scholarly journals Weak States and Steady States: The Dynamics of Fiscal Capacity

2013 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 205-235 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy Besley ◽  
Ethan Ilzetzki ◽  
Torsten Persson
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Tax Compliance ◽  
Preliminary Evidence ◽  
Common Interest ◽  
Weak States ◽  
Public Goods Provision ◽  
Weak State ◽  
Fiscal Capacity ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Public Resources

Investments in fiscal capacity—economic institutions for tax compliance—are an important feature of economic development. This paper develops a dynamic model to study the evolution of fiscal capacity over time. We contrast a social planner's investment path with politically feasible paths. Three types of states emerge in the long run: a common-interest state where public resources are devoted to public goods, a redistributive state where additional fiscal capacity is used for transfers, and a weak state with no transfers and a low level of public goods provision. We also present some preliminary evidence consistent with the theory. (JEL E23, E62, H23, H26, H41)

scholarly journals Who wants violence? The political economy of conflict and state building in Colombia

2019 ◽  
Vol 38 (78) ◽  
pp. 671-700
Author(s):  
Leopoldo Fergusson
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
State Building ◽  
Status Quo ◽  
The Political ◽  
Weak States ◽  
Weak State ◽  
Fertile Ground ◽  
Vested Interests ◽  
The Status

I propose three broad sets of political economy underpinnings for the persistence of conflict and the weak state. First, a “public goods trap” rooted in inequality implies that a low supply of, and demand for, public goods reinforce each other. Second, economic and political rents create vested interests in the status quo. Political rents are particularly problematic, partly because reformers face a curse of dimensionality: many things have to work well for state capacity and stable peace to consolidate. Finally, a very clientelistic pattern of political exchange consolidates a weak state, and weak states are fertile ground for clientelism.

Voluntary Cooperation in Local Public Goods Provision: An Experimental Study

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrej Angelovski ◽  
Daniela Di Cagno ◽  
Werner GGth ◽  
Francesca Marazzi ◽  
Luca Panaccione
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Study ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Local Public Goods ◽  
Public Goods Provision ◽  
Voluntary Cooperation

scholarly journals Swords and Plowshares: Property Rights, Collective Action, and Nonstate Governance in the Jewish Community of Palestine 1920–1948

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
DAVID MUCHLINSKI
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Jewish Community ◽  
Causal Effect ◽  
Public Goods Provision ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Private Goods ◽  
Agricultural Communities ◽  
Institutional Variation ◽  
Subnational Governance

Developing states lacking a monopoly over the use of force are commonly seen as having failed to live up to the ideal Weberian sovereign type. Yet rather than being a calling card of anarchy, the devolution of important state functions to subnational actors is a rational strategy for developing states to effectively provide important public goods. The case study of the Jewish Community of Palestine demonstrates one instance where subnational communities provided public goods. This study highlights the causal effect of property rights within institutions to drive behavior consistent with the provision of public and private goods. Analyzing temporal and institutional variation across two agricultural communities demonstrates a unique strategy of subnational governance and public goods provision in a developing state. Devolution of public goods provision to subnational actors may be an alternative strategy of governance for developing states that are not yet able to effectively provide important public goods.

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