Superstition and Rational Learning
2006 ◽
Vol 96
(3)
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pp. 630-651
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We argue that some, but not all, superstitions can persist when learning is rational and players are patient, and illustrate our argument with an example inspired by the Code of Hammurabi. The code specified an “appeal by surviving in the river” as a way of deciding whether an accusation was true. According to our theory, a mechanism that uses superstitions two or more steps off the equilibrium path, such as “appeal by surviving in the river,” is more likely to persist than a superstition where the false beliefs are only one step off the equilibrium path.
An Interactive Minicomputer Program for the Indexing and Simulation of Electron Diffraction Patterns
1976 ◽
Vol 34
◽
pp. 542-543
Keyword(s):
One Step
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Keyword(s):
2020 ◽
Keyword(s):
2010 ◽
Vol 57
(1)
◽
pp. 77-82
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Keyword(s):
1999 ◽
Vol 30
(1)
◽
pp. 45-50
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