scholarly journals Το γενικό μέρος των βασικών δικαιωμάτων μέσα από τη θεωρία του Τhomas Scanlon

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Θωμάς Σταυρόπουλος
Keyword(s):  
Thomas Scanlon

Αν υιοθετήσουμε τη θέση ότι το δίκαιο και δη τα βασικά δικαιώματα θα πρέπει να συνδέονται με την ηθική, τότε η θεωρία του Thomas Scanlon φαίνεται να παρουσιάζει ιδιαίτερο ενδιαφέρον. Στόχος της διατριβής είναι να διερευνηθεί αν είναι δυνατό να εξαχθούν από τη θεωρία του Scanlon χρήσιμα συμπεράσματα για την εγχώρια νομική επιστήμη. Το πρώτο κεφάλαιο επικεντρώνεται στη σχέση δικαίου και ηθικής και αναπτύσσεται μέσα από την αντιπαραβολή των θεωριών του νομικού φορμαλισμού και του νομικού ρεαλισμού, όπως λαμβάνει χώρα ιδίως στo περιβάλλον των Ηνωμένων Πολιτειών Αμερικής. Αναδεικνύονται οι λόγοι, για τους οποίους τα βασικά δικαιώματα θα πρέπει να γίνονται κατανοητά και ως ηθικές επιταγές. Στο δεύτερο κεφάλαιο γίνεται αναφορά στη θεωρία του Thomas Scanlon, κυρίως στον κοντρακτουαλισμό του, αλλά και σε επιμέρους θέσεις του που παρουσιάζουν ενδιαφέρον για το ερευνητικό αντικείμενο της διατριβής. Στο τρίτο κεφάλαιο αναδεικνύονται οι θέσεις του Scanlon που αφορούν στο γενικό μέρος των βασικών δικαιωμάτων και αντιπαραβάλλονται με κριτική διάθεση προς αυτές της εγχώριας θεωρίας. Στο τέταρτο κεφάλαιο συνοψίζονται τα συμπεράσματα της διατριβής και υποστηρίζεται η θέση ότι η θεωρία του Scanlon μπορεί να κομίσει χρήσιμα στοιχεία για την κατανόηση του γενικού μέρους των βασικών δικαιωμάτων.

Symposium on Amartya Sen's philosophy: 4 Reply

2001 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-66 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amaryta Sen
Keyword(s):  
Martha Nussbaum ◽  
Related Literature ◽  
Philip Pettit ◽  
Elizabeth Anderson ◽  
Thomas Scanlon

I am most grateful to Elizabeth Anderson (2000), Philip Pettit (2000) and Thomas Scanlon (2000) for making such insightful and penetrating comments on my work and the related literature. I have reason enough to be happy, having been powerfully defended in some respects and engagingly challenged in others. I must also take this opportunity of thanking Martha Nussbaum, for not only chairing the session in which these papers were presented followed by a splendid discussion (which she led), but also for taking the initiative, in the first place, to arrange the session.

scholarly journals Contractualism vs. contractarianism

2011 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 27-44
Author(s):  
Aleksandar Dobrijevic
Keyword(s):  
Social Contract ◽  
Contemporary Theory ◽  
Political Dimension ◽  
David Gauthier ◽  
Thomas Scanlon

The author insists that, within contemporary theory, common division of social contract tradition on ?Hobbesian? and ?Kantian? line of thought is entirely justified. Analyzing the theories of David Gauthier and Thomas Scanlon, he also indicates the important difference between ?moral? and ?political? dimension of the idea of social contract. Finally, he rejects recent attempts of identifying contractualism with constructivism.

Actual Agreement Contractualism

Dialogue ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 54 (3) ◽  
pp. 519-539 ◽  
Author(s):  
DAVID BORMAN
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
Social Cooperation ◽  
Actual Agreement ◽  
The Way ◽  
Thomas Scanlon

In this paper, I defend a metaethical position described as ‘actual agreement contractualism’: the view that norms arise from actual attempts to arrive at legitimate terms for social cooperation among all those affected. I distinguish the actual agreement approach from hypothetical approaches to contractualism, and defend the former against objections from Thomas Scanlon, in particular. The attractiveness of a focus on actual agreements, I argue, is seen in the way it resolves problems internal to the hypothetical approach as well as in its implications for the purpose of moral theory and for the obligation to justify our actions to others.

scholarly journals A Unified Moral Terrain?

2017 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-39
Author(s):  
Stephen Everson
Keyword(s):  
Proper Part ◽  
Moral Landscape ◽  
Moral Constraint ◽  
Thomas Scanlon

In his book What We Owe to Each Other, Thomas Scanlon proposes what he calls a ‘contractualist’ explanation of what he describes as ‘a central part of the territory called morality’, i.e. our duties to other rational creatures. If Scanlon is right, the fact that another creature is rational generates a particular kind of moral constraint on how we may act towards it: one should ‘treat rational creatures only in ways that would be allowed by principles that they could not reasonably reject insofar as they too were seeking principles of mutual governance which other rational creatures could not reasonably reject’. This is then used to explain what makes actions right, at least within his central moral area. Such actions will be right because they are permitted by principles that cannot reasonably be rejected. In this essay, I question both whether Scanlon succeeds in identifying a proper part of the moral terrain as a subject for his account and also what, if any, is the contractualist content of that account. I argue that he equivocates between two distinct and incompatible conceptions of the justifiability of principles. According to the first, justifiability is a relation between principles and people, whilst according to the second, for a principle to be justifiable is for it to be justified. For his explanation of morality to have any contractualist force, justifiability needs to be understood as a relation, but for that explanation to have any plausibility, justifiability must be understood nonrelationally. Because of this, the account is unstable and fails to describe any part of the moral landscape.

scholarly journals Responsabilidade Moral Razoável

2014 ◽  
Vol 59 (1) ◽  
pp. 38
Author(s):  
Denis Coitinho Silveira
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Thomas Scanlon

O principal objetivo desse artigo é responder a questão sobre o que constitui a responsabilidade moral. Tentaremos demonstrar que a responsabilidade moral tem duas características centrais, a saber, exigências internalistas e autoridade social. Para tal propósito, faremos uso de estratégias compatibilistas. O próximo passo será tentar descrever a concepção de responsabilidade substancial de Thomas Scanlon e, no final desse artigo, estipularemos um argumento sobre um tipo de responsabilidade moral razoável que pode estar contida na teoria da justiça como equidade de John Rawls.

scholarly journals ¿Ética sin metafísica? El contractualismo moral de Thomas Scanlon

2016 ◽  
Vol 52 (59) ◽  
pp. 43
Author(s):  
Faviola Rivera Castro
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Thomas Scanlon

<p class='p1'>En Lo que nos debemos unos a otros. ¿Qué significa ser moral?, Thomas Scanlon ofrece una postura sobre el contenido y la base normativa de “la moralidad de lo correcto y lo incorrecto”, la cual trata, de acuerdo con él, de lo que nos debemos unos a otros. Mi objetivo es examinar las razones por las cuales Scanlon sostiene que su postura no es metafísica sino práctica. Rastreo el significado de “práctico” en algunos escritos de John Rawls y de Kant, y sostengo que, en realidad, la metafísica de la moral no es necesariamente incompatible con el carácter práctico de esta última. En mi opinión, el rechazo de la metafísica por parte de Scanlon está motivado por su concepción no categórica de la moral.</p>

Why be Moral in Business? A Rawlsian Approach to Moral Motivation

2002 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-72 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard H. Toenjes
Keyword(s):  
Business Ethics ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Moral Motivation ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
Moral Justification ◽  
Business World ◽  
Business Interests ◽  
The Core ◽  
Business Person ◽  
Thomas Scanlon

Abstract:This article puts forth the thesis that the contractualist account of moral justification affords a powerful reply in business contexts to the question why a business person should put ethics above immediate business interests. A brief survey of traditional theories of business ethics and their approaches to moral motivation is presented. These approaches are criticized. A contractualist conception of ethics in the business world is developed, based on the work of John Rawls and Thomas Scanlon. The desire to justify our choices in terms that others can be reasonably expected to accept, or at least in terms that others cannot reasonably reject, is identified and differentiated from other accounts of motivation. It is this desire that constitutes the core motive to be moral in business on the contractualist conception. Implications of this contractualist conception for the theory and practice of business ethics are then discussed.

Aggregation and Two Moral Methods

Utilitas ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
F. M. KAMM
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Pairwise Comparison ◽  
Thomas Scanlon

I begin by reconsidering the arguments of John Taurek and Elizabeth Anscombe on whether the number of people we can help counts morally. I then consider arguments that numbers should count given by F. M. Kamm and Thomas Scanlon, and criticism of them by Michael Otsuka. I examine how different conceptions of the moral method known as pairwise comparison are at work in these different arguments and what the ideas of balancing and tie-breaking signify for decision-making in various types of cases. I conclude by considering how another moral method that I call virtual divisibility functions and what it helps reveal about an argument by Otsuka against those who do not think numbers count.

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