The Moral Conception of “Emotion Noumenon”—On Li Zehou’s Thought of “Emotion Noumenon”

2020 ◽  
Vol 09 (02) ◽  
pp. 50-57
Author(s):  
小茜 铁
Keyword(s):  
Moral Conception

Introduction

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Freeman
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Economic Systems ◽  
Classical Liberalism ◽  
Market Socialism ◽  
Central Values ◽  
Moral Conception ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Principles Of Justice

This introductory chapter begins with a discussion of liberalism, which is best understood as an expansive, philosophical notion. Liberalism is a collection of political, social, and economic doctrines and institutions that encompasses classical liberalism, left liberalism, liberal market socialism, and certain central values. This chapter then introduces subsequent chapters, which are divided into three parts. Part I, “Liberalism, Libertarianism, and Economic Justice,” clarifies the distinction between classical liberalism and the high liberal tradition and their relation to capitalism, and then argues that libertarianism is not a liberal view. Part II, “Distributive Justice and the Difference Principle,” analyzes and applies John Rawls’s principles of justice to economic systems and private law. Part III, “Liberal Institutions and Distributive Justice,” focuses on the crucial role of liberal institutions and procedures in determinations of distributive justice and addresses why the first principles of a moral conception of justice should presuppose general facts in their justification.

Does Humanity Share a Common Moral Faculty?

2010 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-53 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keyword(s):  
Normative Theory ◽  
Moral Truth ◽  
Moral Sentiment ◽  
Philosophical Argument ◽  
Ethical Naturalism ◽  
History Of Ethics ◽  
Moral Conception ◽  
History Of ◽  
Moral Faculty

AbstractThe history of ethics contains many moral faculty theories, which usually are sorted by their metaphysics. The usual suspects include moral rationalism (Richard Price, Kant), moral sentiment theory (Hutcheson, Hume, Smith) and the varieties of ethical naturalism. Moral faculty theories differ importantly upon yet another dimension, on how widely it is distributed. Some, the Platonic elitists (Plato, J.S. Mill, R.M. Hare), suppose that moral truth can be discerned only by philosophical argument. Hence, they ascribe a revisionary task to normative theory, that of correcting nonphilosophers' moral errors. Others, the communalists (Aquinas, Hume, W.D. Ross), hold that the moral faculty is universally distributed. Hence, they hold that normative theory's task is not to revise, but rather to discern and explain the shared moral conception that we all apply in our ordinary moral lives. I here offer arguments to support commonalism.

Rawls' Theory of Justice

Dialogue ◽  
1974 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 139-159 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. M. Macleod
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Viable Alternative ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Moral Conception ◽  
Modern Moral Philosophy ◽  
Utilitarian Theory ◽  
The Way

Rawls' main aim in A Theory of Justice is to provide a viable alternative to the utilitarianism which has dominated so much modern moral philosophy. Although philosophers have long recognised the difficulties in the way of acceptance of a utilitarian account of judgments of justice, they have often responded by seeking merely to reformulate the principle of utility. Other philosophers, with a juster appreciation of the seriousness of these difficulties, have been prepared to reject utilitarianism in all its guises, but they have failed (in Rawl's opinion) “to construct a workable and systematic moral conception to oppose it”. What is needed, beyond a powerful reaffirmation of the familiar objections to utilitarian accounts of justice, is the careful elaboration of a radically non-utilitarian theory of justice. It is this need which Rawls sets out to meet in his book.

The Moral Conception of Nature in Indian Philosophy

Ethics ◽  
1936 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 223 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. M. Datta
Keyword(s):  
Indian Philosophy ◽  
Moral Conception

Ethics, Personal Identity, and Ideals of the Person

1982 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 229-246 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Scheffler
Keyword(s):  
Personal Identity ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Side Constraints ◽  
Regulative Principle ◽  
Moral Conception ◽  
Moral Philosophers

It is not uncommon for contemporary moral philosophers to appeal, in support or in criticism of one moral theory or another, to supposed features of or facts about persons. Rawls, for example, maintains that ‘utilitarianism does not take seriously the distinction between persons,’ and that since ‘the correct regulative principle for anything depends on the nature of that thing,’ we should not expect utilitarianism to be the correct regulative scheme for human beings. Nozick, in a similar spirit, suggests that the deontological restrictions he calls ‘side constraints’ are desirable components of a moral conception because, without them, a moral scheme is unable to ‘sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that … [each individual] is a separate person,’ unable to take account of the fact that, with respect to each individual, ‘his is the only life he has.’ And Williams, to cite still another example, suggests that utilitarianism is a defective moral theory because ‘it cannot coherently describe the relations between a man's projects and his actions.'

On the moral conception of the Enlightenment

1993 ◽  
Vol 27 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 391-402 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giovanni Gullace
Keyword(s):  
The Enlightenment ◽  
Moral Conception

Constructivism, Facts, and Moral Justification

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Freeman
Keyword(s):  
First Principles ◽  
Practical Reasoning ◽  
Fundamental Principle ◽  
Moral Justification ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
Human Good ◽  
Moral Conception ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
Sense Of Justice ◽  
Psychological Capacities

This chapter responds to G. A. Cohen’s criticisms of Rawls’s reliance upon social and psychological facts about humans to argue for his principles of justice. Cohen contends that such facts are irrelevant to the justification of fundamental principles of justice and that Rawls’s difference principle is not a fundamental principle but a principle of regulation to accommodate injustice due to human selfishness. I respond to these criticisms by discussing three reasons why the first principles of a moral conception of justice should be “fact-sensitive”: First, a conception of justice should be compatible with our moral and psychological capacities. Second, a conception of justice should provide principles for practical reasoning and supply a public basis for justification across conceptions of the good. Third, a moral conception should not frustrate but affirm the pursuit of the human good, including the exercise and development of our moral capacities and sense of justice.

Vampire Religion

2002 ◽  
Vol 79 (1) ◽  
pp. 100-121 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Herbert
Keyword(s):  
The Novel ◽  
Religious Motivation ◽  
Middle Classes ◽  
Christian Religion ◽  
The Future ◽  
Moral Conception ◽  
William Robertson ◽  
European Civilization ◽  
The Way

THIS ESSAY HIGHLIGHTS AND SEEKS to trace the conflicted logic of the strong religious motivation exemplified in Bram Stoker's Dracula (1897). First it analyzes the tensions in Stoker's polemic against the primitive other of religion/ superstition, setting that polemic off against those of two late-Victorian anthropologists, William Robertson Smith and James Frazer. For these theorists, the basis of the superstitious mentality lies in the principle of taboo, according to which the divine and the unclean are one and the same and divinity manifests itself in contagious physical transmission. Dracula on the level of its overt homiletic rhetoric presents the campaign waged against vampirism by Van Helsing and his friends as an allegory of the suppression of wicked archaic superstition in the name of enlightened, spiritualized Christian religion. Yet the novel is itself an emanation of a deeply superstitious mentality: it powerfully endorses a moral conception (a familiar one to the Victorian middle classes) based on the perils of the contagious transmission of uncleanness, it portrays the disgustingly filthy Count as an object of religious veneration, and it ascribes frightening magical agency to religious instruments like crucifixes and communion wafers. Along the way it proclaims an ideology of the violent purification of society from the influence of enemies of religion, particularly unclean women and, implicitly, Jews - the ideology against which Frazer particularly warns as posing a lethal danger for the future of European civilization. The argument of Dracula about the relations of religion and superstition is irresolvably contradictory. At the same time, Stoker carries out an exposéé (or offers a case in point) of the perversely reflexive relations obtaining between vampirism and Christian religion in the age of the dominance of evangelicalism. He echoes earlier writers, notably Feuerbach, in diagnosing a strain of vampiric sadism at the heart of Christian piety. In its theme of erotically charged blood-drinking, Dracula evokes in particular the dominant motifs of the Wesleyan hymnal, and thus bears witness to the pathology that energizes Victorian spirituality.

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