scholarly journals Intermediation Reduces Punishment (and Reward)

2011 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 77-106 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lucas C Coffman

This paper shows moral decision making is not well predicted by the overall fairness of an act but rather by the fairness of the consequences that follow directly. In laboratory experiments, third-party punishment for keeping money from a poorer player decreases when an intermediary actor is included in the transaction. This is true for completely passive intermediaries, even though intermediation decreases the payout of the poorest player and hurts equity, and because intermediation distances the transgressor from the outcome. A separate study shows rewards of charitable giving decrease when the saliency of an intermediary is increased. (JEL A13, D63, D64)

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Behnke ◽  
Anja Strobel ◽  
Diana Armbruster

Killing people is universally considered reprehensible and evokes in observers a need to punish perpetrators. To investigate how observers’ personality influences their cognitive, emotional, and punishing reactions towards perpetrators, we analyzed data from 1,004 participants who responded to three scenarios describing deliberate killings from a third-party perspective. Utilitarian motive of killing and inevitability of harm varied systematically between scenarios. Participants’ moral appropriateness judgments, emotions towards perpetrators, and assigned punishments revealed complex scenario-personality interactions. Trait psychopathy led to more understanding emotions but harsher punishments in all scenarios. Regarding utilitarian killings, need for cognition led to milder punishments, whereas intuitive/authority-obedient thinking led to stronger negative emotions and harsher punishments. Other-oriented empathy, trait anxiety, and justice sensitivity did not account for differences in third-party punishments. Our findings highlight the importance of interindividual differences on moral decision making and sense of justice.


Author(s):  
Marcia C. Inhorn

This chapter demonstrates how major divergences have occurred in the fatwas being issued by Sunni and Shia religious authorities regarding the permissibility of third-party reproductive assistance. In recent years, new fatwas emerging from the Shia world have condoned third-party gamete donation, whereas gamete donation continues to be banned across the Sunni Muslim countries. These divergent Sunni and Shia Islamic approaches toward gamete donation have affected the moral decision making of infertile Muslim couples in ways that are only beginning to be realized. The degree of consensus across the Sunni Muslim countries is quite striking, as are the ways in which these fatwas have guided the clinical practices of the Middle Eastern IVF community.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jessica Ellen Ringshaw ◽  
Katie Hamilton ◽  
Susan Malcolm-Smith

AbstractSocial impairment in Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) has been linked to Theory of Mind (ToM) deficits. However, little research has investigated the relationship between ToM and moral decision-making in children with ASD. This study compared moral decision-making and ToM between aggregate-matched ASD and neurotypical boys (n=38 per group; aged 6-12). In a third-party resource allocation task manipulating recipient merit, wealth and health, neurotypical children allocated significantly more resources to the morally deserving recipient, suggesting equitable allocation. A comparatively larger portion of the ASD group allocated equally. ToM emerged as a predictor of moral decision-making. We suggest that ToM (cognitive empathy) deficits may underly atypical moral decision-making in ASD by limiting the integration of empathic arousal (affective empathy) with moral information.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alfred W. Kaszniak ◽  
Cynda H. Rushton ◽  
Joan Halifax

The present paper is the product of collaboration between a neuroscientist, an ethicist, and a contemplative exploring issues around leadership, morality, and ethics. It is an exploration on how people in roles of responsibility can better understand how to engage in discernment processes with more awareness and a deeper sense of responsibility for others and themselves. It draws upon recent research and scholarship in neuroscience, contemplative science, and applied ethics to develop a practical understanding of how moral decision-making works and is essential in this time when there can seem to be an increasing moral vacuum in leadership.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas Kappes ◽  
Jay Joseph Van Bavel

From moral philosophy to programming driverless cars, scholars have long been interested in how to shape moral decision-making. We examine how framing can impact moral judgments either by shaping which emotional reactions are evoked in a situation (antecedent-focused) or by changing how people respond to their emotional reactions (response-focused). In three experiments, we manipulated the framing of a moral decision-making task before participants judged a series of moral dilemmas. Participants encouraged to go “with their first” response beforehand favored emotion-driven judgments on high-conflict moral dilemmas. In contrast, participants who were instructed to give a “thoughtful” response beforehand or who did not receive instructions on how to approach the dilemmas favored reason-driven judgments. There was no difference in response-focused control during moral judgements. Process-dissociation confirmed that people instructed to go with their first response had stronger emotion-driven intuitions than other conditions. Our results suggest that task framing can alter moral intuitions.


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