scholarly journals CEO DUALITY AND FIRM PERFORMANCE IN BRAZIL: EVIDENCE FROM 2008

2011 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcio Alves Amaral-Baptista ◽  
Marcelo Cabús Klotzle ◽  
Maria Angela Campelo de Melo

This research investigates the relationship between CEO duality and the performance of Brazilian firms in 2008. While CEO duality has been the dominant board leadership structure of US corporations, Brazilian firms typically separate the roles of CEO and chairperson. During 2008, some Brazilian firms such as Sadia S/A (a multinational food processing company) adopted a dual leadership structure in an attempt to respond to the global systemic crisis. Using agency and stewardship theory perspectives, we tested our hypotheses with data of Brazilian listed companies. The empirical results indicate that companies where the CEO and chairperson are the same person have significantly higher performance (ROE). We also found a positive association between CEO duality and all other firm performance measures (ROA, ROC, MTBV), although the results were not statistically significant for these.

2010 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 163-175 ◽  
Author(s):  
Afzalur Rashid

This study examines if the CEO duality influences firm performance in Bangladesh. It also examines the interaction of industries in influencing the relationship between CEO duality and firm performance. From an observation of 825 firm years the study uses a 2-stage least square regression (2SLS) analysis. The finding is that there is a negative (non-significant) relationship between CEO duality and firm performance. However, when the industry interaction terms (the role of industries as moderating variable) are added, the CEO duality and firm performance is found to vary across industries. The findings of this study suggest that the CEO duality and firm performance is contingent; no single leadership structure is universal; both the leadership structure has cost and benefits. It is beneficial in some situation supporting the stewardship theory while it is not in other situations supporting the agency theory. This study contributes to the literature on CEO duality and firm performance in the context of developing countries.


2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 617-629
Author(s):  
Ricky W. F. Pang ◽  
Abul F. M. Shamsuddin

We examine the effects of board leadership structure on the performance of Chinese firms listed on the Singapore Stock Exchange. Using a sample of 105 firms covering 2009 to 2011, we find that CEO duality positively affects firm performance that can largely be explained by stewardship theory. There is also support for contingency theory as the CEO duality-firm performance relationship depends on whether Chinese firms are incorporated in Singapore or otherwise. This study offers insights for corporate regulators to soften their stance on the monitoring clauses concerning CEO duality. Major stakeholders in Singapore-based Chinese firms may need to bring some balance to board independence, board size, and the nomination process, particularly where CEO duality improves firm performance.


Author(s):  
Danuse Bement ◽  
Ryan Krause

Boards of directors are governing bodies that reside at the apex of the modern corporation. Boards monitor the behavior of firm management, provide managers access to knowledge, expertise, and external networks, and serve as advisors and sounding boards for the CEO. Board attributes such as board size and independence, director demographics, and firm ownership have all been studied as antecedents of effective board functioning and, ultimately, firm performance. Steady progress has been made toward understanding how boards influence firm outcomes, but several key questions about board leadership structure remain unresolved. Research on board leadership structure encompasses the study of board chairs, lead independent directors, and board committees. Board chair research indicates that when held by competent individuals, this key leadership position has the potential to contribute to efficient board functioning and firm performance. Researchers have found conflicting evidence regarding CEO duality, the practice of the CEO also serving as the board chair. The effect of this phenomenon—once ubiquitous among U.S. boards—ranges widely based on circumstances such as board independence, CEO power, and/or environmental conditions. Progressively, however, potential negative consequences of CEO duality proposed by agency theory appear to be counterbalanced by other governance mechanisms and regulatory changes. A popular mechanism for a compromise between the benefits of CEO duality and independent monitoring is to establish the role of a lead independent director. Although research on this role is in its early stage, results suggest that when implemented properly, the lead independent director can aid board monitoring without adding confusion to a unified chain of command. Board oversight committees, another key board leadership mechanism, improve directors’ access to information, enhance decision-making quality by allowing directors to focus on specialized topics outside of board meetings, and increase the speed of response to critical matters. Future research on the governance roles of boards, leadership configurations, and board committees is likely to explore theories beyond agency and resource dependence, as well as rely less on collecting archival data and more on finding creative ways to access rarely examined board interactions, such as board and committee meetings and executive sessions.


Author(s):  
Saseela Balagobei ◽  
K.G.A. Udayakumara

Corporate Governance as a mechanism helps to align management's goals with those of the stakeholders that are to increase firm performance. The aim of this study is to identify the relationship between board leadership structure and firm performance of listed companies in Sri Lanka during the period of 2014-2016. The data was collected from the secondary data sources and board leadership structure is measured by CEO duality. The sample of this study consists of 100 firms listed in Colombo Stock Exchange based on market capitalization. For the purpose of data analysis, Pearson’s correlation analysis and independent sample t-test were used to examine the hypotheses of this study. The findings reveal that board leadership structure is positively correlated with firm performance in terms of Tobin’s Q and there is no significant difference in firm performance between CEO duality firms & non-duality firms.


2007 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 111-126 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Braun ◽  
Anurag Sharma

Using the competing agency theoretic and stewardship theory perspectives, we empirically examine the relationship between CEO duality and firm performance in family-controlled public firms (FCPFs). We find that duality by itself does not influence firm performance in FCPFs. However, our results show that the relationship between duality and performance is contingent on the family's ownership stake in the firm. In nondual firms, performance is inversely related to family ownership level. Dual FCPFs do not exhibit any changes in performance dependent on family ownership levels. Our findings reveal, in short, that when family ownership is low, the separation of CEO and board chair roles is beneficial in terms of shareholder returns. Having different persons occupy the CEO and board chair positions is a useful governance control as the risk of family entrenchment increases.


2008 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 58-65 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chia-Wei Chen ◽  
Jang Shee Barry Lin ◽  
Bingsheng Yi

Whether dual CEO leadership structure is better for corporations is one of the most hotly debated issues in corporate finance. This paper uses a recent data to re-examine the relationship between CEO duality and firm performance, controlling for other important variables such as firm characteristics, ownership structure, CEO compensation, and agency costs. We find a recent trend of increased number of firms converting from dual to non-dual CEO structure. However, our empirical results do not show a significant relationship between CEO duality and firm performance nor improvement in firm performance after change in leadership structure. We find evidence of endogeneity, and we attribute the insignificance of the relationship between CEO duality and firm performance to the possibility that CEO duality is endogenously and optimally determined given firm characteristic and ownership structure.


2015 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 162-176 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qaiser Rafique Yasser ◽  
Abdullah Al Mamun

Purpose – This paper aims to present an analysis of the association between five categories of concentrated ownership and firm performance in Pakistan. The connection between high ownership concentration and firm performance has attracted much attention, especially in emerging market, yet yielded many inconsistent empirical results. Design/methodology/approach – Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE)-100 Indexed companies listed in KSE from 2007 to 2011 were selected as the sample, and correlation coefficient and regression model were used to inspect the relationship between ownership concentration degree and corporate performance. Findings – It was found that there is no significant association with ownership concentration and accounting-based performance, market-based performance measures and economic profit, in general. Originality/value – The first demonstration that the shareholding proportion of the single largest shareholder is the only variable having positive association with market-based performance measures.


2019 ◽  
Vol 61 (2) ◽  
pp. 345-358 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hichem Khlif ◽  
Khaled Samaha

Purpose This paper aims to examine the relationship between board independence and internal control quality (ICQ) in Egypt and investigate whether CEO duality moderates such an association. Design/methodology/approach A survey among external auditors is used to assess ICQ among Egyptian listed firms over the period of 2007-2010. Findings Findings show that board independence does not have a significant positive effect on ICQ. However, when testing for the moderating effect of CEO duality on such a relationship, the authors document that the association becomes positive and significant under combined board leadership structure, whereas it is negative under separated leadership structure. Originality/value The authors’ results demonstrate that CEO duality plays a governance role in weak legal environment like Egypt by strengthening board independence role in increasing ICQ.


2011 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Afzalur Rashid

This study examines if the CEO duality influence the firm economic performance in Bangladesh and the moderating effects of board composition in the form of outside independent directors. While doing so, it examines the relationship between CEO duality and firm performance during the pre appointment of outside independent directors and post appointment of outside independent directors (the role of other corporate governance mechanism as moderating variable). The finding is that there is there is a negative (non-significant) relationship between CEO duality and firm performance before appointment of outside independent directors in the board. However, independent leadership structure and firm performance is found to be positively related following the acquisition of resource (outside independent directors in the board) supporting the ’resource dependence theory’. The findings of this study partially support the ’agency theory’ and ’resource dependence theory’ but do not support the stewardship theory. This study contributes to the literature on CEO duality in the context of less a developed country.


2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (02) ◽  
pp. 2072-2180
Author(s):  
Dai Long Khuc ◽  
Thi Thu Bui ◽  
Quynh Mai Ha

The study was conducted to investigate the relationship between diversification on Board and firm performance. The investigation has been performed using panel data procedure for a sample of 204 Vietnamese listed companies in two different groups: Large cap and Mid cap, listed in HOSE and HNX during the period of five years from 2015 to 2019. The study uses three performance measures (including return on equity, return on asset, Tobin’s Q) as dependent variable. The independent variables for measurement of diversification on Board are the number of females and the diversification for Supervisory Board are the number of females only. Other independent variables are average age of Board member, CEO duality and the number of independent directors. The results indicated that firm performance have positive relationship with nationality diversity on Board and gender diversity on Supervisory Board. CEO duality shows a significant result of negative effect on firm performance.


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