Cubic Management of Inclusive Scientific Change

2019 ◽  
pp. 237-254
Author(s):  
Mihai V. Putz
Keyword(s):  
Synthese ◽  
1986 ◽  
Vol 69 (2) ◽  
pp. 141-223 ◽  
Author(s):  
Larry Laudan ◽  
Arthur Donovan ◽  
Rachel Laudan ◽  
Peter Barker ◽  
Harold Brown ◽  
...  

1988 ◽  
Vol 14 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 251-264 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Law ◽  
S. Bauin ◽  
J. -P. Courtial ◽  
J. Whittaker

2017 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
pp. 55-62
Author(s):  
Nicholas Overgaard

Although we accept that a scientific mosaic is a set of theories and methods accepted and employed by a scientific community, scientific community currently lacks a proper definition in scientonomy. In this paper, I will outline a basic taxonomy for the bearers of a mosaic, i.e. the social agents of scientific change. I begin by differentiating between accidental group and community through the respective absence and presence of a collective intentionality. I then identify two subtypes of community: the epistemic community that has a collective intentionality to know the world, and the non-epistemic community that does not have such a collective intentionality. I note that both epistemic and non-epistemic communities might bear mosaics, but that epistemic communities are the intended social agents of scientific change because their main collective intentionality is to know the world and, in effect, to change their mosaics. I conclude my paper by arguing we are not currently in a position to properly define scientific community per se because of the risk of confusing pseudoscientific communities with scientific communities. However, I propose that we can for now rely on the definition of epistemic community as the proper social agent of scientific change.Suggested Modifications[Sciento-2017-0012]: Accept the following taxonomy of group, accidental group, and community:Group ≡ two or more people who share any characteristic.Accidental group ≡ a group that does not have a collective intentionality.Community ≡ a group that has a collective intentionality. [Sciento-2017-0013]: Provided that the preceding modification [Sciento-2017-0012] is accepted, accept that communities can consist of other communities.[Sciento-2017-0014]: Provided that modification [Sciento-2017-0012] is accepted, accept the following definitions of epistemic community and non-epistemic community as subtypes of community:Epistemic community ≡ a community that has a collective intentionality to know the world.Non-epistemic community ≡ a community that does not have a collective intentionality to know the world.[Sciento-2017-0015]: Provideed that modification [Sciento-2017-0013] and [Sciento-2017-0014] are accepted, accept that a non-epistemic community can consist of epistemic communities.


2018 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
William Rawleigh

The currently accepted scientonomic ontology includes two classes of epistemic elements – theories and methods. However, the ontology underlying the Encyclopedia of Scientonomy includes questions/topics as a basic element of its semantic structure. Ideally there should be no discrepancy between the accepted ontology of theoretical scientonomy and that of the Encyclopedia.  I argue that questions constitute a distinct class of epistemic elements as they are not reducible to other elements that undergo scientific change – theories or methods. I discuss and reject two attempts at reducing questions to either descriptive or normative theories. According to the descriptive-epistemic account, scientific questions can be logically reduced to descriptive propositions, while according to the normative-epistemic account, they can be reduced to normative propositions. I show that these interpretations are incapable of capturing the propositional content expressed by questions; any possible reduction is carried at the expense of losing the essential characteristic of questions. Further, I find that the attempts to reduce questions to theories introduce an infinite regress, where a theory is an attempt to answer a question, which is itself a theory which answers another question, ad infintum. Instead, I propose to incorporate the question-answer semantic structure from erotetic logic in which questions constitute a distinct class of elements irreducible to propositions. An acceptance of questions into scientonomic ontology as a separate class of epistemic elements suggests a new avenue of research into the mechanism of question acceptance and rejection, i.e. how epistemic communities come to accept certain questions as legitimate and others as illegitimate. Suggested Modifications [Sciento-2018-0001]: Accept the following definition of question: Question ≡ a topic of inquiry. [Sciento-2018-0002]: Accept the ontology of epistemic elements with theories, methods, and questions as distinct epistemic elements. Reject the previously accepted ontology of epistemic elements. [Sciento-2018-0003]: Provided that modification [Sciento-2018-0002] is accepted, accept that the epistemic stance that can be taken by an epistemic agent towards a question is question acceptance (the opposite is unacceptance), defined as follows:  Question Acceptance ≡ a question is said to be accepted if it is taken as a legitimate topic of inquiry. [Sciento-2018-0004]: Provided that modifications [Sciento-2018-0002] and [Sciento-2018-0003] are accepted, accept the following question as legitimate topics of scientonomic inquiry:  Mechanism of Question Acceptance: How do questions become accepted as legitimate? What is the mechanism of question acceptance?  Indicators of Question Acceptance: What are the historical indicators of theory acceptance? How can observational scientonomists establish that such-and-such a question was accepted as a legitimate topic of inquiry by a certain epistemic agent at a certain time?


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