that they did not allow to experimentally separate the aerobic and anaerobic phase. This resulted in the elaboration of a new laboratory programme. Electrochemical corrosion experiments were designed to investigate the effect of a wide variety of parameters on the localised corrosion behaviour of candidate overpack materials: temperature, SO42−, Cl−, S2O32−, oxygen content (aerobic - anaerobic),… Three characteristic potentials can be derived from the cyclic potentiodynamic polarisation (CPP) curves: i) the open circuit potential, OCP, ii) the critical potential for pit nucleation, ENP, and iii) the protection potential, EPP. Monitoring the open circuit potential as a function of time in clay slurries, representative for the underground environment, provides us with a more reliable value for the corrosion potential, ECORR, under disposal conditions. The long-term corrosion behaviour of the candidate overpack materials can be established by comparing the value of ECORR relative to ENP and EPP (determined from the CPP-curves). The immersion tests were developed to complement the in situ experiments. These experiments aimed at determining the corrosion rate and to identify the corrosion processes that can occur during the aerobic and anaerobic period of the geological disposal. Also, some experiments were elaborated to study the effect of graphite on the corrosion behaviour of the candidate overpack materials.


2015 ◽  
Vol 79 (6) ◽  
pp. 1633-1640 ◽  
Author(s):  
L. Bailey

AbstractThe UK has published a generic Disposal System Safety Case for a geological disposal facility (NDA, 2010) and is planning to update this in 2016. However, it is a challenge to present a meaningful safety case when the location and hence the design of a geological disposal facility are not known. Consequently, this paper describes our aim to present a narrative, explaining how we can have confidence in the long-term safety of a geological disposal facility. This narrative is based on an understanding of the environmental safety functions of a geological disposal facility and the features, events and processes (FEPs) that support them. The highest level environmental safety functions required for a geological disposal facility are isolation and containment. By isolation we mean removal of the wastes from people and the surface environment. By containment we mean retaining the radioactivity from the wastes within various parts of the disposal facility for as long as required to achieve safety. Beneath these top-level environmental safety functions we have identified generic environmental safety functions associated with each of the key safety barriers within a geological disposal facility, namely: the wasteform, the container, the local buffer or backfill, the mass backfill (in the access tunnels and service ways), the plugs and seals and the geosphere. This paper discusses the application of environmental safety functions and FEPs to building a safety narrative and explains how it is proposed to use such an approach to develop a generic environmental safety case for the UK to provide confidence in the longterm safety of a geological disposal facility after it has been sealed and closed.


Author(s):  
David Broughton

UKAEA’s mission at its Dounreay establishment in the north of Scotland is to restore the site so that it can be used for other purposes, with a minimal effect on the environment and requiring minimal attention by future generations. A Dounreay Site Restoration Plan (DSRP) has been produced. It sets out the decommissioning and radioactive waste management activities to restore the site within the next 60 years. Management of solid low level radioactive waste (LLW) that already exists, and that which will be produced as the DSRP progresses is an essential site restoration activity. Altogether around 150,000m3 (5.3Mft3) of untreated LLW could arise. This will then need to be treated, packaged and managed, the resulting volume being around 200,000m3 (7Mft3). A project to develop a long term strategy for managing all Dounreay’s existing and future LLW was initiated in 1999. The identification of complete solutions for management of LLW arising from the site restoration of Dounreay, an integrated reactor and reprocessing site, is novel in the UK. The full range of LLW will be encountered. UKAEA is progressing this specific project during a period when both responsibility and policy for UK decommissioning and radioactive waste management are evolving in the UK. At present, for most UK nuclear operators, there are no recognised routes for disposing of significant volumes of decommissioning LLW that has either lower or higher radioactivity than the levels set by BNFL for disposal at the UK national LLW disposal site at Drigg. A large project such as this has the potential to affect the environmental and social conditions that prevail in the area where it is implemented. Local society therefore has an interest in a project of this scale and scope, particularly as there could be a number of feasible solutions. UKAEA is progressing the project by following UK established practice of undertaking a Best Practicable Environmental Option (BPEO) study. UKAEA has no preconceptions of the outcome and is diligently not prejudging issues prematurely. The BPEO process draws experts and non-experts alike into the discussions and facilitates a structured analysis of the options. However to permit meaningful debate those options have to be at first generated, and secondly investigated. This has taken UKAEA two and a half years in technical assessment of options at a cost of around £23/4M. The options and issues have been investigated to the depth necessary for comparisons and valid judgements to be made within the context of the BPEO study. Further technical evaluation will be required on those options that eventually emerge as the BPEO. UKAEA corporate strategy for stakeholder participation in BPEO studies is laid out in “Restoring our Environment”, published in October 2002. This was developed by a joint approach between project managers, Corporate Communications, and discussion with the regulators, government departments and Scottish Executive. An Internal Stakeholder Panel was held in March 2003. The Panel was independently facilitated and recorded. Eight Panel members attended who provided a representative cross-section of people working on site. Two External Stakeholder Panels were held in Thurso at the end of May 2003. A Youth Stakeholder Panel was held at which three sixth form students from local High Schools gave their views on the options for managing Dounreay’s LLW. The agenda was arranged to maximise interactive discussion on those options and issues that the young people themselves considered important. The second External Stakeholder Panel was based on the Dounreay Local Liaison Committee. Additional participants were invited in acknowledgement of the wider issues involved. As the use of Drigg is an option two representatives from the Cumbrian local district committee attended. From all the knowledge and information acquired from both the technical and stakeholder programmes UKAEA will build up the objective line of argument that leads to the BPEO emerging. This will be the completion of this first stage of the project and is planned for achievement in March 2004. Once the BPEO has been identified the next stage will be to work up the applications for the authorisations that will be necessary to allow implementation of the BPEO. Any facilities needed will require planning permission from the appropriate planning authority. The planning application could be called in by a Minister of State or a planning inquiry convened. During this next stage attention will be paid to ensure all reports and submissions are consistent and compliant with regulations and possible future legal processes. Stakeholder dialogue will continue throughout this next stage moving on from disussion of options to the actual developments. The objective will be to resolve as many issues stakeholders might raise prior to the submissions of applications and prior to the regulators’ formal consultation procedures. This will allow early attention to those areas of concern. Beyond the submission of applications for authorisations it is unwise to speculate as nuclear decommissioning will be then organised in the UK in a different way. The Nuclear Decommissioning Authority will most probably be in overall control and, particularly for Dounreay, the Scottish Executive may have developed its policy for radioactive waste management in Scotland.


Energies ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (9) ◽  
pp. 2239
Author(s):  
Leszek Lankof

Together with renewable energy sources, nuclear power represents an important contribution to a sustainable energy mix in many countries and has an important impact on sustainable development. Nuclear energy production is also a source of high-level radioactive waste (HLW) and spent nuclear fuel (SNF), which require special concern. Disposal in deep geological formations is one of the solutions for the long-term management of HLW and SNF. It requires the development of a concept ensuring long-term safe isolation of waste and its validation applying the safety case methodology, which is a formal compilation of evidence, analyses and arguments that quantify and justify a claim that the repository will be safe. The results of laboratory testing of a potential repository host rock are an important component of the evidence that helps in the safety assessment of the deep geological disposal concept. This paper presents results of research focused on the physical, geomechanical and sorption properties of the Brown and Red Zuber unit rocks from the Kłodawa Salt Mine in Poland, which together with rock salt are an important component of Polish salt domes. The Brown and Red Zubers are typical evaporite lithostratigraphic units for the Polish part of the Zechstein Basin. They consist of halite (15–85%) and water-insoluble minerals, such as anhydrite, clay minerals, carbonates, quartz and feldspar, which occurred in varying proportions in the tested samples. The properties of the zuber rocks have been compared with those of rock salt, which is considered a suitable host rock for deep geological disposal of radioactive waste.


Author(s):  
Ellie Scourse ◽  
Hideki Kawamura ◽  
Ian G. McKinley

The early ’80s UK programme for deep geological disposal of high-level radioactive waste was advanced and at the stage of characterising potential sites. When this project was put on hold in the mid ’80s, much expertise in this field was lost. In Japan R&D in the ’80s resulted in major generic safety assessments to demonstrate feasibility in the ’90s. This led to the establishment of NUMO (Nuclear Waste Management Organization of Japan) and the initiation of siting based on volunteerism. This novel approach required more flexible methodology and tools for site characterisation, repository design and safety assessment. NUMO and supporting R&D organisations in Japan have invested much time and effort preparing for volunteers but, unfortunately, no discussions with potential host communities have yet developed to the point where technical work is initiated. Presently, the UK is moving forward; with the NDA RWMD (Nuclear Decommissioning Agency Radioactive Waste Management Directorate) adopting a NUMO-style volunteering approach and a flexible design catalogue. Communities have already shown interest in volunteering. The situation is thus ideal for collaboration. The paper will expand on the opportunities for the UK and Japan to benefit from an active collaboration and discuss how this can be most efficiently implemented.


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