Vertical Integration and Exclusivity in Platform and Two-Sided Markets
2013 ◽
Vol 103
(7)
◽
pp. 2960-3000
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Keyword(s):
The Us
◽
This paper measures the impact of vertically integrated and exclusive software on industry structure and welfare in the sixth-generation of the US video game industry (2000–2005). I specify and estimate a dynamic model of both consumer demand for hardware and software products, and software demand for hardware platforms. I use estimates to simulate market outcomes had platforms been unable to own or contract exclusively with software. Driven by increased software compatibility, hardware and software sales would have increased by 7 percent and 58 percent and consumer welfare by $1.5 billion. Gains would be realized only by the incumbent, suggesting exclusivity favored the entrant platforms. (JEL D12, L13, L22, L63, L86)
2013 ◽
Vol 12
(10)
◽
pp. 1273
Keyword(s):
2005 ◽
Vol 20
(4)
◽
pp. 234-244
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2018 ◽
Vol 4
(2)
◽
pp. 13-18
Keyword(s):