Constructivism, Facts, and Moral Justification

Author(s):  
Samuel Freeman

This chapter responds to G. A. Cohen’s criticisms of Rawls’s reliance upon social and psychological facts about humans to argue for his principles of justice. Cohen contends that such facts are irrelevant to the justification of fundamental principles of justice and that Rawls’s difference principle is not a fundamental principle but a principle of regulation to accommodate injustice due to human selfishness. I respond to these criticisms by discussing three reasons why the first principles of a moral conception of justice should be “fact-sensitive”: First, a conception of justice should be compatible with our moral and psychological capacities. Second, a conception of justice should provide principles for practical reasoning and supply a public basis for justification across conceptions of the good. Third, a moral conception should not frustrate but affirm the pursuit of the human good, including the exercise and development of our moral capacities and sense of justice.

Author(s):  
Samuel Freeman

This introductory chapter begins with a discussion of liberalism, which is best understood as an expansive, philosophical notion. Liberalism is a collection of political, social, and economic doctrines and institutions that encompasses classical liberalism, left liberalism, liberal market socialism, and certain central values. This chapter then introduces subsequent chapters, which are divided into three parts. Part I, “Liberalism, Libertarianism, and Economic Justice,” clarifies the distinction between classical liberalism and the high liberal tradition and their relation to capitalism, and then argues that libertarianism is not a liberal view. Part II, “Distributive Justice and the Difference Principle,” analyzes and applies John Rawls’s principles of justice to economic systems and private law. Part III, “Liberal Institutions and Distributive Justice,” focuses on the crucial role of liberal institutions and procedures in determinations of distributive justice and addresses why the first principles of a moral conception of justice should presuppose general facts in their justification.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 53-73
Author(s):  
Sebastian Gałecki

Although the “frame problem” in philosophy has been raised in the context of the artificial intelligence, it is only an exemplification of broader problem. It seems that contemporary ethical debates are not so much about conclusions, decisions, norms, but rather about what we might call a “frame”. Metaethics has always been the bridge between purely ethical principles (“this is good and it should be done”, “this is wrong and it should be avoided”) and broader (ontological, epistemic, anthropological etc.) assumptions. One of the most interesting meta-ethical debates concerns the “frame problem”: whether the ethical frame is objective and self-evident, or is it objective but not self-evident? In classical philosophy, this problem takes the form of a debate on the first principles: nonprovable but necessary starting points for any practical reasoning. They constitute the invisible but essential frame of every moral judgment, decision and action. The role of philosophy is not only to expose these principles, but also to understand the nature of the moral frame.


Author(s):  
Wayan Resmini ◽  
Abdul Sakban

Pengadilan, oleh masyarakat tidak lagi dilihat sebagai lembaga penyelesaiain sengketa satu-satunya. Saat ini keberadaan lembaga pengadilan sudah terindikasi dengan berbagai kasus korupsi, kolusi, dan nepotisme, yang lebih dikenal dengan istilah KKN. Hal ini mengingat banyak produk keputusan pengadilan yang menyimpang dari asas-asas keadilan, cepat dan berbiaya murah. Dalam konteks inilah diperlukan model alternative penyelesaian sengketa pada masyararakat hukum adat yang lebih efisien, adil serta akomodatif guna menjaga kelesterian dan keberlanjutan kehidupan masyarakat hukum adat, yang lebih manusiawi dan berkeadilan. Tradisi penyelesaian sengketa pada masyarakat hukum adat didasarkan pada nilai filosofi kebersamaan (komunal), pengorbanan, nilai supernatural, dan keadilan. Dalam masyarakat hukum adat kepentingan bersama merupakan filosofi hidup yang meresap pada setiap anggota masyarakat adat. Pelaksanaan hasil mediasi yang sudah disakralkan dihadapan tokoh adat, apalagi sudah dilakukan dengan suatu upacara adat (ritual), maka kesepakatan tersebut harus dilaksanakan dengan segera, bila salah satu pihak mengingkari atau tidak bersedia melaksanakan hasil mediasi, maka pihak tersebut akan mendapatkan sanksi adat dari masyarakat hukum adat. Sanksi adat diberikan atas pertimbangan, bahwa pengingkaran kesepakatan damai merupakan bentuk pengingkaran terhadap nilai dan rasa keadilan masyarakat hukum adat. Penjatuhan sanksi adat dijatuhkan oleh tokoh adat yang bertindak sebagai penjaga nilai keadilan dan warisan leluhur dalam masyarakat hukum adat.The court, by the community is no longer seen as the only dispute resolution agency. At present the existence of a court institution has been indicated by various cases of corruption, collusion and nepotism, which are better known as KKN. This is because there are many products of court decisions that deviate from the principles of justice, fast and low cost. In this context an alternative model of dispute resolution is needed in the customary law community that is more efficient, fair and accommodative in order to maintain the sustainability and sustainability of the life of indigenous peoples, who are more humane and just. The tradition of dispute resolution in indigenous peoples is based on the values of communal philosophy, sacrifice, supernatural values, and justice. In indigenous peoples the common interest is a life philosophy that permeates every member of the indigenous community. The implementation of the mediation results that have been sacred before traditional leaders, moreover has been done with a traditional ceremony (ritual), then the agreement must be carried out immediately, if one party denies or is unwilling to carry out the mediation results, the party will get customary sanctions from the community customary law. Customary sanctions are given for consideration, that the denial of a peace agreement is a form of denial of the values and sense of justice of indigenous peoples. The imposition of customary sanctions is imposed by traditional leaders who act as guardians of the value of justice and ancestral heritage in indigenous and tribal peoples. 


Author(s):  
Robert A. Schultz

As we saw from the last two chapters, the ethical IT professional is embedded in contexts of management, organization, and society. Ethical behavior for the IT professional is, therefore, impacted by the ethics of people and institutions in his or her environment. The primary term for ethical institutions is justice.1 In the next three chapters, we will examine the justice of institutions impacting the IT professional. The framework used will be that provided by the works of John Rawls (1999, 2001). Rawls’ work is based on the idea of a social contract, that a justly ordered society is one to which individuals can freely decide to obligate themselves. But our decision will very likely be biased if we base it on our current situation. So Rawls’ major addition is to say that the decision must be made prior to being in society, without knowledge of what our position will be in society, and it will be a decision we will be obligated to stick to and expect others to make and stick to as well. The basic principles for society chosen in this position (which Rawls calls the original position) will be the Principles of Justice. According to Rawls (1999, 2001), there will be two: 1. The First Principle of Justice or Greatest Equal Liberty: Society is to be arranged so that all members have the greatest equal liberty possible for all, including fair equality of opportunity. Each individual has basic liberties which are not to be compromised or traded off for other benefits. Besides the basic freedoms such as freedom of speech, assembly, religion, and so on, it includes equality of opportunity. Thus society’s rules are not biased against anyone in it and allow all to pursue their interests and realize their abilities. 2. The Second Principle of Justice or the Difference Principle: Economic inequalities in society are justified insofar as they make members of the least advantaged social class, better off than if there were no inequality. The social contract basis for this principle is straightforward: If you are entering a society with no knowledge of your specific place in that society, the Difference Principle guarantees that you will be no worse off than you need to be to keep the society functioning.


2013 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Freeman

AbstractJohn Rawls says: “The main problem of distributive justice is the choice of a social system.” Property-owning democracy is the social system that Rawls thought best realized the requirements of his principles of justice. This article discusses Rawls’s conception of property-owning democracy and how it is related to his difference principle. I explain why Rawls thought that welfare-state capitalism could not fulfill his principles: it is mainly because of the connection he perceived between capitalism and utilitarianism.


1980 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kai Nielsen

AbstractThis is an examination of some Left critiques of Rawls. Stress is put, not on his underlying moral methodology, including his contractarianism, though surely there is need for such a critique as well, but on an examination of his principles of justice, particularly his equal liberty principle and his difference principle. This is often thought to be the heart of his theory. It is argued that Rawls’ asociological and ahistorical approach and his ignoring of questions of power and of ideology and his lack of an adequate conceptualization of liberty lead to major distortions in his account. Both principles are shown to be problematic and the equal liberty principle is shown to be in conflict with the difference principle.


Author(s):  
Samsudin Samsudin

Judges' considerations often do not provide satisfaction and do not provide a sense of justice to the parties. The decision of the judge of the Religious High Court is considered the final place, although it can submit an appeal to the Supreme Court which is the highest institution in the area of ​​the religious court, so the researcher raises this title and formulates the problem that is the direction of the research. This study aims to find out how the judge's judgment and whether the judges of the Mataram High Court in determining the level of mut’ah and livelihood in the divorce case have fulfilled the principles of justice, usefulness, and legal certainty. The type of research used is qualitative research. Data collection techniques use study decisions, documentation, and interviews. In addition, the data obtained are informants' information, documentation, and are not numbers. Based on the results of the study, the results obtained are as follows: 1) The consideration of the judges of the Mataram High Court in determining mut’ah levels and iddah livelihoods on divorce cases is observing from work, income, wife who is not incoherent and also to the old wife accompany her husband in fostering a family. 2) whereas regarding the decision of the judges of the Mataram High Court in determining the level of mut’ah and livelihood of the iddah in divorce cases the principles of justice and legal usefulness has not yet been fulfilled, the judge is more focused on the principle of legal certainty and the fulfillment of rights and obligations. However, the amount determined is not in accordance with the sense of justice and certainly will not be fulfilled. In its decision, the judge saw the Law, Compilation of Islamic Law (KHI), Islamic Sharia (Al-Qur'an and Hadith), Perma Number 03 of 2017, and Circular of the Supreme Court of Republic of Indonesia Number 1 of 2017.


Author(s):  
Samuel Freeman

This chapter defends a moral contractarian approach to the problem of justice towards persons with severe and profound cognitive disabilities. Critics such as Martha Nussbaum argue that contract views are incapable of justifying the rights of the severely cognitively disabled since they do not have the capacities for practical reasoning, social cooperation, and productive activity. But the moral contract method is not restricted to arguing only for the rights and claims of normally functioning individuals. It can be generalized and regarded as an impartial moral perspective from which to justify duties of justice owed to all persons. Trustees or guardians for the severely cognitively disabled can then act as representatives of their interests, and impartially agree to principles of justice specifically designed to address their special needs and basic capabilities. The approach is Rawlsian, though the arguments go beyond Rawls’ view and draw on Scanlon’s contractualism and other considerations.


2012 ◽  
Vol 42 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 303-334 ◽  
Author(s):  
Louis-Philippe Hodgson

John Rawls famously holds that the basic structure is the ‘primary subject of justice.’ By this, he means that his two principles of justice apply only to a society's major political and social institutions, including chiefly the constitution, the economic and legal systems, and (more contentiously) the family structure. This thesis — call it thebasic structure restriction— entails that the celebrated difference principle has a narrower scope than one might have expected. It doesn't apply directly to choices that individuals make within the basic structure. Individuals can live up to the demands of justice simply by obeying whatever rules are set by, and by doing what is necessary to sustain, the basic structure; they needn't attempt to benefit maximally the worst off through their personal choices. Nor does the principle apply to interactions taking place beyond the basic structure, on the international stage. International actors can live up to the demands of justice by observing a comparatively modest ‘duty of assistance’ toward severely destitute societies; they needn't make it their aim to benefit maximally the world's poorest individuals.


2006 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 206-233 ◽  
Author(s):  
Loren E. Lomasky

While citizens of developed countries enjoy lives of unmatched affluence, over a billion people struggle to subsist on incomes of less than $1/day. Can't we conclude that their poverty constitutes a glaring injustice? The answer almost certainly is yes—but not because some countries are rich, nor because of inadequate levels of redistribution. Liberal political theory traditionally maintains that persons are rights-holders, and the primary duty owed them is noninterference. Corrupt and tyrannical governments flagrantly violate the liberty rights of their captive populations. External governments conspicuously fail to respect noninterference, however, when they erect barriers to trade between foreign nationals and their own citizens, subsidize domestic industries, prevent innocent movement across borders by would-be workers, and when they tender assistance to abusive states (such as foreign aid that lines the pockets of kleptocrats and enhances their power). The theory advanced here is similar to that of Rawls in rejecting an international difference principle, but unlike Rawls it advances an account of international justice as continuous with domestic principles of justice.


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