scholarly journals Using a Free Permit Rule to Forecast the Marginal Abatement Cost of Proposed Climate Policy

2017 ◽  
Vol 107 (3) ◽  
pp. 748-784 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kyle C. Meng
Keyword(s):  
Climate Policy ◽  
Stock Returns ◽  
Regression Discontinuity ◽  
Abatement Cost ◽  
Marginal Abatement Cost ◽  
Regression Discontinuity Design ◽  
Prediction Market ◽  
Market Prices ◽  
Permit Price ◽  
Bounding Analysis

This paper develops a method for forecasting the marginal abatement cost (MAC) of climate policy using three features of the failed Waxman-Markey bill. First, the MAC is revealed by the price of traded permits. Second, the permit price is estimated using a regression discontinuity design (RDD) comparing stock returns of firms on either side of the policy's free permit cutoff rule. Third, because Waxman-Markey was never implemented, I extend the RDD approach to incorporate prediction market prices which normalize estimates by policy realization probabilities. A final bounding analysis recovers a MAC range of $5 to $19 per ton CO2e. (JEL G12, G14, Q52, Q54, Q58)

Marginal abatement cost curves for agricultural climate policy: State-of-the art, lessons learnt and future potential

2018 ◽  
Vol 182 ◽  
pp. 705-716 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vera Eory ◽  
Sylvain Pellerin ◽  
Gema Carmona Garcia ◽  
Heikki Lehtonen ◽  
Ieva Licite ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Climate Policy ◽  
State Of The Art ◽  
Abatement Cost ◽  
Marginal Abatement Cost ◽  
Lessons Learnt ◽  
Cost Curves ◽  
Future Potential

scholarly journals Effectiveness of a Power Factor Correction Policy in Improving the Energy Efficiency of Large-Scale Electricity Users in Ghana

Energies ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (13) ◽  
pp. 2582 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Lotsu ◽  
Yuichiro Yoshida ◽  
Katsufumi Fukuda ◽  
Bing He
Keyword(s):  
Energy Efficiency ◽  
Power Factor ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Regression Discontinuity ◽  
Power Factor Correction ◽  
Energy Crisis ◽  
Regression Discontinuity Design ◽  
The Government ◽  
Power Factor Improvement ◽  
The Impact

Confronting an energy crisis, the government of Ghana enacted a power factor correction policy in 1995. The policy imposes a penalty on large-scale electricity users, namely, special load tariff (SLT) customers of the Electricity Company of Ghana (ECG), whose power factor is below 90%. This paper investigates the impact of this policy on these firms’ power factor improvement by using panel data from 183 SLT customers from 1994 to 1997 and from 2012. To avoid potential endogeneity, this paper adopts a regression discontinuity design (RDD) with the power factor of the firms in the previous year as a running variable, with its cutoff set at the penalty threshold. The result shows that these large-scale electricity users who face the penalty because their power factor falls just short of the threshold are more likely to improve their power factor in the subsequent year, implying that the power factor correction policy implemented by Ghana’s government is effective.

How Much of the Incumbency Advantage is Due to Scare-Off?

2015 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 493-514 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew B. Hall ◽  
James M. Snyder
Keyword(s):  
Regression Discontinuity ◽  
Regression Discontinuity Design ◽  
Incumbency Advantage ◽  
Previous Election ◽  
Us Senate ◽  
State Legislative

This paper uses a regression discontinuity design to estimate the degree to which incumbents scare off challengers with previous officeholder experience. The estimates indicate a surprisingly small amount of scare-off, at least in cases where the previous election was nearly tied. As Lee and others have shown (and as we confirm for our samples) the estimated party incumbency advantage in these same cases is quite large—in fact, it is about as large as the average incumbency advantage for all races found using other approaches. Drawing from previous estimates of the electoral value of officeholder experience, we thus calculate that scare-off in these cases accounts for only about 5–7 percent of the party incumbency advantage. We show that these patterns are similar in elections for US House seats, statewide offices and US senate seats, and state legislative seats.

Sectoral marginal abatement cost curves: implications for mitigation pledges and air pollution co-benefits for Annex I countries

2012 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 169-184 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fabian Wagner ◽  
Markus Amann ◽  
Jens Borken-Kleefeld ◽  
Janusz Cofala ◽  
Lena Höglund-Isaksson ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Air Pollution ◽  
Abatement Cost ◽  
Marginal Abatement Cost ◽  
Cost Curves
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