scholarly journals Central Bank Communications and the General Public

2018 ◽  
Vol 108 ◽  
pp. 578-583 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Haldane ◽  
Michael McMahon
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
General Public ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
The Public ◽  
Central Bank Communication ◽  
Bank Of England ◽  
The Revolution

Despite the recent revolution in central bank communication, it is unclear the general public have benefitted from these enhanced central bank communications. We first analyze the growth of communication and some reasons that the public may have missed the revolution. We then discuss the desirability of greater communication with the public. The case for feasibility of such communication examines observational and experimental evidence following the recently adopted use of a layered communication at the Bank of England. We find that, while more research is needed, there are compelling reasons for central banks to continue trying to target communication at the public.

scholarly journals Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy Predictability under Uncertain Economic Conditions

2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 5-32
Author(s):  
Jonne O. Lehtimäki ◽  
Marianne Palmu
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Policy Instrument ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
The Public ◽  
Central Bank Communication ◽  
Monetary Policy Transparency

Abstract Modern central banks increasingly value monetary policy transparency, and attempt to build credibility by communicating their decisions to the public. This paper studies whether the communication of central banks can be used to explain upcoming changes in their most important monetary policy instrument, the short-term refinancing rate, and whether the public can trust central bank communication during times of financial crisis. This is done by constructing an indicator to measure the predictability of monetary policy by calculating the median of the policy makers’ official comments. The performance of this indicator is studied with ordered probit methods. The results show that predictability was reached relatively well at central bank level during the financial crisis despite the rapid growth of economic uncertainty, and that communication can be a useful tool for central banks during uncertain times.

scholarly journals Análisis de la integración y dependencia de las políticas monetarias de la Unión Europea

2013 ◽  
pp. 47
Author(s):  
María del Carmen González Velasco ◽  
Roque Brinckmann
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Uncovered Interest Parity ◽  
European Central ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Bank Of England ◽  
Interest Parity

En este artículo se efectúa un análisis de la integración y dependencia de las políticas monetarias de la Unión Europea y, en concreto, de las políticas monetarias de la Unión Económica yMonetaria y de la zona no euro para el periodo comprendido entre Enero de 1999 y Septiembre 2009. Se aplica la metodología de la cointegración de Engle y Granger (1987) y de Johansen(1988) para contrastar la hipótesis de la paridad de tipos de interés no cubierta y se llega a la conclusión de que ambas políticas están cointegradas porque mantienen una relación de equilibrio a largo plazo. También se deduce una dependencia de la política del Banco de Inglaterra de la política del Banco Central Europeo, lo que confirma la importancia y el liderazgo de la Unión Económica y Monetaria.<br /><br />This study is to investigate the long-run relationship and dependence between the UME´s monetary policy and non-euro zone´s monetary policy for the period from January 4, 1999 to September 30, 2009. We use cointegration methodology to test the Uncovered Interest Parity Hypothesis and the results indicate a long-run cointegration and empirical evidence testifies a leader-follower pattern between the two central banks. According to this pattern, the Bank of England does follow the European Central Bank.

Private Networks and the Public Interest

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon James Bytheway ◽  
Mark Metzler
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Public Interest ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Capital City ◽  
World City ◽  
Capitalist System ◽  
The Public ◽  
The World ◽  
Hierarchical Nature

This concluding chapter examines the hierarchical nature of the markets in capital, which constitute the peak markets of the world capitalist system. It also reconsiders the central-bank connections between Tokyo, London, and New York as vital inner links within a larger set of world-city geographies. In a century of violent changes, these “capital city” geographies have been remarkably persistent. The great Tokyo bubble of 1989–90 was the greatest yet of its kind, but it now seems relatively modest next to the New York and London bubbles of 2007–8. Each of these “capital city” bubbles showed a mix of classic and novel features. Each also revealed, again, the centrality of the central banks themselves.

Putting the Program into Action, 1920–1928

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon James Bytheway ◽  
Mark Metzler
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Ad Hoc ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Financial Globalization ◽  
International Network ◽  
Bank Of England ◽  
International Monetary Policy ◽  
Central Bankers

This chapter details how Montagu Norman of the Bank of England, in partnership with Benjamin Strong of the FRBNY, turned ad hoc wartime cooperation into a formal agenda. The paired ideas that national central banks should be autonomous, and that they should cooperate with each other, were first spelled out in a private “manifesto” that Norman circulated among fellow central bankers in 1921. Central bank cooperation was internationally recognized as a principle at the 1922 Genoa Conference, and it was also put into practice. Cooperation between central banks began primarily as informational cooperation, which includes not only the sharing of information but also the sharing and propagation of worldviews. An international network of central banks thus developed out of the war, as did the world's first truly coordinated system of international monetary policy. In these and other ways, financial globalization surged to a new level in the 1920s.

Narrative Practices in Central Bank Communication

2019 ◽  
pp. 341-352
Author(s):  
Zeynep Karas
Keyword(s):  
Literature Review ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Policy Decision ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Human Communication ◽  
Macroprudential Policy ◽  
Central Bank Communication

A fundamental and effective way of human communication is narratives. It is believed that narratives help central banks communicate with their stakeholders easily. Central banks have started to make use of narratives in their communications for accountability concerns and policy decision announcements. Central banks should make use of narratives to meet the public's and the markets' expectations. To improve the quality and effectiveness of central banks' communications, a focused and coherent narrative would be an important asset to help make the ambiguous and technical nature of macroprudential policy more precise and meaningful. This paper aims to show that to what extent narratives have been being used in communication activities by central banks. In this scope, a literature review will be made to identify narrative uses by central banks and a connection will be tried to be established between narratives and central bank communication to show how significant roles narratives can play in central bank communication.

Monetary Policy Committees and Central Bank Communication

2020 ◽  
pp. 19-44
Author(s):  
Nicole Baerg
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Size Composition ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Empirical Literature ◽  
Inflation Expectations ◽  
Policy Changes ◽  
Central Bank Communication ◽  
Central Bank Transparency ◽  
Key Policy

This chapter starts by tracing trends in central bank transparency. It reports key policy changes by some of the world’s most important central banks: the FOMC, the European Central Bank, the Bank of England, and the Bank of Japan. The second section reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on central bank design, paying close attention to the role of committee size, composition, and decision-making protocol, and classifies central banks around the world according to these features. The third section outlines the aim of central bank communications: to broadcast news and to reduce noise. The author argues that while previous literature has examined both committee design and central bank communications, it has done so in isolation. By putting these two topics together, the chapter argues that we can better understand, first, how different types of committees may be better at communicating and, second, how communication affects households’ inflation expectations and inflation.

Writing Clearly: The ECB’s Monetary Policy Communication

2013 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 50-72 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aleš Bulíř ◽  
Martin Čihák ◽  
Kateřina Š Šmídkova
Keyword(s):  
Risk Assessment ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Press Releases ◽  
Central Bank Communication ◽  
Additional Information ◽  
European Central ◽  
Policy Communication ◽  
Better Than

Abstract The article presents a novel methodology for measuring the clarity of central bank communication using content analysis, illustrating the methodology with the case of the European Central Bank (ECB). The analysis identifies the ECB’s written communication as clear in about 85-95% of instances, which is comparable with, or better than, similar results available for other central banks. We also find that the additional information on risk to inflation and especially projection risk assessment contained in the ECB’s Monthly Bulletins helps to improve communication clarity compared to ECB’s press releases. In contrast, the bulletin’s communication on monetary developments has a negative, albeit small, impact on clarity.

scholarly journals Análisis de la integración y dependencia de las políticas monetarias de la Unión Europea

2013 ◽  
pp. 47
Author(s):  
María del Carmen González Velasco ◽  
Roque Brinckmann
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Uncovered Interest Parity ◽  
European Central ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Bank Of England ◽  
Interest Parity

En este artículo se efectúa un análisis de la integración y dependencia de las políticas monetarias de la Unión Europea y, en concreto, de las políticas monetarias de la Unión Económica yMonetaria y de la zona no euro para el periodo comprendido entre Enero de 1999 y Septiembre 2009. Se aplica la metodología de la cointegración de Engle y Granger (1987) y de Johansen(1988) para contrastar la hipótesis de la paridad de tipos de interés no cubierta y se llega a la conclusión de que ambas políticas están cointegradas porque mantienen una relación de equilibrio a largo plazo. También se deduce una dependencia de la política del Banco de Inglaterra de la política del Banco Central Europeo, lo que confirma la importancia y el liderazgo de la Unión Económica y Monetaria.<br /><br />This study is to investigate the long-run relationship and dependence between the UME´s monetary policy and non-euro zone´s monetary policy for the period from January 4, 1999 to September 30, 2009. We use cointegration methodology to test the Uncovered Interest Parity Hypothesis and the results indicate a long-run cointegration and empirical evidence testifies a leader-follower pattern between the two central banks. According to this pattern, the Bank of England does follow the European Central Bank.

Central Bank Communication

2019 ◽  
pp. 230-262
Author(s):  
Jakob de Haan ◽  
Jan-Egbert Sturm
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Interest Rates ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Inflation Expectations ◽  
Short Term ◽  
The Public ◽  
Central Bank Communication ◽  
Forward Guidance ◽  
The World ◽  
Future Direction

Many central banks in the world nowadays regard their external communication as an important tool to achieve their goals. This chapter provides an overview of the different ways in which central banks inform the public about the future direction of monetary policy and how successful they have been in recent years. Forward guidance is either part of a monetary policy strategy in which an explicit inflation target is targeted or is part of a strategy that attempts to circumvent the effective lower bound regarding the nominal interest rate. In both cases, forward guidance attempts to influence longer-term interest rates and inflation expectations through the expected future short-term interest rates.

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