Tax Reform as Political Choice

1987 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-35 ◽  
Author(s):  
James M Buchanan
Keyword(s):  
Public Choice ◽  
Tax Reform ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Public Choice Theory ◽  
Political Choice ◽  
Political Event ◽  
Political Reality ◽  
Reform Legislation ◽  
Tax Changes ◽  
Gains And Losses

Public choice theory explains and interprets politics as the interaction among constituents and agents seeking to advance or to express their own interests. Applied to an observed political event like the 1986 tax reform legislation, any such analysis must identify the effects on separate interests and make some presumption concerning the perception of these effects. The linkage between assigning gains and losses from the 1986 tax changes and explaining these changes depends critically on the model of political choice. Political reality presumably embodies some mix of models of consensus, conflict, and agents' discretion. These three models are examined separately, with features from each retaining some explanatory value.

scholarly journals Diverse Interests and International Legitimation: Public Choice Theory and the Politics of International Tax

AJIL Unbound ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 114 ◽  
pp. 265-269
Author(s):  
Lilian V. Faulhaber
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Public Choice ◽  
Tax Reform ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Public Choice Theory ◽  
Profit Shifting ◽  
National Interests ◽  
The World ◽  
International Tax

In her article, Mason concludes that politics – or “bargaining over national interests”— “will play a starring role in determining the outcomes” of the current digital tax project. In this essay, I apply public choice theory to the politics of international tax and argue that two questions can shape our understanding of international tax negotiations and therefore help us predict the outcomes of future international tax reform projects. First, what interests are country delegates representing? Second, how are countries using their involvement in international negotiations to represent these interests? The first question highlights that country delegates are often not defending some agreed-upon “national interest” but are instead often protecting the interests of particular political parties, industries, or taxpayers, which in turn means that interests can change over time and that some voices are missing from debates. The second question highlights that country delegates can engage in international tax negotiations in a variety of ways. They can try to limit what, if anything, the negotiations achieve; they can try to push for more expansive results; and they can use the negotiations to provide international support for their own country's laws. This essay focuses on one particular version of this third type of engagement, where delegates use their country's involvement in an international project to validate and legitimate an idea or proposal that may previously have had little support. I refer to this involvement as “international legitimation,” and I argue that the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Project shows that delegates who took this approach may have achieved the most long-term success in that their inclusion of little-known provisions or concepts in the international outputs of the BEPS Project ended up leading to these provisions and concepts being adopted by countries around the world.

Collective Decision-making: FIFA from the Perspective of Public Choice

2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Florian Follert ◽  
Lukas Richau ◽  
Eike Emrich ◽  
Christian Pierdzioch
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Public Choice ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Collective Decision ◽  
Public Confidence ◽  
Collective Decision Making ◽  
Public Choice Theory ◽  
World Cup ◽  
The World ◽  
Selection Of

AbstractVarious scandals have shaken public confidence in football's global governing body, Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA). It is evident that decision-making within such a collective provides incentives for corruption. We apply the Buchanan-Tullock model that is known from Public Choice theory to study collective decision-making within FIFA. On the basis of this theoretical model, we develop specific proposals that can contribute to combating corruption. Three core aspects are discussed: the selection of the World Cup host, transparency in the allocation of budgets, and clear guidelines for FIFA officials and bodies with regard to their rights and accountability. Our insights can contribute to a better understanding of collective decision making in heterogenous groups.

Financial Indicators as Determinants of Mayoral Elections

2020 ◽  
pp. 27-53
Author(s):  
Serena Santis ◽  
Francesca Citro ◽  
Beatriz Cuadrado-Ballesteros ◽  
Marco Bisogno
Keyword(s):  
Local Government ◽  
Public Choice ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Capital Expenditure ◽  
Financial Indicators ◽  
Public Choice Theory ◽  
The Public ◽  
Mayoral Elections ◽  
Local Politicians ◽  
Italian Context

The chapter seeks to contribute to the literature on determinants of local government election by adopting a different perspective focused on the effects of financial indicators on the elections of mayors. Using the agency and the public choice theory, this study implements a model where specific financial indicators—whose selection takes into account the increased autonomy and responsibility of local politicians—have been included to document their effect on mayoral re-election. Focusing on the Italian context, the chapter examines a sample of 129 municipalities during the period 2008-2014, where several elections were held. By using different estimators, findings indicate that the re-election of mayors is affected by the level of indebtedness and the current equilibrium. In addition, current spending is better valued by citizens/voters than capital expenditure, which increases the probability of being re-elected.

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