scholarly journals Incorrect Responses in First-Order False-Belief Tests: A Hybrid-Logical Formalization

2020 ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Torben Braüner
Keyword(s):  
False Belief ◽  
First Order ◽  
Logical Formalization

Training Preschoolers on First-Order False Belief Understanding: Transfer on Advanced ToM Skills and Metamemory

2014 ◽  
pp. n/a-n/a ◽  
Author(s):  
Serena Lecce ◽  
Federica Bianco ◽  
Patrizia Demicheli ◽  
Elena Cavallini
Keyword(s):  
False Belief ◽  
First Order ◽  
False Belief Understanding

Complex language, complex thought?

2016 ◽  
Vol 33 ◽  
pp. 28-40
Author(s):  
Suzanne T.M. Bogaerds-Hazenberg ◽  
Petra Hendriks
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Second Order ◽  
False Belief ◽  
Production Task ◽  
False Belief Task ◽  
First Order ◽  
First Order Theory ◽  
Complex Thought

Abstract It has been argued (e.g., by De Villiers and colleagues) that the acquisition of sentence embedding is necessary for the development of first-order Theory of Mind (ToM): the ability to attribute beliefs to others. This raises the question whether the acquisition of double embedded sentences is related to, and perhaps even necessary for, the development of second-order ToM: the ability to attribute beliefs about beliefs to others. This study tested 55 children (aged 7-10) on their ToM understanding in a false-belief task and on their elicited production of sentence embeddings. We found that second-order ToM passers produced mainly double embeddings, whereas first-order ToM passers produced mainly single embeddings. Furthermore, a better performance on second-order ToM predicted a higher rate of double embeddings and a lower rate of single embeddings in the production task. We conclude that children’s ability to produce double embeddings is related to their development of second-order ToM.

Towards the Systematization of the Japanese Maritime Traffic Law

1997 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 130-136
Author(s):  
Hiroyuki Matsumoto ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Predicate Logic ◽  
Social Engineering ◽  
Public Law ◽  
Engineering System ◽  
Legal Knowledge ◽  
First Order ◽  
Maritime Traffic ◽  
Traffic Law ◽  
Logical Formalization ◽  
Laws And Regulations

The existing laws and regulations function as a social engineering system in the vertically-structured society. However it is difficult for nonprofessionals to understand the legal knowledge which has, abstract expressions for provisions, the hierarchy structures of legal systems, the richness of legal text, the deficiency of laws, and so on. In this paper, I discuss, through a jurimetrics approach, the possibility of the systematization of legal knowledge (maritime traffic laws and regulations in Japan; a kind of public law) which is complicated in its structures and nature. Also, I propose, for the purpose of legal norm sentences analysis, the model of legal thoughts and the method of logical formalization using first-order predicate logic.

scholarly journals Pragmatics in the False-Belief Task: Let the Robot Ask the Question!

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean Baratgin ◽  
Marion Dubois-Sage ◽  
Baptiste Jacquet ◽  
Jean-Louis Stilgenbauer ◽  
Frank Jamet
Keyword(s):  
Mental Representations ◽  
Human Condition ◽  
False Belief ◽  
Typically Developing ◽  
False Belief Task ◽  
Typically Developing Children ◽  
First Order ◽  
Initial Task ◽  
Cognitive Knowledge

The poor performances of typically developing children younger than 4 in the first-order false-belief task “Maxi and the chocolate” is analyzed from the perspective of conversational pragmatics. An ambiguous question asked by an adult experimenter (perceived as a teacher) can receive different interpretations based on a search for relevance, by which children according to their age attribute different intentions to the questioner, within the limits of their own meta-cognitive knowledge. The adult experimenter tells the child the following story of object-transfer: “Maxi puts his chocolate into the green cupboard before going out to play. In his absence, his mother moves the chocolate from the green cupboard to the blue one.” The child must then predict where Maxi will pick up the chocolate when he returns. To the child, the question from an adult (a knowledgeable person) may seem surprising and can be understood as a question of his own knowledge of the world, rather than on Maxi's mental representations. In our study, without any modification of the initial task, we disambiguate the context of the question by (1) replacing the adult experimenter with a humanoid robot presented as “ignorant” and “slow” but trying to learn and (2) placing the child in the role of a “mentor” (the knowledgeable person). Sixty-two typical children of 3 years-old completed the first-order false belief task “Maxi and the chocolate,” either with a human or with a robot. Results revealed a significantly higher success rate in the robot condition than in the human condition. Thus, young children seem to fail because of the pragmatic difficulty of the first-order task, which causes a difference of interpretation between the young child and the experimenter.

scholarly journals Worse Theory of Mind in Only-Children Compared to Children With Siblings and Its Intervention

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhuo Zhang ◽  
Haoxue Yu ◽  
Muyun Long ◽  
Hui Li
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Second Order ◽  
False Belief ◽  
Control Group ◽  
Only Children ◽  
First Order ◽  
False Belief Tasks ◽  
Children First ◽  
Experimental Group

The purpose of this study was to explore theory of mind (ToM) differences in children with different birth orders (only-children, first-born children, and second-born children), and further explore the effect of cognitive verb training for only-children’s ToM. Adopting the paradigm of false belief, Study 1 was conducted in which a sample of 120 children aged 3–6, including first-born children, second-born children (siblings aged 1–13 years), and only-children were tested. The results showed that (1) children aged 3–6 had significantly higher scores on first-order false-belief than second-order false-belief. (2) Controlling for age, the only-children scored significantly lower than the first-born children. In Study 2, 28 only-children aged 4–5 (13 in the experimental group and 15 in the control group) who initially failed in false-belief tasks were trained with the cognitive verb animations. Significant post-training improvements were observed for only-children who received training of animations embedded with cognitive verb. Those findings indicated that ToM of only-children was significantly worse than first-born children of two-child families, and linguistic training could facilitate ToM of only-children whose ToM were at a disadvantage.

Dual systems for all: Higher-order, role-based relational reasoning as a uniquely derived feature of human cognition

2019 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel J. Povinelli ◽  
Gabrielle C. Glorioso ◽  
Shannon L. Kuznar ◽  
Mateja Pavlic
Keyword(s):  
Temporal Reasoning ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Important Case ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Relational Reasoning ◽  
Dual Systems ◽  
First Order ◽  
Reasoning System ◽  
Role Based

Abstract Hoerl and McCormack demonstrate that although animals possess a sophisticated temporal updating system, there is no evidence that they also possess a temporal reasoning system. This important case study is directly related to the broader claim that although animals are manifestly capable of first-order (perceptually-based) relational reasoning, they lack the capacity for higher-order, role-based relational reasoning. We argue this distinction applies to all domains of cognition.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document