Some problems in teaching appreciation of art (one type) in New Zealand (mixed) high schools

It is becoming abundantly evident that art instruction in New Zealand high schools must concern itself with something more than the practice of drawing and its allied crafts if pictorial Art is to play its proper part in the life of the community. The fact that a very large number of so-called "well-educated" people disclaim any real knowledge of pictorial art shows how ineffective our system of art education has been in the past.

Some problems in teaching appreciation of art (one type) in New Zealand (mixed) high schools

It is becoming abundantly evident that art instruction in New Zealand high schools must concern itself with something more than the practice of drawing and its allied crafts if pictorial Art is to play its proper part in the life of the community. The fact that a very large number of so-called "well-educated" people disclaim any real knowledge of pictorial art shows how ineffective our system of art education has been in the past.

A General Theory of Location Based on the Notion of Entire Location

It would be a good thing to have at our disposal a general theory of location that is neutral with respect to (i.e. that does not rule out or entail) (i) the view that some objects have more than one exact location, (ii) the view that some objects are located without having an exact location, and (iii) the view that some objects are “spanners”—where a spanner is an object exactly located at a region that has proper parts but which has no proper part exactly located at a proper part of the region. As far as I know, no theory of location that can be found in the literature has this feature. I put forward a new theory that does—or so I argue. The theory takes as its sole locational primitive the notion of being entirely located at.

Locke, Simplicity, and Extension

This paper aims to clarify Locke’s distinction between simple and complex ideas. I argue that Locke accepts what I call the “compositional criterion of simplicity.” According to this criterion, an idea is simple just in case it does not have another idea as a proper part. This criterion is prima facie inconsistent with Locke’s view that there are simple ideas of extension. This objection was presented to Locke by his French translator, Pierre Coste, on behalf of Jean Barbeyrac. Locke responded to Barbeyrac’s objection, but his response, along with a passage from Chapter XV of Book II of the Essay, “Of Duration and Expansion, considered together,” has been taken to show that he did not accept the compositional criterion. I examine these passages and argue that they are not in tension with but rather affirm that criterion.

On Good and Bad Reasons for Endorsing Mereological Hylemorphism

Hylemorphism is the view that an object’s essence is—at least in part—determined by what is called the object’s form. According to the mereological version of hylemorphism, an object’s form is also a proper part of the object alongside its physical parts. Whether there are good reasons for this assumption depends not least on the background assumptions about forms and their role in the composition of objects. In the case of contemporary mereological hylemorphists, this background is provided by what I call vertical hylemorphism. I shall first argue that, as long as vertical hylemorphism is accepted, there are no good reasons for endorsing mereologism. Then, I shall point out that there is an attractive, alternative version of hylemorphism—horizontal hylemorphism—which provides good reasons to endorse mereologism.

We are all a little bit Cerberus: towards bioethical applicability of animalism

I consider the applicability of the animalism in the framework of bioethical discussions — in particular related to situations in which a person is the cause of an event that is outside of her intentions, for example, infection with a dangerous disease. Animal or living organism are more adequate concept for posing this problem than the ‘Lockean’, psychological, personality. However, the conceptualization of the animal, proposed by the most famous animalist Eric Olson, turns out to be inappropriate for the bioethical formulation of bioethical problems. I suppose that Olson’s logic striving to cleanse the animal of everything that can be recognized as not proper part of it to some extent repeats the logic of constructing a transcendental subject. At the same time, the complexity of some bioethical problems emerges due to the impossibility of relying on the concept of a transcendental subject. The figure of Cerberus, a two-headed animal, and a single agent, allows to develop an alternative interpretation of the animal (living organism), more comprehensively characterizing who is involved in bioethical collisions. The article outlines the image of a single but distributed agent. As an example of such biological (animalistic), but also cognitive (psychological) distribution, I suggest the animal’s possession of the inner and skin microbiome.

Konceptualizowanie uczuć jako specyfika opisu przeżyć w tekstach uczniowskich

The aim of the article is to analyze the development of the description of experiences and the conceptualisation of feelings in the school essays. The author analyzes the proper part of the description of experiences prepared by primary school students; the interpretation consists of both treating the text as a product – the effect of using technology in the process of linguistic activity – as well as introducing the students’ textual abilities and skills. The analyzed texts include the authors’ own interpretations of their experiences, starting from the presentation of stimuli that triggered the given feelings, through describing the accompanying and emotional reactions, and ending with the description of the results derived from the experienced emotions. The essence of the description of experiences is the conceptualization of feelings, for the development of which students use three different schemas: simple time sequences, the contrast technique and the “kaleidoscope technique”.

Constitution and Dependence

Constitution is the relation that holds between an object and what it is made of: statues are constituted by the lumps of matter they coincide with; flags, one may think, are constituted by colored pieces of cloth; and perhaps human persons are constituted by biological organisms. Constitution is often thought to be a "dependence relation." In this paper, I argue that given some plausible theses about ontological dependence, most definitions of constitution don’t allow us to retain this popular doctrine. The best option for those who want to maintain that constitution is a dependence relation is to endorse a kind of mereological hylomorphism: constituted objects have their constituters as proper parts, along with a form, which is another proper part. The upshot is that constitution theorists who think of constitution as a dependence relation but are reluctant to endorse mereological hylomorphism ought to give up one of their commitments.

Maximality, Function, and the Many

In the region where some cat sits, there are many very cat-like items that are proper parts of the cat (or otherwise mereologically overlap the cat), but which we are inclined to think are not themselves cats, e.g. all of Tibbles minus the tail. The question is, how can something be so cat-like without itself being a cat. Some have tried to answer this “Problem of the Many” (a problem that arises for many different kinds of things we regularly encounter, including desks, persons, rocks, and clouds) by relying on a mereological maximality principle, according to which, something cannot be a member of a kind K if it is a large proper part of, or otherwise greatly mereologically overlaps, a K. It has been shown, however, that a maximality constraint of this type, i.e. one that restricts mereological overlap, is open to strong objections. Inspired by the insights of, especially, Sutton and Madden, I develop a type of functional-maximality principle that avoids these objections (and has other merits), and thereby provides a better answer to the Problem of the Many.

Opting for the Best

The book concerns what is, perhaps, the least controversial normative principle concerning action: you ought to perform your best option—best, that is, in terms of whatever ultimately matters. The book sets aside the question of what ultimately matters so as to focus on the following questions. What are our options? Which options do we assess directly in terms of their own goodness and which do we assess in terms of the goodness of the more encompassing options of which they’re a proper part? What do we hold fixed when assessing how good an option is? Do we, for instance, hold fixed the agent’s present beliefs, desires, and intentions? And do we hold fixed the agent’s predictable future misbehavior? The book argues that addressing these sorts of questions is the key to solving certain puzzles concerning what we ought to do, including those involving supererogation, indeterminate outcomes, overdetermined outcomes, and predictable future misbehavior. One of the book’s more controversial theses is that we have obligations not only to voluntarily perform certain actions, but also to nonvoluntarily form certain reasons-responsive attitudes (e.g., desires, beliefs, and intentions). This is important because what effect an act will have on the world depends not only on which acts the agent will simultaneously and subsequently be performing but also on which attitudes she will simultaneously and subsequently be forming.