THOUGHT AS A QUASI-POSSIBILITY

Modal logic determines a lot in modern metaphysics and ontology, which delve deeper and deeper into the realm of the possible, not limited to the analysis of reality. This makes it relevant to study the problems of philosophical argumentation, built on the basis of modal logic. The aim of the work is to prove that thinkability does not necessarily entail a logical possibility. Because of this, many kinds of modal arguments that involve inference from conceivability to possibility can be flawed. Methodology: the author considers the question of the existence of objects impossible from the point of view of classical logical omniscience as a parallel to the idea of the existence of impossible possible worlds by J. Hintikka. The main idea of this article is the assertion that the gap between conceivability and possibility is generated by the intellectual limitations of the epistemic agent. The agent consistently — within the framework of the information available to him, and not in the absolute sense - considers logically possible that which is logically impossible from the point of view of logical omniscience. It turns out that we are able to think not only of something non-existent (to have empty intentions), but even quite capable of thinking the logically impossible. The conceivability of the impossible is somewhat analogous to the conceivability of impossible objects that are constructed by contemporary artists. The paper draws a parallel between the tautological thinkability of such an equation that is not tautological and the thinkability as a theorem of something that is not a theorem (S. Kripke’s modal arguments). As a particular example, the author criticizes the argument of the zombie by D. Chalmers, which is popular in modern philosophy of consciousness. It is shown that the conceivability of a zombie does not exclude the possible inconsistency of a zombie from an absolute point of view. In the second part, various types of the a priori are also considered, the opposition is built between the classical idea of logical omniscience and the agent-based approach using the categories of semantics of possible worlds. The main result of the proposed work is to prove that both formally contradictory and conceptually contradictory can be outside the framework of the epistemic attainability of the final agent. The author introduces a new philosophical category of the quasi-possible.

Foundations of relativism by J. Margolis in the polemic of R. Rorty and H. Putnam

The polemic about the realism of H. Putnam and R. Rorty is a remarkable event of the 20th century for a number of reasons. Forming within the analytical philosophy, and using the most relevant concepts and ideas of this direction as arguments, this polemic for almost three decades of its existence balanced on the border with relativism, the least popular and admited direction of philosophy of the 20th century. Putnam's arguments against metaphysical realism reject any "point of view of God", entail "internalism", accept the concept of incommensurability of conceptual schemes and the relativization the reality described by the epistemic agent to his experience. Rorty's arguments reject not only relativism, but also realism, but his concepts of ethnocentrism and solidarity also take the view that the standards of truth correlate with the conceptual schemes, are "sociologized" and meet the interests of the majority. J. Margolis find in this polemic not only a retreat into relativism, but also recognized its pragmatistic potential, which gave him the opportunity to defend relativism, proposing its reliable (robust) version and building a neo-pragmatist philosophy on the development of the arguments of both sides.

What Is Justified Group Belief?

This chapter, develops and defends a view of justified group belief—the Group Epistemic Agent Account: groups are understood as epistemic agents in their own right, ones that have evidential and normative constraints that arise only at the group level, such as a sensitivity to the relations among the evidence possessed by group members and the epistemic obligations that arise via membership in the group. These constraints bear significantly on whether groups have justified belief. At the same time, however, group justifiedness is still largely a matter of member justifiedness, where the latter is understood as involving both beliefs and their bases. The result is a view that neither inflates nor deflates group epistemology, but instead recognizes that a group’s justified beliefs are constrained by, but are not ultimately reducible to, members’ justified beliefs.

Epistemic Injustice and the Attention Economy

In recent years, a significant body of literature has emerged on the subject of epistemic injustice: wrongful harms done to people in their capacities as knowers (Fricker 2007). Up to now this literature has ignored the role that attention has to play in epistemic injustice. This paper makes a first step towards addressing this gap. We argue that giving someone less attention than they are due, which we call an epistemic attention deficit, is a distinct form of epistemic injustice. We begin by outlining what we mean by epistemic attention deficits, which we understand as a failure to pay someone the attention they are due in their role as an epistemic agent. We argue that these deficits constitute epistemic injustices for two reasons. First, they affect someone’s ability to influence what others believe. Second, they affect one’s ability to influence the shared common ground in which testimonial exchanges take place. We then outline the various ways in which epistemic attention deficits harm those who are subject to them. We argue that epistemic attention deficits are harms in and of themselves because they deprive people of an essential component of epistemic agency. Moreover, epistemic attention deficits reduce an agent’s ability to participate in valuable epistemic practices. These two forms of harm have important impacts on educational performance and the distribution of resources. Finally, we argue that epistemic attention deficits both hinder and shape the development of epistemic agency. We finish by exploring some practical implications arising from our discussion.

A theory of temporal telepresence: Reconsidering the digital time collapse

This article focuses on the concept of ‘time collapse’ commonly used within scholarship on digital memory. Despite its intuitive appeal, I claim that the notion of a collapsed time leaves considerable room for conceptual ambiguity, which in turn hampers a deeper ethical analysis of the topic. In view of this ambiguity, the present article sets out to provide analytical rigor to, and thus unpack the ethical dimensions of, the notion of time collapse. Pursuing this goal, I introduce the concept of temporal friction, denoting informational resistance that makes moments of time perceivable as separate for an embodied epistemic agent. I argue that the concept of temporal friction offers a more flexible and precise interpretation of collapsed time, and draw on two examples – search warrants and the so-called digital remains – to illustrate its ethical significance.

Revising Probabilities and Full Beliefs

A new formal model of belief dynamics is proposed, in which the epistemic agent has both probabilistic beliefs and full beliefs. The agent has full belief in a proposition if and only if she considers the probability that it is false to be so close to zero that she chooses to disregard that probability. She treats such a proposition as having the probability 1, but, importantly, she is still willing and able to revise that probability assignment if she receives information that gives her sufficient reasons to do so. Such a proposition is (presently) undoubted, but not undoubtable (incorrigible). In the formal model it is assigned a probability 1 − δ, where δ is an infinitesimal number. The proposed model employs probabilistic belief states that contain several underlying probability functions representing alternative probabilistic states of the world. Furthermore, a distinction is made between update and revision, in the same way as in the literature on (dichotomous) belief change. The formal properties of the model are investigated, including properties relevant for learning from experience. The set of propositions whose probabilities are infinitesimally close to 1 forms a (logically closed) belief set. Operations that change the probabilistic belief state give rise to changes in this belief set, which have much in common with traditional operations of belief change.

Epistemology of Belief

The following article discovers current trends of contemporary epistemology, related to epistemic agent and his/her activities. A number of issues raised here describe internal experience of the agent, such as (in)voluntary nature of belief formation, trust in one’s faculties of perception, correspondence of formed beliefs to evidence, demarcation between purely epistemic and pragmatic rationality. Another part of the issues is related to external experiences of the agent. The most crucial among them are: blameworthiness of the agent’s belief system, limited intake of testimonial knowledge as a result of social bias; epistemic disagreement and “epistemic peers” as the sources of knowledge or additional pressure from the environment. The author considers virtue epistemology as a new way of performing normativity.

Epistemic Tools and Epistemic Agents in Scientonomy

The only subtype of epistemic agent currently recognized within scientonomy is community. The place of both individuals and epistemic tools in the scientonomic ontology is yet to be clarified. This paper extends the scientonomic ontology to include epistemic agents and epistemic tools as well as their relationship to one another. Epistemic agent is defined as an agent capable of taking epistemic stances towards epistemic elements. These stances must be taken intentionally, that is, based on a semantic understanding of the epistemic element in question and its available alternatives, with reason, and for the purpose of acquiring knowledge. I argue that there can be both communal and individual epistemic agents. Epistemic agents are linked by relationships of authority delegation based on their differing areas of expertise. Having established the role of epistemic agents in the process of scientific change, I then turn to the role of epistemic tools, such as a thermometer, a text, or a particle accelerator in epistemic activities. I argue that epistemic tools play a different role in scientific change than do epistemic agents. This role is specified by an agent’s employed method. A physical object or system is an epistemic tool for some epistemic agent if there is a procedure by which the tool can provide an acceptable source of knowledge for answering some question under the employed method of the agent. An agent is said to rely on such a tool. Suggested Modifications [Sciento-2019-0014]: Accept the following definition of epistemic agent: Epsitemic Agent ≡ an agent capable of taking epistemic stances towards epistemic elements. [Sciento-2019-0015]: Accept that there are two types of epistemic agents – individual and communal. Also accept the following question as a legitimate topic of scientonomic inquiry: Applicability of the Laws of Scientific Change to Individuals: do the scientonomic laws apply to individual epistemic agents? [Sciento-2019-0016]: Accept the term epistemic tool, with the following definition: Epistemic Tool ≡ a physical object or system is an epistemic tool for an epistemic agent, when there is a procedure by which the tool can provide an acceptable source of knowledge for answering some question under the employed method of that agent. [Sciento-2019-0017]: Accept the following definition of authority delegation, which generalizes the currently accepted definition to apply to all epistemic agents: Authority Delegation ≡ epistemic agent A is said to be delegating authority over question x to epistemic agent B iff (1) agent A accepts that agent B is an expert on question x and (2) agent A will accept a theory answering question x if agent B says so. Also accept the following redefinitions of subtypes of authority delegation, including mutual authority delegation, one-sided authority delegation, singular authority delegation, multiple authority delegation, hierarchical authority delegation, and non-hierarchical authority delegation: Mutual Authority Delegation ≡ epistemic agents A and B are said to be in a relationship of mutual authority delegation iff A delegates authority over question x to B, and B delegates authority over question y to A. One-Sided Authority Delegation ≡ epistemic agents A and B are said to be in a relationship of one-sided authority delegation iff A delegates authority over question x to B, but B doesn’t delegate any authority to A. Singular Authority Delegation ≡ epistemic agent A is said to engage in a relationship of singular authority delegation over question x iff A delegates authority over question x to exactly one epistemic agent. Multiple Authority Delegation ≡ epistemic agent A is said to engage in a relationship of multiple authority delegation over question x iff A delegates authority over question x to more than one epistemic agents. Hierarchical Authority Delegation ≡ a sub-type of multiple authority delegation where different epistemic agents are delegated different degrees of authority over question x. Non-Hierarchical Authority Delegation ≡ a sub-type of multiple authority delegation where different epistemic agents are delegated the same degree of authority over question x. [Sciento-2019-0018]: Accept the relationship of tool reliance can obtain between epistemic agents and epistemic tools. Accept the following definition of tool reliance: Tool Reliance ≡ an epistemic agent is said to rely on an epistemic tool when there is a procedure through which the tool can provide an acceptable source of knowledge for answering some question under the employed method of that agent.

Method Hierarchies in Clinical Epidemiology

Accumulating evidence from diverse fields of inquiry suggests the existence of method hierarchies, where criteria employed by the same epistemic agent constitute a certain preference hierarchy. In this paper, we illustrate the phenomenon of method hierarchy by discussing several prominent studies in clinical epidemiology of coronary artery disease. The current “gold standard” in clinical epidemiology is the randomized controlled trial (RCT) method. Yet, in the absence of studies that satisfy the strict requirement of the RCT method, clinical epidemiologists often relax the requirements of double-blinding, complete follow-up, no treatment switching, and/or randomization. Instead, they sometimes employ less stringent requirements, such as the requirement to account for the potential imbalances between groups through statistical models. This suggests the existence of a certain method hierarchy. However, it is unclear how method hierarchies are to be conceptualized and documented. Specifically, it remains to be seen whether a method hierarchy is best understood as being composed of individual employed methods or as a single composite method with a complex system of if-s and else-s. Suggested Modifications [Sciento-2019-0013]: Accept the existence of method hierarchies. Accept the following definition of method hierarchy: Method Hierarchy ≡ a set of methods is said to constitute a hierarchy iff theories that satisfy the requirements of methods that are higher in the hierarchy are preferred to theories that satisfy the requirements of methods that are lower in the hierarchy. Accept the following question as a legitimate topic of scientonomic inquiry: Conceptualizing Method Hierarchies: should we conceive of a method hierarchy as being composed of individual employed methods/requirements, or should we think of it as constituting one composite method with a system of if-s and else-s, and-s and or-s?

Deducing the Principal Principle

This chapter gives two distinct justifications of the Principal Principle (PP) for Humean objective chances (HOCs). The first justification is “consequentialist” in nature: it shows that in practical decision-making, an agent who has to make bets on repeated chancy events of type A, and who knows the chance of A but has no better information (the scenario of PP), will do better setting her credence equal to the chance of A than she can do with any other, significantly different, betting strategy. The second justification shows that an epistemic agent meeting the conditions for application of PP is irrational—logically incoherent, in fact—if she sets her credence to a level substantially different from the chance. This argument is an adaptation of one originally offered by Colin Howson and Peter Urbach (1993) to justify the PP for von Mises–style hypothetical frequentism. It is shown that the argument works better in support of HOC than it did in support of frequentism.