scholarly journals The Status of Questions in the Ontology of Scientific Change

2018 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
William Rawleigh
Keyword(s):  
Basic Element ◽  
Scientific Change ◽  
Semantic Structure ◽  
Epistemic Agent ◽  
Distinct Class ◽  
Epistemic Stance ◽  
The Status ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Theory Acceptance ◽  
Scientific Questions

The currently accepted scientonomic ontology includes two classes of epistemic elements – theories and methods. However, the ontology underlying the Encyclopedia of Scientonomy includes questions/topics as a basic element of its semantic structure. Ideally there should be no discrepancy between the accepted ontology of theoretical scientonomy and that of the Encyclopedia.  I argue that questions constitute a distinct class of epistemic elements as they are not reducible to other elements that undergo scientific change – theories or methods. I discuss and reject two attempts at reducing questions to either descriptive or normative theories. According to the descriptive-epistemic account, scientific questions can be logically reduced to descriptive propositions, while according to the normative-epistemic account, they can be reduced to normative propositions. I show that these interpretations are incapable of capturing the propositional content expressed by questions; any possible reduction is carried at the expense of losing the essential characteristic of questions. Further, I find that the attempts to reduce questions to theories introduce an infinite regress, where a theory is an attempt to answer a question, which is itself a theory which answers another question, ad infintum. Instead, I propose to incorporate the question-answer semantic structure from erotetic logic in which questions constitute a distinct class of elements irreducible to propositions. An acceptance of questions into scientonomic ontology as a separate class of epistemic elements suggests a new avenue of research into the mechanism of question acceptance and rejection, i.e. how epistemic communities come to accept certain questions as legitimate and others as illegitimate. Suggested Modifications [Sciento-2018-0001]: Accept the following definition of question: Question ≡ a topic of inquiry. [Sciento-2018-0002]: Accept the ontology of epistemic elements with theories, methods, and questions as distinct epistemic elements. Reject the previously accepted ontology of epistemic elements. [Sciento-2018-0003]: Provided that modification [Sciento-2018-0002] is accepted, accept that the epistemic stance that can be taken by an epistemic agent towards a question is question acceptance (the opposite is unacceptance), defined as follows:  Question Acceptance ≡ a question is said to be accepted if it is taken as a legitimate topic of inquiry. [Sciento-2018-0004]: Provided that modifications [Sciento-2018-0002] and [Sciento-2018-0003] are accepted, accept the following question as legitimate topics of scientonomic inquiry:  Mechanism of Question Acceptance: How do questions become accepted as legitimate? What is the mechanism of question acceptance?  Indicators of Question Acceptance: What are the historical indicators of theory acceptance? How can observational scientonomists establish that such-and-such a question was accepted as a legitimate topic of inquiry by a certain epistemic agent at a certain time?

scholarly journals Redrafting the Ontology of Scientific Change

2018 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 13-38
Author(s):  
Hakob Barseghyan
Keyword(s):  
Normative Theory ◽  
Scientific Change ◽  
Epistemic Agent ◽  
Theory Evaluation ◽  
Recent Developments ◽  
Previous Definition ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Descriptive Theories ◽  
Theory Acceptance

Recent developments in theoretical scientonomy coupled with a reflection on the practice of the Encyclopedia of Scientonomy all suggest that the ontology of scientific change currently accepted in scientonomy has serious flaws. The new ontology, suggested in this paper, solves some of the issues permeating the current ontology. Building on Rawleigh’s suggestion, it considers a theory as an attempt to answer a certain question. It also introduces the category of definition as a subtype of theory. It also reveals that methods and methodologies of the currently accepted ontology do not differ from the perspective of their propositional content and, thus, belong to the same class of epistemic elements. This is captured in the new definition of method as a set of criteria for theory evaluation. It is also argued that methods are a subtype of normative theories. It is shown that normative theories of all types, including methods, ethical norms, and aesthetic norms, can be both accepted and employed. Finally, a new definition of scientific mosaic is suggested to fit the new ontology.   Suggested Modifications [Sciento-2018-0005]: Accept the following definitions of method and methodology: Method ≡ a set of criteria for theory evaluation.  Methodology ≡ a normative discipline that formulates the rules which ought to be employed in theory assessment. Reject the previous definitions of method and methodology. [Sciento-2018-0006]: Accept the following ontology of epistemic elements, where:  Each theory is an attempt to answer a certain question. Theories can be of three types – descriptive, normative, or definitions. Method is a subtype of normative theory. Questions as well as theories of all types – including methods – can be accepted. Normative theories of all types can be employed; the name of the stance is norm employment. Accept the following definition of theory acceptance: Theory acceptance ≡ a theory is said to be accepted by the epistemic agent if it is taken as the best available answer to its respective question. Also accept the following questions as legitimate topics of inquiry: Role of Definitions in Scientific Change: Do definitions play any distinct role in the process of scientific change, or do they only exhibit the exact same patterns as descriptive and normative theories? Reducibility of Definitions: Are definitions a distinct subtype of theory, or are they somehow reducible to descriptive theories and/or normative theories? Reject the previous ontology of epistemic elements and the previous definition of theory acceptance. [Sciento-2018-0007]: Accept the following definition of definition: Definition ≡ A statement of the meaning of a term. [Sciento-2018-0008]: Provided that modification [Sciento-2018-0006] is accepted, accept the following definition of norm employment: Norm Employment ≡ a norm is said to be employed if its requirements constitute the actual expectations of the epistemic agent.  [Sciento-2018-0009]: Accept the new definition of scientific mosaic: Scientific Mosaic ≡ a set of all epistemic elements accepted and/or employed by the epistemic agent.  Reject the previous definition of scientific mosaic. [Sciento-2018-0010]: Accept that: Epistemic stances of all types can be taken explicitly and/or implicitly. Epistemic elements of all types can be explicit and/or implicit. Accept the following question as a legitimate topic of inquiry: Tracing Implicit/Explicit: Should observational scientonomy trace when a certain stance towards an epistemic element was taken explicitly or implicitly? What are the practical considerations for and against collecting and storing this data?

scholarly journals The Status of Normative Propositions in the Theory of Scientific Change

2016 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Zoe Sebastien
Keyword(s):  
Logical Consequence ◽  
Normative Theory ◽  
Scientific Change ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Scientific Methods ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Status ◽  
Third Law ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Theory Acceptance

The scope of the Theory of Scientific Change (TSC) encompasses any and all changes that occur in a given scientific mosaic, the set of all methods employed and theories accepted at a given time by a given scientific community. Currently, theory is defined as a set of propositions that attempts to describe something. This definition excludes normative propositions from the scope of the TSC. Normative theories, such as those of methodology or ethics, have been excluded since including them appears to give rise to a destructive paradox first identified by Joel Burkholder. There are many historical cases where employed scientific methods are known to conflict with professed methodologies. This seems to violate the third and zeroth laws of scientific change. By the third law, employed methods are deducible from accepted theories. But, this seems impossible in cases where methodologies and methods conflict. Under the zeroth law, all elements in the scientific mosaic are compatible with one another. But, that seems to be clearly not the case if methodologies and methods conflict with one another. In this paper, I argue that normative propositions such as methodologies can be included in the scientific mosaic as accepted theories without generating a paradox and that neither the third nor zeroth laws of scientific change need be violated. I outline my solution to the paradox of normative theories and conclude by describing some new and exciting avenues for future research that are now open.Suggested Modifications[Sciento-2016-0001]: Accept the following reformulation of the third law:The third law ≡ a method becomes employed only when it is deducible from some subset of other employed methods and accepted theories of the time. Consequently, accept that there is no paradox of normative theories: when an employed method and an accepted methodology are logically inconsistent with one another; it merely indicates that the employed method isn’t a logical consequence of the accepted methodology. By the third law, the employed method still follows from some accepted theories, but not from this particular methodology.  Reject the previous formulation of the third law; it can remain in use for educational purposes. [Sciento-2016-0002]: Provided that the preceding modification [Sciento-2016-0001] is accepted, accept the following taxonomy for theory, descriptive theory, normative theory, and methodology:Theory ≡ a set of propositions.Descriptive theory ≡ a theory that attempts to describe something.Normative theory ≡ a theory that attempts to prescribe something. Methodology ≡ a normative theory that prescribes the rules which ought to be employed in theory assessment.Modify the definition of theory acceptance to make it possible for both descriptive and normative theories to be accepted:Theory Acceptance ≡ a theory is said to be accepted if it is taken as the best available description or prescription of its object. Reject the previous definitions of theory, methodology, and theory acceptance. 

scholarly journals The Status of Technological Knowledge in the Scientific Mosaic

2018 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 39-53
Author(s):  
Maxim Mirkin
Keyword(s):  
Technological Knowledge ◽  
Propositional Knowledge ◽  
Scientific Change ◽  
Scientific Communities ◽  
Sorting Algorithms ◽  
Mode Of Operation ◽  
The Status ◽  
History Of ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Technological Methods

In this paper, I argue that there is accepted propositional technological knowledge which appears to exhibit the same patterns of change as questions, theories, and methods in the natural, social, and formal sciences. I show that technological theories attempting to describe the construction and operation of artifacts as well as to prescribe their correct mode of operation are not merely used, but also often accepted by epistemic agents. Since technology often involves methods different from those found in science and produces normative propositions, many of which remain tacit, one may be tempted to think that changes in technological knowledge should be somehow exempt from the laws of scientific change. Indeed, it seems tacitly accepted in the scientonomic community that, while scientific communities clearly accept theories, technological communities merely use them. As a result, scientonomy currently deals with natural, social, and formal sciences, and the status of technological knowledge within the scientonomic ontology remains unclear. To help elucidate the topic, I propose that the historical cases of sorting algorithms, telescopes, crop rotation, and colorectal cancer surgeries confirm that technological theories and methods are often an integral part of an epistemic agent’s mosaic and seem to exhibit the same scientonomic patterns of change typical of accepted theories therein. Thus, I suggest that propositional technological knowledge can be part of a mosaic.   Suggested Modifications [Sciento-2018-0011]: Accept the three-fold distinction between explicit, explicable-implicit, and inexplicable with the following definitions: Explicit ≡ propositional knowledge that has been openly formulated by the agent. Explicable-Implicit ≡ propositional knowledge that hasn’t been openly formulated by the agent. Inexplicable ≡ non-propositional knowledge, i.e. knowledge that cannot, even in principle, be formulated as a set of propositions. Also accept the following definition of implicit: Implicit ≡ not explicit. [Sciento-2018-0012]: Accept that propositional technological knowledge – i.e. technological questions, theories, and methods – can be part of a mosaic. Also accept the following questions as legitimate topics of scientonomic inquiry:  History of Technological Mosaics: What technological theories were accepted and what technological methods were employed by different epistemic agents at different time periods? The Status of Inexplicable Knowledge: Is there such a thing as inexplicable knowledge? Typology of Technological Knowledge: What types of technological knowledge are there?

scholarly journals Epistemic Tools and Epistemic Agents in Scientonomy

2019 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
pp. 63-89
Author(s):  
Paul Patton
Keyword(s):  
Physical Object ◽  
Particle Accelerator ◽  
Scientific Change ◽  
Epistemic Agent ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Relationship Of ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Epistemic Stances

The only subtype of epistemic agent currently recognized within scientonomy is community. The place of both individuals and epistemic tools in the scientonomic ontology is yet to be clarified. This paper extends the scientonomic ontology to include epistemic agents and epistemic tools as well as their relationship to one another. Epistemic agent is defined as an agent capable of taking epistemic stances towards epistemic elements. These stances must be taken intentionally, that is, based on a semantic understanding of the epistemic element in question and its available alternatives, with reason, and for the purpose of acquiring knowledge. I argue that there can be both communal and individual epistemic agents. Epistemic agents are linked by relationships of authority delegation based on their differing areas of expertise. Having established the role of epistemic agents in the process of scientific change, I then turn to the role of epistemic tools, such as a thermometer, a text, or a particle accelerator in epistemic activities. I argue that epistemic tools play a different role in scientific change than do epistemic agents. This role is specified by an agent’s employed method. A physical object or system is an epistemic tool for some epistemic agent if there is a procedure by which the tool can provide an acceptable source of knowledge for answering some question under the employed method of the agent. An agent is said to rely on such a tool. Suggested Modifications [Sciento-2019-0014]: Accept the following definition of epistemic agent: Epsitemic Agent ≡ an agent capable of taking epistemic stances towards epistemic elements. [Sciento-2019-0015]: Accept that there are two types of epistemic agents – individual and communal. Also accept the following question as a legitimate topic of scientonomic inquiry: Applicability of the Laws of Scientific Change to Individuals: do the scientonomic laws apply to individual epistemic agents? [Sciento-2019-0016]: Accept the term epistemic tool, with the following definition: Epistemic Tool ≡ a physical object or system is an epistemic tool for an epistemic agent, when there is a procedure by which the tool can provide an acceptable source of knowledge for answering some question under the employed method of that agent. [Sciento-2019-0017]: Accept the following definition of authority delegation, which generalizes the currently accepted definition to apply to all epistemic agents: Authority Delegation ≡ epistemic agent A is said to be delegating authority over question x to epistemic agent B iff (1) agent A accepts that agent B is an expert on question x and (2) agent A will accept a theory answering question x if agent B says so. Also accept the following redefinitions of subtypes of authority delegation, including mutual authority delegation, one-sided authority delegation, singular authority delegation, multiple authority delegation, hierarchical authority delegation, and non-hierarchical authority delegation: Mutual Authority Delegation ≡ epistemic agents A and B are said to be in a relationship of mutual authority delegation iff A delegates authority over question x to B, and B delegates authority over question y to A. One-Sided Authority Delegation ≡ epistemic agents A and B are said to be in a relationship of one-sided authority delegation iff A delegates authority over question x to B, but B doesn’t delegate any authority to A. Singular Authority Delegation ≡ epistemic agent A is said to engage in a relationship of singular authority delegation over question x iff A delegates authority over question x to exactly one epistemic agent. Multiple Authority Delegation ≡ epistemic agent A is said to engage in a relationship of multiple authority delegation over question x iff A delegates authority over question x to more than one epistemic agents. Hierarchical Authority Delegation ≡ a sub-type of multiple authority delegation where different epistemic agents are delegated different degrees of authority over question x. Non-Hierarchical Authority Delegation ≡ a sub-type of multiple authority delegation where different epistemic agents are delegated the same degree of authority over question x. [Sciento-2019-0018]: Accept the relationship of tool reliance can obtain between epistemic agents and epistemic tools. Accept the following definition of tool reliance: Tool Reliance ≡ an epistemic agent is said to rely on an epistemic tool when there is a procedure through which the tool can provide an acceptable source of knowledge for answering some question under the employed method of that agent.

scholarly journals A Compatibility Law and the Classification of Theory Change

2018 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 67-82
Author(s):  
Patrick Thomas Fraser ◽  
Ameer Sarwar
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Theory ◽  
Theory Change ◽  
Epistemic Stance ◽  
Current Formulation ◽  
Previous Definition ◽  
The Law ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Theory Acceptance ◽  
Demarcation Criteria

The current formulation of the zeroth law (the law of compatibility) is marred with a number of theoretical problems, which necessitate its reformulation. In this paper, we propose that compatibility is an independent stance that can be taken towards epistemic elements of all types. We then provide a new definition of compatibility criteria to reflect this change. We show that the content of the zeroth law is deducible from our definition of compatibility. Instead of a static law of compatibility, we propose a new dynamic law of compatibility that explains how the stance of compatibility obtains. Unlike the zeroth law, this new law has empirical content, as it forbids certain conceivable scenarios. Having established these notions, we propose a classification space that exhaustively covers all the possible states a theory may occupy and all the transitions it may undergo during its lifecycle.   Suggested Modifications [Sciento-2018-0015]: Accept the following definition of compatibility: Compatibility ≡ the ability of two elements to coexist in the same mosaic. Also accept the following corollary: Compatibility Corollary: at any moment of time, the elements of the scientific mosaic are compatible with each other. Accept that all theorems that take the current zeroth law as their premise are recoverable when the compatibility corollary is used as a premise instead.  Reject the zeroth law.   [Sciento-2018-0016]: Accept compatibility as a distinct epistemic stance that can be taken towards epistemic elements of all types. Also accept that compatibility is binary, reflexive, and symmetric. Transitivity of compatibility holds only within mosaics, not sui generis.   [Sciento-2018-0017]: Accept the following definition of compatibility criteria: Compatibility Criteria ≡ criteria for determining whether two elements are compatible or incompatible. Reject the previous definition of compatibility criteria.   [Sciento-2018-0018]: Accept the following law of compatibility as a scientonomic axiom: The Law of Compatibility: if a pair of elements satisfies the compatibility criteria employed at the time, it becomes compatible within the mosaic; if it does not, it is deemed incompatible; and if assessment is inconclusive, the pair can become compatible, incompatible, or its status may be unknown.   [Sciento-2018-0019]: Accept the new definition of theory acceptance: Theory Acceptance ≡ an accepted theory is a scientific theory that is taken as the best available description or prescription of its object. Reject the previous definition of theory acceptance.   [Sciento-2018-0020]: Accept the following theorem: Demarcation-Acceptance Synchronism theorem: every theory that becomes accepted satisfies the demarcation criteria employed at the time of acceptance.

Slave Women and Their Descendants among the Upper Classes in Tetouan, Morocco (1859–1956): Between Recognition and Conflict

2020 ◽  
pp. 036319902096739
Author(s):  
Josep Lluís Mateo Dieste
Keyword(s):  
Skin Color ◽  
Arab World ◽  
Family Members ◽  
Negative Stereotypes ◽  
The Social ◽  
Form Part ◽  
Slave Women ◽  
The Status ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Determinant Factor

In the Arab world, the recognized children of elite men and slave women could adopt the status of their father, ignoring the slave origin of the mother, owing to a system of patrilineal transmission. This regime co-existed with negative stereotypes toward slaves and blackness, despite the very fact that—as this study of notable families in Tetouan between 1859 and 1956 demonstrates—skin color was not the determinant factor to form part of this group. Rather, it was based on the social definition of filiation, leading to legal disputes between family members to delineate the boundaries of kinship.

scholarly journals Rethinking Southern Europe: Society, Networks and Politics

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Alan Granadino ◽  
Eirini Karamouzi ◽  
Rinna Kullaa
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Southern Europe ◽  
Eurozone Crisis ◽  
Development Education ◽  
Family Structures ◽  
Conceptual Clarity ◽  
Welfare Systems ◽  
The Status ◽  
Nineteenth And Twentieth Centuries ◽  
Definition Of

Writing and researching Southern Europe as a symbiotic area has always presented a challenging task. Historians and political scientists such as Stanley Payne, Edward Malefakis, Giulio Sapelli, and Roberto Aliboni have studied the concept of Southern Europe and its difficult paths to modernity. They have been joined by sociologists and anthropologists who have debated the existence of a Southern European paradigm in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and the arduous transformation of the region's welfare systems, economic development, education and family structures. These scholarly attempts to understand the specificities of Southern Europe date back to the concerns of Western European Cold War strategists in the 1970s, many of whom were worried about the status quo of the region in the aftermath of the fall of the dictatorships. But this geographical and geopolitical definition of the area did not necessarily follow existing cultural, political and economic patterns. Once the Eurozone crisis hit in the 2000s these questions came back with renewed force but with even less conceptual clarity, as journalists and pundits frequently gestured towards vague notions of what they considered to be ‘Southern Europe’.

Grammatik der Narration

2020 ◽  
Vol 48 (3) ◽  
pp. 457-494
Author(s):  
Sonja Zeman
Keyword(s):  
Narrative Discourse ◽  
Linguistic Theory ◽  
Second Step ◽  
Narrative Fiction ◽  
The Status ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Narrative Syntax

AbstractIs there a ‚narrative syntax‘, i. e. a special grammar restricted to narrative fiction? Starting from this question which has been investigated since early structuralism, the paper focusses on grammatical characteristics of narrative discourse mode and their implications for a linguistic theory of narration. Its goal is two-fold: In a first step, the traditional accounts by Benveniste, Hamburger, Kuroda and recent typological studies are brought together in order to support the claim that the distinction between narrative and non-narrative discourse mode is a fundamental one that has consequences for the use of grammar. In a second step, I discuss three central questions within the intersection between narrative micro- and macro-structures, namely (i) the definition of narrativity, (ii) the status of the narrator, and (iii) the relation between narration and fictionality. In sum, the article argues that investigations on the ‘grammar of narration’ do not just offer insights into a specific text configuration next to others, but are deeply linked to fundamental theoretical questions concerning the architecture of language – and that the comparison between linguistic and narratological categories offers a potential for addressing them.

The Humdrum Use of Ultimate Authority: Defining and Analysing Chapter VII Resolutions

2009 ◽  
Vol 78 (3) ◽  
pp. 309-342 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrik Johansson
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
United Nations ◽  
Security Council ◽  
Security Council Resolution ◽  
Post Cold War ◽  
Standard Definition ◽  
The Status ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Business As Usual

AbstractUnder Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council has the unique authority to make decisions that are binding on member states. However, the lack of a standard definition of what makes a Security Council resolution "a Chapter VII resolution" has caused disagreement regarding the status of several resolutions. This is unfortunate as the international community should never have to doubt whether a Security Council resolution is in fact adopted under Chapter VII or not. It is also unnecessary. This article addresses this problem by proposing a definition of Chapter VII resolutions, based on two criteria referred to as "Article 39 determinations" and "Chapter VII decisions". On the basis of the proposed definition, the article describes and analyses a dramatic increase in the use of Chapter VII during the post-Cold War era. It concludes that as Chapter VII has come to constitute the majority of Security Council resolutions in recent years, the resort to Chapter VII no longer signifies exceptional determination and resolve, which it did during the Cold War; instead Chapter VII today implies business as usual. An appendix lists all Chapter VII resolutions from 1946–2008.

Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) Statements in the U. S. Creative Sector: Progress, or More Bullshit?

2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 33-46
Author(s):  
Antonio C. Cuyler
Keyword(s):  
Content Analysis ◽  
Research Question ◽  
Theoretical Framework ◽  
Status Quo ◽  
Arts Organizations ◽  
The Public ◽  
Cultural Organizations ◽  
The Status ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Equity And Inclusion

This article represents a snapshot and analysis of U. S. service arts organizations’ DEI statements and activities in 2018. At that time, many primarily White-serving U. S. cultural organizations responded defensively to accusations of elitism and a harmful rigged funding system that maintained the status quo by awarding most cultural funding to these organizations while undermining the health and vitality of cultural organizations by and for historically oppressed communities (Sidford, 2011). Furthermore, Helicon Collaborative (2017) found that even with a host of cultural equity, “diversity” projects (Tseng 2016), and public-facing DEI statements, little had changed within six years. Therefore, this study uses directed and summative content analysis to investigate the research question “what do cultural equity and diversity statements communicate about cultural organizations’ positions on DEI?” This study also uses Frankfurt’s (2005) essay On Bullshit and Laing’s (2016) two-prong definition of accountability as a theoretical framework to examine if and how cultural organizations hold themselves accountable for achieving DEI in the creative sector. Lastly, readers should keep in mind that the public murder of Geor-ge Floyd in 2020 has hastened all of the service arts organizations’ access, diversity, equity, and inclusion (ADEI) work examined in this study.

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